Sec. 4-1. Definition of Relevant Evidence

Definition of Relevant Evidence

‘‘Relevant evidence’’ means evidence having

any tendency to make the existence of any fact

that is material to the determination of the pro-

ceeding more probable or less probable than it

would be without the evidence.

COMMENTARY

Section 4-1 embodies the two separate components of relevant evidence recognized at common law: (1) probative value;

and (2) materiality. State v. Jeffrey, 220 Conn. 698, 709, 601

A.2d 993 (1991); State v. Dabkowski, 199 Conn. 193, 206,

506 A.2d 118 (1986).

Section 4-1 incorporates the requirement of probative value

by providing that the proffered evidence must tend ‘‘to make

the existence of any fact . . . more probable or less probable

than it would be without the evidence.’’ See, e.g., State v.

Prioleau, 235 Conn. 274, 305, 664 A.2d 793 (1995); State v.

Briggs, 179 Conn. 328, 332, 426 A.2d 298 (1979), cert. denied,

447 U.S. 912, 100 S. Ct. 3000, 64 L. Ed. 2d 862 (1980).

Section 4-1’s ‘‘more probable or less probable than it would be

without the evidence’’ standard of probative worth is consistent

with Connecticut law. See, e.g., State v. Rinaldi, 220 Conn.

345, 353, 599 A.2d 1 (1991) (‘‘[t]o be relevant, the evidence

need not exclude all other possibilities; it is sufficient if it tends

to support the conclusion, even to a slight degree’’ (emphasis

added)); State v. Miller, 202 Conn. 463, 482, 522 A.2d 249

(1987) (‘‘[e]vidence is not inadmissible because it is not conclu-

sive; it is admissible if it has a tendency to support a fact

relevant to the issues if only in a slight degree’’ (emphasis

added)). Thus, it is not necessary that the evidence, by itself,

conclusively establish the fact for which it is offered or render

the fact more probable than not.

Section 4-1 expressly requires materiality as a condition to

relevancy in providing that the factual proposition for which

the evidence is offered must be ‘‘material to the determination

of the proceeding . . . .’’ See State v. Marra, 222 Conn

s, it is not necessary that the evidence, by itself,

conclusively establish the fact for which it is offered or render

the fact more probable than not.

Section 4-1 expressly requires materiality as a condition to

relevancy in providing that the factual proposition for which

the evidence is offered must be ‘‘material to the determination

of the proceeding . . . .’’ See State v. Marra, 222 Conn. 506,

521, 610 A.2d 1113 (1992); State v. Corchado, 188 Conn.

653, 668, 453 A.2d 427 (1982). The materiality of evidence

turns upon what is at issue in the case, which generally will

be determined by the pleadings and the applicable substantive

law. See Williams Ford, Inc. v. Hartford Courant Co., 232

Conn. 559, 570, 657 A.2d 212 (1995).