Sec. 2-1. Judicial Notice of Adjudicative Facts

(a) Scope of section. This section governs only

judicial notice of adjudicative facts.

(b) Taking of judicial notice. A court may, but

is not required to, take notice of matters of fact,

in accordance with subsection (c).

(c) Kinds of facts. A judicially noticed fact must

be one not subject to reasonable dispute in that

it is either (1) within the knowledge of people gen­

erally in the ordinary course of human experience,

or (2) generally accepted as true and capable of

ready and unquestionable demonstration.

(d) Time of taking judicial notice. Judicial

notice may be taken at any stage of the proceeding.

COMMENTARY

(a) Scope of section.

Section 2-1 addresses the principle of judicial notice, which

relieves a party from producing formal evidence to prove a

fact. E.g., Beardsley v. Irving, 81 Conn. 489, 491, 71 A. 580

(1909); Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Napert-Boyer Partnership, 40 Conn. App. 434, 441, 671 A.2d 1303 (1996). Section

2-1 deals only with judicial notice of ‘‘adjudicative’’ facts. Adju­

dicative facts are the facts of a particular case or those facts

that relate to the activities or events giving rise to the particular

controversy. See Moore v. Moore, 173 Conn. 120, 122, 376

A.2d 1085 (1977); K. Davis, ‘‘Judicial Notice,’’ 55 Colum. L.

Rev. 945, 952 (1955).

This section does not deal with judicial notice of ‘‘legislative’’

facts, i.e., facts that do not necessarily concern the parties in

a particular case but that courts consider in determining the

constitutionality or interpretation of statutes or issues of public

policy upon which the application of a common-law rule

depends. See Moore v. Moore, supra, 173 Conn. 122; K.

Davis, supra, 55 Colum. L. Rev. 952. The Code leaves judicial

notice of legislative facts to common law.

(b) Taking of judicial notice.

Subsection (b) expresses the common-law view that

‘‘[c]ourts are not bound to take judicial notice of matters of

fact.’’ DeLuca v. Park Commissioners, 94 Conn. 7, 10, 107

A. 611 (1919).

a common-law rule

depends. See Moore v. Moore, supra, 173 Conn. 122; K.

Davis, supra, 55 Colum. L. Rev. 952. The Code leaves judicial

notice of legislative facts to common law.

(b) Taking of judicial notice.

Subsection (b) expresses the common-law view that

‘‘[c]ourts are not bound to take judicial notice of matters of

fact.’’ DeLuca v. Park Commissioners, 94 Conn. 7, 10, 107

A. 611 (1919).

(c) Kinds of facts.

Subsection (c) is consistent with common-law principles of

judicial notice. See, e.g., West Hartford v. Freedom of Informa­

tion Commission, 218 Conn. 256, 264, 588 A.2d 1368 (1991);

State v. Tomanelli, 153 Conn. 365, 369, 216 A.2d 625 (1966).

Both the fact that raw pork must be cooked thoroughly to

kill parasites; see Silverman v. Swift & Co., 141 Conn. 450,

458, 107 A.2d 277 (1954); and the fact that the normal period

of human gestation is nine months; Melanson v. Rogers, 38

Conn. Supp. 484, 490–91, 451 A.2d 825 (1982); constitute

examples of facts subject to judicial notice under category

(1). Examples of category (2) facts include: scientific tests

or principles; State v. Tomanelli, supra, 153 Conn. 370–71;

geographical data; e.g., Nesko Corp. v. Fontaine, 19 Conn.

Supp. 160, 162, 110 A.2d 631 (1954); historical facts; Gannon

v. Gannon, 130 Conn. 449, 452, 35 A.2d 204 (1943); and

times and dates. E.g., Patterson v. Dempsey, 152 Conn. 431,

435, 207 A.2d 739 (1965).

Within category (2), the court may take judicial notice of the

existence, content and legal effect of a court file, or of a specific

entry in a court file if that specific entry is brought to the

attention of the court, subject to the provisions of Section 2-

2. Judicial notice of a court file or a specific entry in a court

file does not establish the truth of any fact stated in that court

file. The rules governing hearsay and its exceptions determine

the admissibility of court records for the truth of their content.

See Fox v. Schaeffer, 131 Conn. 439, 447, 41 A.2d 46 (1944);

see also O’Connor v

the court, subject to the provisions of Section 2-

2. Judicial notice of a court file or a specific entry in a court

file does not establish the truth of any fact stated in that court

file. The rules governing hearsay and its exceptions determine

the admissibility of court records for the truth of their content.

See Fox v. Schaeffer, 131 Conn. 439, 447, 41 A.2d 46 (1944);

see also O’Connor v. Larocque, 302 Conn. 562, 568 n.6, 31

A.3d 1 (2011).

Although a judicially noticed fact is one not subject to reason-

able dispute, the trier of fact in a criminal case is not required

to accept the fact as conclusive. See State v. Tomanelli, supra,

153 Conn. 369; see also Fed. R. Evid. 201 (f). Other parties

may offer evidence in disproof of a fact judicially noticed in a

criminal case. See State v. Tomanelli, supra, 369. In a civil

case, the jury must accept the noticed fact as conclusive. See

Fed. R. Evid. 201 (f). The effect of this rule is to reject dictum

to the contrary found in Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Napert-

Boyer Partnership, supra, 40 Conn. App. 441, and to bring

the rule into harmony with the Federal Rules of Evidence and

the Connecticut civil jury instructions.

(d) Time of taking judicial notice.

Subsection (d) adheres to common-law principles. Drabik

v. East Lyme, 234 Conn. 390, 398, 662 A.2d 118 (1995); State

v. Allen, 205 Conn. 370, 382, 533 A.2d 559 (1987). The Code

does not govern the taking of judicial notice on appeal.