Sec. 1-5. Remainder of Statements

(a) Contemporaneous introduction by pro­

ponent. When a statement is introduced by a

party, the court may, and upon request shall,

require the proponent at that time to introduce

any other part of the statement, whether or not

otherwise admissible, that the court determines,

considering the context of the first part of the state­

ment, ought in fairness to be considered contem­

poraneously with it.

(b) Introduction by another party. When a

statement is introduced by a party, another party

may introduce any other part of the statement,

whether or not otherwise admissible, that the court

determines, considering the context of the first

part of the statement, ought in fairness to be con­

sidered with it.

COMMENTARY

(a) Contemporaneous introduction by proponent.

Subsection (a) recognizes the principle of completeness.

Sometimes, one part of a statement may be so related to

another that, in fairness, both should be considered contemporaneously. Subsection (a) details the circumstances under

which a court may or shall require a proponent of one part of

a statement to contemporaneously introduce the other part.

See Clark v. Smith, 10 Conn. 1, 5 (1833); Ives v. Bartholomew,

9 Conn. 309, 312–13 (1832); see also Practice Book § 13-31

(a) (5) (depositions); cf. Walter v. Sperry, 86 Conn. 474, 480,

85 A. 739 (1912).

The basis for the rule is that matters taken out of context

can create misleading impressions or inaccuracies and that

waiting until later in the trial to clear them up can be ineffectual.

See, e.g., State v. Arthur S., 109 Conn. App. 135, 140–41, 950

A.2d 615, cert. denied, 289 Conn. 925, 958 A.2d 153 (2008).

‘‘Statement,’’ as used in this subsection, includes written,

recorded and oral statements. Because the other part of the

statement is introduced for the purpose of placing the first

part into context, the other part need not be independently

admissible. See State v. Tropiano, 158 Conn. 412, 420, 262

A.2d 147 (1969), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 949, 90 S. Ct. 1866,

26 L. Ed

, 958 A.2d 153 (2008).

‘‘Statement,’’ as used in this subsection, includes written,

recorded and oral statements. Because the other part of the

statement is introduced for the purpose of placing the first

part into context, the other part need not be independently

admissible. See State v. Tropiano, 158 Conn. 412, 420, 262

A.2d 147 (1969), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 949, 90 S. Ct. 1866,

26 L. Ed. 2d 288 (1970).

(b) Introduction by another party.

Unlike subsection (a), subsection (b) does not involve the

contemporaneous introduction of evidence. Rather, it recog­

nizes the right of a party to subsequently introduce another

part or the remainder of a statement previously introduced in

part by the opposing party under the conditions prescribed in

the rule. See State v. Paulino, 223 Conn. 461, 468–69, 613

A.2d 720 (1992); State v. Castonguay, 218 Conn. 486, 496–97,

590 A.2d 901 (1991); Rokus v. Bridgeport, 191 Conn. 62, 69,

463 A.2d 252 (1983); see also Practice Book § 13-31 (a)

(5) (depositions).

Although the cases upon which subsection (b) is based deal

only with the admissibility of oral conversations or statements,

the rule logically extends to written and recorded statements.

Thus, like subsection (a), subsection (b)’s use of the word

‘‘statement’’ includes oral, written and recorded statements. In

addition, because the other part of the statement is introduced

under subsection (b) for the purpose of putting the first part

into context, the other part need not be independently admissible. See State v. Paulino, supra, 223 Conn. 468–69; State v.

Castonguay, supra, 218 Conn. 496; cf. Starzec v. Kida, 183

Conn. 41, 47 n.6, 438 A.2d 1157 (1981).

Sec. 1-4