Case law

ZHENG v. AUSTIN

District Court, S.D. Indiana · Jan 12, 2023

Zheng has not met her burden of establishing that she is likely to succeed on the merits because she has not set forth any evidence supporting her claims, that she has not established that she is likely to suffer irreparable … Zheng "clear evidence of experience qualifying [her] for hire into several open(ing) positions." [Filing No. 104 at 23.] Mr. Glick and Ms. Vigil subjected Ms.

De Cola v. Starke County Council

District Court, N.D. Indiana · Apr 29, 2021

immunity. … The Indiana courts were clearly Mr.

Term. of the Parent-Child Rel. of: A.T., Minor Child, M.T., Father v. Indiana Dept. of Child Services

Indiana Court of Appeals · Dec 5, 2012

Father was evaluated by the Samaritan Center, but the facility lacked a qualified therapist to provide sex offender treatment. Father continued with in-home therapy but did not address the sex abuse issue. … In deference to the trial court’s unique position to assess the evidence, we will set aside the court’s judgment terminating a parent-child relationship only if it is clearly erroneous.

Allen v. Galipeau

District Court, N.D. Indiana · Apr 29, 2024

. § 1915A, to determine if the action is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. … She noted that one leg was clearly longer than the other. Allen told her that he felt a snap when he was injured and asked for an x-ray.

Troutman v. Liebel

District Court, N.D. Indiana · Oct 28, 2022

“Legal mail” is entitled to greater protection, but this a term of art referring only to mail to or from the inmate’s legal counsel that is clearly identified on the envelope. Kaufman v. … Filing a grievance qualifies as “protected activity” for purposes of a First Amendment claim. Gomez, 680 F.3d at 866. However, Mr. Troutman has not satisfied the second and third prongs.

In Re the Termination of the Parent-Child Rel. of El.S. and Et.S. (Minor Children) and M.S. (Mother) v. The Indiana Dept. of Child Services

Indiana Court of Appeals · Sep 12, 2013

The parent-child relationship between the children, El.S. and Et.S. and Mother is hereby terminated and all rights, powers, privileges, immunities, duties, and obligations, including the right … In sum, Mother has failed to establish that the trial court’s findings are either fatally incomplete or clearly erroneous. II.

Penni Williams v. John Mark Williams

Indiana Court of Appeals · May 31, 2013

Pursuant to Ind.Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision shall not be regarded as precedent or cited before any court except for the purpose of May 31 2013, 9:26 am establishing the defense of … court to order either or both parents to pay sums toward their child’s college education constitutes a reasonable manner in which to enforce the expectation that most families would encourage their qualified

American Family Mutual Insurance v. C.M.A. Mortgage, Inc.

682 F. Supp. 2d 879 · District Court, S.D. Indiana · Jan 12, 2010

Instead, Liberty Mutual relied on Metzler’s criminal conviction to conclusively establish that Metzler had acted intentionally. Id. at 902. … Accordingly, the Court found that, assuming Metzler qualified as an insured, Liberty Mutual was collaterally estoppel from challenging the judgment against him. Id. Liberty Mutual overstates its case.

Bouye v. State

699 N.E.2d 620 · Indiana Supreme Court · Jul 20, 1998

To establish a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel, a defendant must show both that his counsel’s performance was sufficiently deficient, and that prejudice resulted from that deficiency. Strickland v. … The defendant clearly challenged Witherspoon’s credibility by contending that the October 6 statement was made to conceal or minimize Witherspoon’s own involvement in the murders.

Ontorio Frye v. State of Indiana

Indiana Court of Appeals · Apr 16, 2014

The fact that Frye was injured as a result of his operation of his vehicle clearly indicates that he operated the vehicle in a manner that could have—and in fact did—endanger Frye. … Upon review, we conclude that Frye has failed to meet his burden of establishing that the speech in question qualified as protected political speech under Article I, Section 9 of the Indiana Constitution.

Anthony Wilson v. State of Indiana

Indiana Court of Appeals · Jun 24, 2013

“The fundamental error exception to the waiver rule is available only where the record reveals clearly blatant violations of basic and elementary principles of due process and the harm or potential for harm cannot be denied … “To qualify as fundamental error, an error must be so prejudicial to the rights of the defendant as to make a fair trial impossible.” Rowe v. State, 867 N.E.2d 262, 266 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007).

Kelly Robertson v. Elkhart Housing Authority

Indiana Court of Appeals · Nov 13, 2014

Employer is a public entity that was established under Ind. Code Ann. § 36-7-18 et seq. … We need consider only one of those elements, however, as the evidence clearly indicates this element was not met.

RUGGLES v. HAMILTON COUNTY

District Court, S.D. Indiana · Sep 17, 2025

follows: [A]n individual employed by an employer, except that the term 'employee' shall not include any person elected to public office in any State or political subdivision of any State by the qualified … When, however, the duties and responsibilities are not clearly defined by statute, "a factual analysis of the [individual's] actual job duties" is necessary.

Briggs v. Clinton County Bank & Trust Co. of Frankfort

452 N.E.2d 989 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Aug 9, 1983

However, to the extent that the court's order was "the culmination of a series of adverse actions of said Judge establishing a pattern which now clearly demonstrates the hostility, bias and prejudice of Judge Munro ..." … He also points out that the trial judge qualified on February 28, 1977, but took no action until March 29, 1977.

Akeem Carpenter v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.)

Indiana Court of Appeals · Aug 11, 2016

[19] The generally accepted procedure in answering a jury’s question on a matter of law is to reread all instructions in order to avoid emphasizing any particular point and not to qualify, modify, or … Indiana | Memorandum Decision 45A03-1510-CR-1746 | August 11, 2016 Page 12 of 17  weapon was ever recovered, that Davis described a man with blue pants as the one who shot Wu, and that Carpenter was clearly

Holtz v. Hilliard

1 F. Supp. 2d 887 · District Court, S.D. Indiana · Mar 23, 1998

The signature card very clearly explained the nature of the joint account. … Balser’s affidavit, based as it is upon his experience in the trust department of an Evansville bank, does not establish that he is qualified to opine on the business practices of national mutual fund organizations that manage

WATKINS

District Court, S.D. Indiana · Apr 24, 2026

Standard When screening a complaint, the Court must dismiss any portion that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim for relief, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune … Watkins, therefore, has not alleged facts to establish that his procedural due process rights have been violated in connection with being removed from a program or programs that could have resulted in extra credit time.

James E. Saylor v. State of Indiana

55 N.E.3d 354 · Indiana Court of Appeals · May 23, 2016

We review the post-conviction court’s legal conclusions de novo but accept its factual findings unless they are clearly erroneous. Id. at 746. … The petitioner must establish that the evidence as a whole leads unerringly and unmistakably to a decision opposite that reached by the post-conviction court. Smith v.

Antwoine Young v. State of Indiana

Indiana Court of Appeals · Dec 11, 2014

Accordingly, we accept the post-conviction court’s findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous, but we do not defer to the post-conviction court’s conclusions of law. Wilson v. State, 799 N.E.2d 51, 53 (Ind. … Matthew Lutheran Church was not a qualifying youth program center, the trial court (arguably) would not have permitted the State to amend its information again – “regardless of whether there was a ‘plethora’ of qualifying

Sonia Long v. City of Logansport, Building Commissioner

Indiana Court of Appeals · Feb 17, 2014

The sole possible disputed issue here is whether the building qualifies as an “unsafe building.” … As such, there are no genuine issues of material fact and the building qualifies as an “unsafe building” as a matter of law under the definitions of the Unsafe Building Law.