The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
SOUTH BEND DIVISION
ROBERT E. ALLEN, JR.,
Plaintiff,
v. Cause No. 3:23-CV-857-PPS-JEM
SANDRA ALLEN, BRANDON
WALTERS, and CENTERION HEALTH
LLC,
Defendants.
OPINION AND ORDER
Robert E. Allen, Jr., a prisoner without a lawyer, filed a complaint about events
that happened after he was attacked by other inmates at Westville Correctional Facility
in January 2023 and suffered injuries that required surgery. [DE 2.] I granted him leave
to proceed against Nurse Allen for being deliberately indifferent to his hip injury.
[DE 14 at 6.] But because he did not know the identities of the correctional officers who
were also involved, the Warden of Westville Correctional Facility was ordered to
provide information about their identities so that Allen could file an amended
complaint. Id.
The Warden satisfied his obligation. [DE 23.] And Allen has filed an amended
complaint, naming the previously unknown defendants. [DE 24.] I must now screen
that amended complaint as required by 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, to determine if the action is
frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks
monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. “A document filed
pro se is to be liberally construed, and a pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded,
must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.”
Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (quotation marks and citations omitted).
Allen alleges that on January 11, 2023, he was assaulted by multiple inmates on
P-2 South Hallway between 6:00 and 7:30 p.m. [DE 24 at 2.] He “hobbled” to the
officer’s station, trying to get Officer Deray Collins to help him. He reported that he had
been assaulted and asked Officer Collins to call a signal because he thought that he
broke his leg. Officer Collins called a signal, and Sergeant Brandon Walters responded.
At this point, Allen was on the floor by the officer’s station. He told Sergeant
Walters what had happened and explained that his upper leg was hurting, and he had
felt a snap. He reported that he was sure something was broken and asked for them to
get him medical attention. Walters continued to badger him as a nurse approached.
Walters sent the nurse away and told Allen he had to crawl to the stairwell and go
down the stairs where there was a wheelchair or he would leave Allen there, where he
would be at the mercy of the other inmates. Allen begged for assistance but was denied
help.
Allen reports that he crawled, very painfully, to the stairwell. Once he got there,
another officer helped drag him down the stairs to where the wheelchair was located.
Once he got there, he was taken to urgent care, where Nurse Allen told the officers to
put him up on the table. She gave him Naproxen for the pain and said that was all she
could do. She noted that one leg was clearly longer than the other. Allen told her that he
felt a snap when he was injured and asked for an x-ray. She told him that there were no
x-ray techs there at the time and he had to wait until one came the next day. He insisted
that his leg was broken and asked to go to the hospital. She repeated that he had to
wait.
Allen spent the night in the infirmary. When it came time to get x-rayed he was
told he had to get back in the wheelchair, despite the pain that he was in. At this point,
his leg was swollen and he was in extreme pain. Another inmate helped him into the
wheelchair, but when he got to x-ray, the x-ray tech told him to get up on the four-foot-
high table by himself. He explains that every move is an “excruciatingly painful
process.” [DE 24 at 3.] So, instead, an inmate held him up against a wall for the x-ray.
The pain almost made him pass out.
Under the Eighth Amendment, inmates are entitled to adequate medical
care. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976). To establish liability, a prisoner must
satisfy both an objective and subjective component by showing: (1) his medical need
was objectively serious; and (2) the defendant acted with deliberate indifference to that
medical need. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994). A medical need is “serious” if
it is one that a physician has diagnosed as mandating treatment, or one that is so
obvious that even a lay person would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor’s
attention. Greeno v. Daley, 414 F.3d 645, 653 (7th Cir. 2005). Deliberate indifference
means that the defendant “acted in an intentional or criminally reckless manner, i.e., the
defendant must have known that the plaintiff was at serious risk of being harmed and
decided not to do anything to prevent that harm from occurring even though he could
have easily done so.” Board v. Farnham, 394 F.3d 469, 478 (7th Cir. 2005). Based on the
initial complaint, I concluded that Allen plausibly alleged that the Dorm Officer and the
Sergeant at the scene were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs by
making him go down two flights of stairs on his own power despite his leg injury. But
upon reading the allegations in the amended complaint, I conclude that Officer Collins
acted reasonably in calling a signal to obtain assistance, but Sergeant Walters bears the
responsibility for making Allen go down two flights of stairs. Therefore, Allen may
proceed against Sergeant Walters, but Officer Collins will be dismissed.
Similarly, Allen may proceed against Nurse Allen, as before, for not calling an
ambulance right away from urgent care or otherwise seeking emergency treatment. For
a medical professional to be held liable for deliberate indifference to an inmate’s
medical needs, he or she must make a decision that represents “such a substantial
departure from accepted professional judgment, practice, or standards, as to
demonstrate that the person responsible actually did not base the decision on such a
judgment.” Jackson v. Kotter, 541 F.3d 688, 697 (7th Cir. 2008). In addition, ignoring an
inmate’s complaints of pain or delaying necessary treatment can amount to deliberate
indifference, particularly where the delay “exacerbates the plaintiff’s condition or
unnecessarily prolongs suffering.” Goodloe v. Sood, 947 F.3d 1026, 1031 (7th Cir. 2020)
(citations and internal quotation marks omitted). The claim against Nurse Allen
remains.
Allen reasserts previously dismissed claims against Warden John Galipeau. He
alleges Warden Galipeau should be held liable because of a “blind eye policy” and
asserts that his own situation is just one of many incidents of deliberate indifference to
medical needs because of unprofessional and untrained staff. [DE 24 at 3.] Warden
Galipeau cannot be held liable simply because he is in charge of the prison; he needs
some kind of personal involvement in the alleged constitutional violation. See Burks v.
Raemisch, 555 F.3d 592, 594 (7th Cir. 2009). If a constitutional violation is widespread, I
could assume at the pleading stage that the warden was aware of the problem and
could have taken action. See Sinn v. Lemmon, 911 F.3d 412, 423 (7th Cir. 2018)
(“Individual defendants . . . who are responsible for setting prison policy, can be held
liable for a constitutional violation if they are aware of a systemic lapse in enforcement
of a policy critical to ensuring inmate safety yet fail to enforce that policy.” (quotation
marks omitted)). But here, Allen provides no examples of other occurrences, besides his
own. One instance is not enough to find a widespread occurrence. Id. Warden Galipeau
will be dismissed.
Finally, Allen reasserts a claim against Centerion Health LLC, arguing that the
company has a policy that until he is x-rayed, he cannot go to the hospital. Because of
this policy, he alleges that he had to remain in pain in the infirmary overnight until an
x-ray tech was available the next day. Centerion is the company that provides medical
care at the prison. A private company performing a public function can be sued
under Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978), but only if the
“unconstitutional acts of their employees . . . were carried out pursuant to an official
custom or policy.” Grieveson v. Anderson, 538 F.3d 763, 771 (7th Cir. 2008) (citations
omitted). The purpose of this requirement is to “distinguish between the isolated
wrongdoing of one or a few rogue employees and other, more widespread practices.”
Howell v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc., 987 F.3d 647, 654 (7th Cir. 2021). To allege a
viable Monell policy claim, the plaintiff must identify an official policy that caused him
injury. Grieveson, 538 F.3d at 771. Alternatively, a plaintiff pursuing an official custom or
practice theory “must allege facts that permit the reasonable inference that the practice
is so widespread so as to constitute a governmental custom.” Gill v. City of Milwaukee,
850 F.3d 335, 344 (7th Cir. 2017). Here, Allen plausibly alleges that a policy of requiring
an x-ray before being sent to the hospital caused him injury. He may proceed against
Centerion Health LLC.
For these reasons, the Court:
(1) GRANTS Robert E. Allen, Jr., leave to proceed against Nurse Allen in her
individual capacity for compensatory and punitive damages for being deliberately
indifferent to his hip injury on or about January 14, 2023, in violation of the Eighth
Amendment;
(2) GRANTS Robert E. Allen, Jr., leave to proceed against Sergeant Brandon
Walters in his individual capacity for compensatory and punitive damages for being
deliberately indifferent to his hip injury on or about January 14, 2023, in violation of the
Eighth Amendment;
(3) GRANTS Robert E. Allen, Jr., leave to proceed against Centerion Health LLC
in its official capacity for compensatory and punitive damages for a policy of requiring
an x-ray before an inmate may go to the hospital, prolonging Allen’s suffering on or
about January 14, 2023, in violation of the Eighth Amendment;
(4) DISMISSES all other claims;
(5)DISMISSES Galipeau and Deray Collins;
(6)DIRECTS the Clerk, under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d), to request Waiver of Service
from (and if necessary, the United States Marshals Service to use any lawful means to
locate and serve process on) Brandon Walters at the Indiana Department of Correction,
with a copy of this order and the complaint (ECF 24);
(7) DIRECTS the Clerk, under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d), to request Waiver of Service
from (and if necessary, the United States Marshals Service to use any lawful means to
locate and serve process on) Centerion Health LLC at Centurion Health of Indiana,
LLC, with a copy of this order and the complaint (ECF 24);
(8) ORDERS the Indiana Department of Correction and Centurion Health of
Indiana, LLC, to provide the full name, date of birth, and last known home address of
any defendant who does not waive service if it has such information;
(9) ORDERS, under 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(g)(2), Brandon Walters and Centerion
Health LLC to respond, as provided for in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and
N.D. Ind. L.R. 10-1(b), only to the claims for which the plaintiff has been granted leave
to proceed in this screening order; and
(10) REMINDS Sandra Allen that under Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(3) her answer to
the amended complaint is due within 14 days.
SO ORDERED on April 29, 2024.
/s/ Philip P. Simon
PHILIP P. SIMON, JUDGE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT