WATKINS

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA

TERRE HAUTE DIVISION

GREG A. WATKINS, II, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) No. 2:25-cv-00544-JPH-MJD

)

TRICIA PRETORIUS Warden Putnamville )

Correctional Facility, et al., )

)

Defendants. )

ORDER SCREENING COMPLAINT, DENYING PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION,

AND DIRECTING FURTHER PROCEEDINGS

Plaintiff Greg Watkins, II, is a prisoner currently incarcerated at

Putnamville Correctional Facility ("Putnamville"). He filed this civil action under

42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging violations of his constitutional rights in connection

with his removal from a prison program that might have earned him additional

credit time. Because the plaintiff is a "prisoner," this Court must screen the

complaint before service on the defendants. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a), (c). The Court

also addresses and DENIES Mr. Watkins's motion for preliminary injunction.

Dkt. [17].

I. Screening Standard

When screening a complaint, the Court must dismiss any portion that is

frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim for relief, or seeks monetary relief

against a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b). To

determine whether the complaint states a claim, the Court applies the same

standard as when addressing a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 12(b)(6). See Schillinger v. Kiley, 954 F.3d 990, 993 (7th Cir. 2020).

Under that standard, a complaint must include "enough facts to state a claim to

relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570

(2007). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content

that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable

for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). The

Court construes pro se complaints liberally and holds them to a "less stringent

standard than pleadings drafted by lawyers." Cesal v. Moats, 851 F.3d 714, 720

(7th Cir. 2017).

II. The Complaint

The Court accepts Mr. Watkins's factual allegations as true at the pleading

stage but not his legal conclusions. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 ("we must take all

of the factual allegations in the complaint as true," but "we 'are not bound to

accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation'") (quoting

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555)). The complaint names as defendants (1) Warden

Tricia Pretorius; (2) Unit Custody Officer Griswald; (3) Sgt. D. Foster; and (4) Sgt.

M. Hilliard. Mr. Watkins is seeking compensatory and punitive damages,

injunctive relief, and declaratory relief.

The complaint alleges that on July 7, 2024, Officer Griswald was unhappy

that Mr. Watkins told her to speak more loudly when announcing it was "chow"

time. Dkt. 1 at 7. So, she called a "fake code A-117 over the radio," which led to

Mr. Watkins being restrained. Id. at 5. Thereafter, Sgt. Foster filed a false

disciplinary charge against Mr. Watkins based on this incident. During the

ensuing disciplinary hearing, Sgt. Hilliard did not allow him to have a witness

present to testify for him and then found him guilty of the charge in disregard of

the evidence. Mr. Watkins unsuccessfully appealed the disciplinary finding at

the facility and departmental levels. The finding resulted in Mr. Watkins "being

removed from the program" and losing a six-month time cut. Id.

On March 10, 2025, Mr. Watkins filed a habeas corpus action in this Court

seeking relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 in relation to this incident and disciplinary

finding. Watkins v. Pretorius et al., No. 2:25-cv-00123-JMS-MKK, dkt. 1.

Originally, Mr. Watkins only alleged he lost "privileges," lost his commissary

access for 15 days, and was removed from his dormitory. Id. After the

respondents in that case moved to dismiss the action, Mr. Watkins amended his

habeas petition to also allege that he was removed from the "Plus Program" at

Putnamville, which resulted in him potentially losing 163 days of extra credit

time. Id. at dkt. 13-1 at 12. On July 15, 2025, this Court dismissed the habeas

action because Mr. Watkins had not suffered "grievous loss" as a result of the

disciplinary finding. Id. at dkt. 18. Specifically, "the denial of a future opportunity

to earn an earlier release via educational or other programming does not meet

the custody requirement" for a federal habeas corpus action. Id. at dkt. 18 at 5.

In the habeas action, Mr. Watkins also filed a motion requesting that he

be allowed to file a simultaneous lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Id. at dkt. 16.

The Court denied this motion but noted Mr. Watkins was free to file such an

action if he wished, reminding him that a complaint in such an action would be

subject to screening under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. Id. at dkt. 18 at 6.

Mr. Watkins filed this action on October 30, 2025. Dkt. 1. On February

12, 2026, he also filed a motion for an "expedited" preliminary injunction,

requesting that the defendants be required "to reinstate Watkins Case Plan

Credit Time ('CPCT') time cut . . . ." Dkt. 17.

III. Discussion of Claims

Applying the screening standard to the factual allegations in the

complaint, certain claims are dismissed while other claims shall proceed as

submitted.

First, to the extent Mr. Watkins asserts that his procedural due process

rights were violated in connection with his disciplinary proceeding and his

removal from the PLUS or CPCT program(s), the Fourteenth Amendment

provides that no State shall "deprive any person of life, liberty, or property

without due process of law . . . ." But "[o]nly statutes or rules attaching

consequences to particular circumstances give prisoners liberty or property

interests." Wallace v. Robinson, 940 F.2d 243, 246 (7th Cir. 1991). In Wallace,

the Seventh Circuit concluded that inmates have no property or liberty interest

in prison employment. Id. at 248. The same is true for educational programming.

Id.; see also Antonelli v. Sheahan, 81 F.3d 1422, 1431 (7th Cir. 1996)

("[P]articipation in a rehabilitative program is a privilege that the Due Process

Clause does not guarantee."); Bradford, 211 N.E.3d at 39 ("[E]ducational time

credit for those incarcerated in the [IDOC] is not an entitlement or a guarantee.

Simply put, offenders have no constitutional right to receive credit time."). Mr.

Watkins, therefore, has not alleged facts to establish that his procedural due

process rights have been violated in connection with being removed from a

program or programs that could have resulted in extra credit time. See Epperson

v. Dep't of Corr., No. 3:24-CV-28 DRL-AZ, 2025 WL 1432754, at *1 (N.D. Ind.

May 16, 2025) (dismissing, at screening, prisoner's claim that his constitutional

rights were violated based on denial of opportunity to earn additional credit time

through educational programming). All procedural due process claims in this

case are dismissed.1

Second, "[i]ndividual liability under § 1983 . . . requires personal

involvement in the alleged constitutional deprivation." Colbert v. City of Chicago,

851 F.3d 649, 657 (7th Cir. 2017) (internal quotation omitted) (citing Wolf-Lillie

v. Sonquist, 699 F.2d 864, 869 (7th Cir. 1983) ("Section 1983 creates a cause of

action based on personal liability and predicated upon fault. An individual

cannot be held liable in a § 1983 action unless he caused or participated in an

alleged constitutional deprivation. . . . A causal connection, or an affirmative

link, between the misconduct complained of and the official sued is necessary.")).

Mr. Watkins's complaint does not allege any action on the part of Warden

Pretorius that, if true, would allow the Court to infer that she is personally

responsible for any injury Mr. Watkins might have suffered. In fact, there are no

allegations at all regarding what Warden Pretorius did or did not do. Even

1 Although not listed in the caption of Mr. Watkins's complaint, he alleges in the body

of the complaint that Unit Team Manager Mikels and Deborah Reasoner at the Indiana

Department of Correction main office also violated his due process rights by denying his

appeals from the disciplinary finding. The conclusion that Mr. Watkins has no due

process claim with respect to the disciplinary hearing and finding equally applies to

these persons.

"knowledge [alone] of a subordinate's misconduct is not enough for

liability." Vance v. Rumsfeld, 701 F.3d 193, 203 (7th Cir. 2012) (en banc). Indeed,

"inaction following receipt of a complaint about someone else's conduct is

[insufficient]." Estate of Miller by Chassie v. Marberry, 847 F. 3d 425, 428 (7th

Cir. 2017); see Burks v. Raemisch, 555 F.3d 592, 595 (7th Cir. 2009) ("[The

plaintiff's] view that everyone who knows about a prisoner's problem must pay

damages . . . can't be right."). Something more than generalized knowledge and

inaction is required for personal responsibility. All claims against Warden

Pretorius are dismissed.

Third, Mr. Watkins's allegation that Sgt. Foster filed a false disciplinary

charge against him does not by itself state a claim. "Issuing false and unjustified

disciplinary charges can amount to a violation of substantive due process if the

charges were in retaliation for the exercise of a constitutional right." Black v.

Lane, 22 F.3d 1395, 1402 (7th Cir. 1994). There are no allegations that Sgt.

Foster in particular was retaliating against Mr. Watkins. All claims against Sgt.

Foster are dismissed.

Mr. Watkins does allege, however, that Officer Griswald retaliated against

him by calling a false signal because he asked her to speak louder when she

announced that it was time to eat. "[O]therwise permissible conduct can become

impermissible when done for retaliatory reasons." Murphy v. Lane, 833 F.2d 106,

108–09 (7th Cir. 1987) (district court reversed for dismissing complaint

challenging otherwise permissible prison transfer because of sufficient allegation

of retaliation). A First Amendment retaliation claim shall proceed against Officer

Griswald.2

The claim against Officer Griswald is the only viable claim identified by the

Court. All other claims have been dismissed. If the plaintiff believes that

additional claims were alleged in the complaint, but not identified by the Court,

he shall have through May 22, 2026, in which to file a motion to reconsider the

screening order.

IV. Preliminary Injunction Motion

"A preliminary injunction is an extraordinary equitable remedy that is

available only when the movant shows clear need." Turnell v. Centimark Corp.,

796 F.3d 656, 661 (7th Cir. 2015). To obtain a preliminary injunction a plaintiff

first must show that: "(1) without this relief, [he] will suffer irreparable harm; (2)

traditional legal remedies would be inadequate; and (3) [he] has some likelihood

of prevailing on the merits of [his] claims." Speech First, Inc. v. Killen, 968 F.3d

628, 637 (7th Cir. 2020).

However, the Court will not address the three threshold elements because,

as a preliminary matter, a request for injunctive relief must necessarily be tied

to the specific claims on which the plaintiff is proceeding. See Benisek v. Lamone,

585 U.S. 155, 161 (2018) ("[T]he purpose of a preliminary injunction is merely to

2 Mr. Watkins's complaint also alleges that he sustained lasting nerve damage to his left

hand when he was seized as a result of Officer Griswald's call. However, he does not

separately allege that this amounted to cruel and unusual punishment (excessive force)

in violation of the Eighth Amendment, nor does the complaint clearly indicate whether

any named defendant directly caused this injury. The injury may become relevant,

however, in assessing damages for the retaliation claim if Mr. Watkins ultimately is

successful in litigating that claim.

preserve the relative positions of the parties until a trial on the merits can be

held." (cleaned up)); see also DeBeers Consol. Mines v. United States, 325 U.S.

212, 220 (1945) ("A preliminary injunction is always appropriate to grant

intermediate relief of the same character as that which may be granted finally.").

Mr. Watkins's case is proceeding on a retaliation claim against Officer

Griswald. There are no allegations that Officer Griswald, the sole remaining

defendant in this action, had any control over Mr. Watkins's PLUS or CPTC

placement, nor that she would have the ability to return him to such a

placement. See Maddox v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc., 528 F. App'x 669, 672

(7th Cir. 2013) ("An injunction, like any 'enforcement action,' may be entered

only against a litigant, that is, a party that has been served and is under the

jurisdiction of the district court") (quoting Lake Shore Asset Mgmt., Ltd. v.

Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n, 511 F.3d 762, 767 (7th Cir.

2007)). Accordingly, this Court lacks authority to grant the relief requested, and

the motion must be denied. Pacific Radiation Oncology, LLC v. Queen's Medical

Center, 810 F.3d 631, 636 (9th Cir. 2015) (holding that absent a nexus between

underlying claims and request for injunctive relief, district court has no authority

to grant injunctive relief) (citing DeBeers Consol. Mines, 325 U.S. at 220).

IV. Conclusion and Service of Process

The clerk is directed to terminate Tricia Pretorius, D. Foster, and M.

Hilliard as defendants on the docket.

Mr. Watkins's motion for preliminary injunction is DENIED. Dkt. [17].

The clerk is directed pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(c)(3) to issue process

to defendant Officer Griswald in the manner specified by Rule 4(d). Process shall

consist of the complaint filed on October 30, 2025, dkt. [1], applicable forms

(Notice of Lawsuit and Request for Waiver of Service of Summons and Waiver of

Service of Summons), and this Order.

The clerk is directed to serve the Indiana Department of Correction

employee electronically.

Nothing in this Order prohibits the filing of a proper motion pursuant to

Rule 12 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

SO ORDERED.

Date: 4/24/2026 S) ards Patrick banter

James Patrick Hanlon

United States District Judge

Southern District of Indiana

Distribution:

Electronic service to Indiana Department of Correction:

Unit Custody Officer Griswald

(At Putnamville Correctional Facility)

GREG A. WATKINS, II

296350

PUTNAMVILLE - CF

PUTNAMVILLE CORRECTIONAL FACILITY

Inmate Mail/Parcels

1946 West U.S. Hwy 40

Greencastle, IN 46135