The opinion
Pursuant to Ind.Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not be
regarded as precedent or cited before any
court except for the purpose of Dec 11 2014, 9:32 am
establishing the defense of res judicata,
collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT: ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:
STEPHEN T. OWENS GREGORY F. ZOELLER
Public Defender of Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
ANNE C. KAISER GEORGE P. SHERMAN
Deputy Public Defender Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
ANTWOINE YOUNG, )
)
Appellant/Petitioner, )
)
vs. ) No. 49A04-1405-PC-217
)
STATE OF INDIANA, )
)
Appellee/Respondent. )
APPEAL FROM THE MARION SUPERIOR COURT
The Honorable Steven R. Eichholtz, Judge
Cause No. 49G20-1106-PC-042420
December 11, 2014
MEMORANDUM DECISION - NOT FOR PUBLICATION
VAIDIK, Chief Judge
Case Summary
Antwoine Young was charged with Class A felony dealing in cocaine within 1000
feet of subsidized housing and Class B felony possession of cocaine within 1000 feet of
subsidized housing; the probable-cause affidavit, however, states that the offense occurred
within 1000 feet of a youth program center located within a church. In order to avoid
facing a potential fifty-year sentence, Young pled guilty to the lesser-included Class B
felony dealing charge, and received a sentence of twelve years in the Indiana Department
of Correction. Thereafter he filed a petition for post-conviction relief, arguing that he
received ineffective assistance of counsel and that his guilty plea was illusory because his
attorney had failed to investigate the validity of the 1000-foot enhancement location,
without which Young would not have been faced with the Class A felony and therefore
would not have accepted the guilty plea. The post-conviction court denied his petition, and
Young now appeals from the denial of post-conviction relief. Because Young has failed
to show clear error, we affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
In May 2011 two undercover police officers purchased .13 grams ($20 dollars’
worth) of crack cocaine from a black male—later identified as Antwoine Young—on the
street in front of 422 North Oakland Avenue in Indianapolis. Thereafter, Young was
arrested following a routine traffic stop and, according to the charging information, charged
with Count I, Class A felony dealing in cocaine within 1000 feet of subsidized housing and
Count II, Class B felony possession of cocaine within 1000 feet of subsidized housing. The
probable-cause affidavit, however, states that the drug deal occurred within 1000 feet of a
2
“YOUTH PROGRAM CENTER AT STAINT [sic] MATTHEW LUTHERAN
CHURCH.” See Appellant’s App. p. 21.
Six months later, Attorney Howard Green entered his appearance as Young’s
counsel. Attorney Green had been hired by Young’s family because Young and his family
were not satisfied with the plea agreement his public defender had presented to him and
hoped Attorney Green could obtain a better plea deal. Thereafter, Young pled guilty to the
lesser-included charge of Class B felony dealing in cocaine under Count I, pursuant to a
plea agreement which provided that Count II would be dismissed and a sentence of twelve
years would be imposed, with placement to be determined by the trial court. At the
sentencing hearing, the trial court ordered that Young serve all twelve years at the DOC.
In November 2012 Young filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief. One
month later, defense counsel entered an appearance on Young’s behalf. Thereafter,
Young’s counsel requested discovery information from the State; specifically, defense
counsel requested that the State admit or deny (1) that the alleged drug offenses occurred
in the street in front of 422 N. Oakland Avenue and (2) that the State at no time from the
date of the alleged drug deal and Young’s guilty-plea hearing had any knowledge of
“subsidized housing” within 1000 feet of the location of the alleged drug deal. See id. at
62. The State admitted both, and clarified that “no subsidized housing was involved in this
case.” Id. at 64.
Young’s post-conviction petition was amended by counsel in October 2013. In the
amended petition, Young alleged that his guilty plea was not entered into knowingly,
intelligently, and voluntarily because the benefit from his plea bargain was illusory, and
3
that he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Specifically, Young argued in his
petition as follows:
1. Young pled guilty to avoid a risk that did not exist (conviction and
sentencing for dealing cocaine within 1,000 feet of ‘subsidized housing’);
2. Young’s benefit in pleading guilty to the lesser offense was illusory
(because the risk of the charged Class A felony was bogus);
3. Young’s guilty plea was not made knowingly, intelligently, and
voluntarily (because the supposed benefit of the plea bargain to Young was
illusory); and,
4. Young received ineffective assistance of trial counsel (because of
counsel’s failure to properly investigate the legitimacy of the alleged
‘subsidized housing’ element associated with the charged Class A felony and
thereby also failing to recognize that in actuality there was no benefit to
Young in pleading guilty).
Id. at 68.
The post-conviction hearing was held in November 2013. At the hearing, Attorney
Green testified that he had not requested any information from the State regarding the
alleged subsidized housing. He also testified that “[Young] had no interest in going to
trial.” P-C Tr. p. 17. Finally, the following colloquy occurred:
Q: . . . If you had known that the Class A [f]elony was not a legitimate charge,
would you have – would your advice to Mr. Young have changed?
A: Well . . . there was still a delivery of cocaine to an undercover officer.
So he still, he is still facing with that sort of penalty regardless. What would
have cha[n]ged, I believe, is that my discussions with the State, I would have
said, “Perhaps there should have been a better offer more appropriate based
upon certain things.” I don’t know if that would have been fruitful. I think
the State’s perspective would have been regardless of the housing facility or
that facility, they look at criminal history, they look at the act, they look at
the dealing, the transfer of it to another officer, and they might want what
they want anyway. But again, as I said, I wasn’t – I was never going to take
an A because I wouldn’t take money from a family to get something that he
could have got with anybody.
4
Id. at 19-20.
At the post-conviction hearing, Young testified that his primary motivation in taking
the plea agreement was to avoid the fifty-year sentence he would have faced on the Class
A felony, and that had he known the most serious charge he was facing was a Class B
felony, he would not have accepted the plea agreement he was offered; rather he would
have gone to trial on the Class B felony or would have accepted a plea to a Class C felony.1
Deputy Prosecutor John Bober also testified at the post-conviction hearing. He
stated that the Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Department East District Narcotics had
targeted an approximately two-mile area in Indianapolis, within which Young’s drug deal
had occurred; Bober assisted the police in this project and prosecuted “about 80 percent of
the sixty-plus cases that were filed . . . .”—including Young’s case. Id. at 27-28. Bober
testified that he and another person prepared all the charging informations involved in this
project, relying on templates to do so, and that they “supplied the detectives with the
thousand foot locations.” Id. at 30. Confronted with the inconsistencies in the charging
information and probable-cause affidavit, Bober characterized this as a “scrivener’s error”
which would have been corrected had the case gone to trial. Id. at 32. Bober also testified
that there were “numerous thousand foot locations in that particular area between schools,
churches, subsidized housing, any other youth program centers. We had a plethora of
locations to choose for each case.” Id. Bober stated further: “I believe there is not a single
1
But as the State observes, there was no Class C felony dealing in cocaine that Count I could have
been reduced to under the statute in effect at the time of the offense. See Ind. Code Ann. § 35-48-4-1 (West
2012).
5
location in that area that is not within a thousand feet of a youth program center.” Id. at
37.
Regarding St. Matthew Lutheran Church in particular, Bober stated that he had
never actually gone inside the church, but had driven by it many times and had taken
pictures of it in preparation for trial. Id. at 38. Bober also testified that he had called the
“general number” of the church and had spoken with “someone who answered the phone
from the church office and verified they had Sunday school.” Id. at 39. He also stated that
he “never had to go to trial with St. Matthew Lutheran Church at [sic] the thousand foot
location.” Id. at 42.
Finally, Jonathan Harwell, law student and law clerk at the Indiana State Public
Defender’s Office, testified that he had been assigned to determine whether there was, in
fact, a youth program center at St. Matthew Lutheran Church. In furtherance of this
assignment, Harwell visited the church to see if there were any “noticeable youth programs
or anything like that in the area.” Id. at 45. He did not see any signs, placards, or other
indications of Sunday school and could not tell if the church was still open, but he spoke
by telephone with Pastor Ralph Spears approximately three or four months before the post-
conviction hearing. Harwell testified that based on “the information [Harwell] gathered
from [Pastor Spears], the church had not been fully active as a church since 2008” and
“even at that time the services being offered were more on a therapeutic basis than . . . what
we would think of as your traditional Sunday school.” Id. at 51, 53.
Following the hearing, the trial court issued findings of fact and conclusions of law.
First, the court quoted at length from Segura v. State:
6
[I]n the case of claims related to a defense or failure to mitigate a penalty, it
must be shown that there is a reasonable probability that a more favorable
result would have obtained in a competently run trial. However, for claims
relating to penal consequences, a petitioner must establish, by objective facts,
circumstances that support the conclusion that counsel’s errors in advice as
to penal consequences were material to the decision to pled. Merely alleging
that the petitioner would not have pleaded is insufficient. Rather, specific
facts, in addition to the petitioner’s conclusory allegation, must establish an
objective reasonable probability that competent representation would have
caused the petitioner not to enter a plea. This case does not meet that
standard. Segura offers nothing more than the naked allegation that his
decision to plead would have been affected by counsel’s advice.
Appellant’s App. p. 151 (quoting in part from Segura v. State, 749 N.E.2d 496, 507-08
(Ind. 2001)) (internal citations omitted in original). The court then dismissed Young’s
post-conviction petition, stating: “[Young] here has shown nothing more than a conclusory
allegation that but for counsel’s mistake he would not have pled guilty. That is
insufficient.” Id.
Young now appeals the denial of post-conviction relief.
Discussion and Decision
In post-conviction proceedings, the petitioner bears the burden of proof by a
preponderance of the evidence. Ind. Post-Conviction Rule 1(5); Henley v. State, 881
N.E.2d 639, 643 (Ind. 2008). When appealing from the denial of post-conviction relief,
the petitioner stands in the position of one appealing from a negative judgment, and the
standard of review is rigorous. Fisher v. State, 810 N.E.2d 674, 679 (Ind. 2004); see also
Trujillo v. State, 962 N.E.2d 110, 113 (Ind. 2011). “To prevail on appeal from the denial
of post-conviction relief, a petitioner must show that the evidence as a whole leads
unerringly and unmistakably to a conclusion opposite that reached by the post-conviction
court.” Kubsch v. State, 934 N.E.2d 1138, 1144 (Ind. 2010), reh’g denied. Here, the post-
7
conviction court made findings of fact and conclusions of law in accordance with Indiana
Post-Conviction Rule 1(6). “A post-conviction court’s findings and judgment will be
reversed only upon a showing of clear error—that which leaves us with a definite and firm
conviction that a mistake has been made.” Ben-Yisrayl v. State, 729 N.E.2d 102, 106 (Ind.
2000) (citation and quotation marks omitted). “The post-conviction court is the sole judge
of the weight of the evidence and the credibility of witnesses.” Woods v. State, 701 N.E.2d
1208, 1210 (Ind. 1998). Accordingly, we accept the post-conviction court’s findings of
fact unless they are clearly erroneous, but we do not defer to the post-conviction court’s
conclusions of law. Wilson v. State, 799 N.E.2d 51, 53 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003).
On appeal, Young argues that that the post-conviction court erroneously relied on
the standard established by Segura, 749 N.E.2d 496, rather than the proper standard from
Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52 (1985). In Hill, the United States Supreme Court held that
the two-part test adopted in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), for evaluating
claims of ineffective assistance of counsel—requiring that the defendant show that
counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and that there
is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the
proceeding would have been different—applies to guilty-plea challenges based on
ineffective assistance of counsel. See Hill, 474 U.S. at 57 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at
694). In order to satisfy the second, or “prejudice,” requirement, the defendant must show
that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, he would not have pled
guilty and would have insisted on going to trial. Id. at 59. Hill goes on to say:
In many guilty plea cases, the “prejudice” inquiry will closely resemble the
inquiry engaged in by courts reviewing ineffective-assistance challenges to
8
convictions obtained through a trial. For example, where the alleged error of
counsel is a failure to investigate or discover potentially exculpatory
evidence, the determination whether the error “prejudiced” the defendant by
causing him to plead guilty rather than go to trial will depend on the
likelihood that discovery of the evidence would have led counsel to change
his recommendation as to the plea. This assessment, in turn, will depend
in large part on a prediction whether the evidence likely would have
changed the outcome of a trial.
Id. (emphasis added).
In Segura, a defendant who pled guilty to dealing in cocaine sought post-conviction
relief, alleging that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to advise him that
deportation was a possible consequence of a guilty plea. See Segura, 749 N.E.2d at 498.
In that case, the Indiana Supreme Court set forth a distinction between prejudice resulting
from failure to advise the defendant on an issue that impairs or overlooks a defense, and
prejudice resulting from an incorrect advisement of penal consequences. See id. at 499.
Here, Young asserts that his counsel was ineffective for failing to question the validity of
the 1000 foot enhancement used in the charging information, which led to the Class A
felony charge; had he not been faced with a potential fifty-year sentence, Young continues,
he would not have pled guilty. Thus, Young is claiming prejudice from an error or
omission overlooking a defense.
The specific standard for showing prejudice on such a claim was articulated by our
Supreme Court in Segura:
We conclude that Hill standing alone requires a showing of a reasonable
probability of success at trial if the alleged error is one that would have
affected a defense. This result seems preferable for several reasons. In Van
Cleave, [674 N.E.2d 1293 (Ind. 1996),] we identified sound reasons for
requiring that a petitioner who pleads guilty show a reasonable probability
of acquittal in order to prevail in a postconviction attack on the conviction
based on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. As Hill emphasized,
9
the State has an interest in the finality of guilty pleas. This is in part grounded
in the cost of a new trial, and the demands on judicial resources that are
imposed by revisiting the guilty plea, but also in concerns about the toll a
retrial exacts from victims and witnesses who are required to revisit the crime
years later.
Id. at at 503 (emphasis added) (citing Hill, 474 U.S. at 58); see also State v. Van Cleave,
674 N.E.2d 1293 (Ind. 1996), reh’g granted on other grounds, 681 N.E.2d 181 (Ind.
1997)). Thus, in Segura, our Supreme Court adopted the Hill standard for showing
prejudice from ineffective assistance of counsel in a guilty-plea case where the alleged
prejudice results from an error or omission that overlooked or impaired a defense: a
showing of a reasonable probability of success at trial.2 See id.
Here, the post-conviction court properly relied on Segura, but employed the wrong
standard from that case, requiring Young to establish, by objective facts, circumstances
supporting the conclusion that counsel’s errors in advice as to penal consequences were
material to the decision to plead and that competent representation would have caused the
petitioner not to plead. See id. at 507; see also Appellant’s App. p. 151. But because
Young contends that Attorney Green failed to investigate and challenge the 1000-foot
enhancement, he is claiming prejudice resulting from an error or omission that overlooked
or impaired a defense; therefore, according to the proper standard, Young must show a
2
As observed by this Court in Manzano v. State, 12 N.E.3d 321, 326 n.1 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014),
trans. denied, the Seventh Circuit rejected the Segura holding and concluded that our Supreme Court
misinterpreted the United States Supreme Court’s holding in Hill, 474 U.S. 52. See Payne v. Brown, 662
F.3d 825, 828 (7th Cir. 2011). The Seventh Circuit concluded that Hill “holds that a person who contends
that ineffective assistance of counsel induced him to pled guilty establishes ‘prejudice’ by demonstrating
that, but for counsel’s errors, he would have insisted on a trial.” Id. But because the Seventh Circuit’s
“decisions on questions of federal law are not binding on state courts,” see Jackson v. State, 830 N.E.2d
920, 921 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005), we apply the standard established by our supreme court in Segura.
10
reasonable probability of success at trial. See id. at 503; see also Hill, 474 U.S. 52. We
find that Young has failed to meet this standard.
On appeal, Young argues that without knowledge of subsidized housing within 1000
feet of the drug deal, the State would not have secured a conviction on the Class A felony
as it was charged, and had Attorney Green known of the mistake, he might have been able
to negotiate a better plea agreement. Appellant’s Br. p. 11. Yet Deputy Prosecutor Bober
testified that had this case proceeded to trial, he would have recognized the “scrivener’s
error” and moved to amend the information to add the youth program center at St. Matthew
Lutheran Church, making it consistent with the probable-cause affidavit.3 P-C Tr. p. 33-
34. And although defense witness Harwell testified as to the lack of a youth program center
at that particular church, Deputy Prosecutor Bober testified: “I believe there is not a single
location in that area that is not within a thousand feet of a youth program center.” Id. at
37. Young did not offer any evidence to dispute this assertion.
We find, therefore, that Young has not met his burden of showing that he was
prejudiced by Attorney Green’s failure to question the validity of that 1000-foot
enhancement location because he cannot show a reasonable probability of success at trial
but for Attorney Green’s error. See Segura, 749 N.E.2d at 503; see also Hill, 474 U.S. at
58. And according to Strickland, if we can dismiss an ineffective-assistance claim on the
3
In Young’s reply brief, he argues for the first time that if the case had gone to trial and if during
trial the State had discovered that St. Matthew Lutheran Church was not a qualifying youth program center,
the trial court (arguably) would not have permitted the State to amend its information again – “regardless
of whether there was a ‘plethora’ of qualifying locations to choose from” – because Young’s substantial
rights would have been violated by the amendment. Appellant’s Reply Br. p. 4 (citing Nunley v. State, 995
N.E.2d 718, 723 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), reh’g denied); see also Ind. Code § 35-34-1-5(a). But because this
argument is premised on entirely hypothetical scenarios rather than what actually occurred, we need not
address this argument today.
11
prejudice prong, we need not address whether counsel’s performance was deficient. See
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697 ((“[T]here is no reason for a court deciding an ineffective
assistance claim . . . to address both components of the inquiry if the defendant makes an
insufficient showing on one . . . . If it is easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on
the ground of lack of sufficient prejudice, . . . that course should be followed.”). Because
we find that Young has made an insufficient showing of prejudice, we find that he has
likewise failed to show that he received ineffective assistance of counsel.
Next, Young argues that his guilty plea was illusory because he accepted the plea
bargain under the misconception that he could be convicted of a Class A felony. A plea
bargain motivated by an improper threat is deemed illusory and a denial of substantive
rights. Graham v. State, 941 N.E.2d 1091 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011). The State must possess,
at the moment a guilty plea is entered, the power to carry out any threat that was a factor
in obtaining the plea agreement. Id. at 1100-01. “[A] threat by a prosecutor to do what the
law will not permit, if it motivates a defendant ignorant of the impossibility, renders the
plea involuntary.” Id. at 1101 (quoting Lassiter v. Turner, 423 F.2d 897, 900 (4th Cir.
1970)). “Defendants who can show that they were coerced or misled into pleading guilty
by the judge, prosecutor or defense counsel will present colorable claims for relief.”
Cornelious v. State, 846 N.E.2d 354, 357-58 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006), trans. denied.
In Graham v. State, a petitioner argued that his guilty plea to Class B felony dealing
in a narcotic drug under Indiana Code section 35-48-4-1 was illusory and involuntary
because it was motivated by the improper threat of a thirty-year habitual offender
enhancement to his sentence if he did not plead guilty. See Graham, 941 N.E.2d 1091,
12
1100 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011). In that case, however, the State was prohibited by statute from
seeking a sentence enhancement for an offense under Indiana Code section 35-48-4, since
the offense was not one listed in Indiana Code section 35-50-2-2(b)(4) and Graham did not
have more than one prior conviction for dealing in cocaine, a legend or narcotic drug, or a
schedule I, II, III, IV, or V controlled substance. See Ind. Code § 35-50-2-8(b)(3). Thus
there was “no question that the State’s threat of a general habitual offender enhancement
of Graham’s sentence was not capable of being fulfilled.” See Graham, 941 N.E.2d at
1101.
But here, as discussed above, Young did not prove that he could not have been
charged with a Class A felony. First, there is no reason to believe the State would not have
been able to correct the scrivener’s error in preparation for trial; moreover, even if Young
had proven that there was no youth program at St. Matthew Lutheran Church, Deputy
Prosecutor Bober testified as to his belief that “there is not a single location in that area
that is not within a thousand feet of a youth program center” and Young did not dispute
that contention. P-C Tr. p. 37. In light of the overwhelming evidence of Young’s guilt and
his extensive criminal history, there is no reason to believe that Young would have been
offered a better plea agreement or would have had any reasonable probability of success at
trial.4 Indeed, according to the facts of this case, we are convinced that not only would
4
Young pled guilty to a Class B felony carrying a penalty range of six to twenty years, with ten
years being the advisory sentence. See Ind. Code § 35-50-2-5(a) (“A person who commits a Class B felony
(for a crime committed before July 1, 2014) shall be imprisoned for a fixed term of between six [] and
twenty [] years, with the advisory sentence being ten [] years.”). The sentencing court first took note of
Young’s extensive criminal and delinquent history, and the fact that he was on probation at the time of this
offense; the court then stated that in mitigation Young was accepting responsibility by pleading guilty, but
that the weight to be given to that was attenuated because the offense had been reduced from a Class A to
13
Young have wished to avoid trial, he could have expected nothing substantially better than
his sentence under the plea bargain, with a high degree of exposure to a much harsher
sentence had he gone to trial facing a Class A felony. See Willoughby v. State, 792 N.E.2d
560, 565 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003), trans. denied. Because Young has not proven that the Class
A felony charge rose to the level of an “improper threat,” we need not consider its impact
on Young’s decision to plead guilty. See Graham, 941 N.E.2d at 1101 (citing Nash v.
State, 429 N.E.2d 666, 672 (Ind. Ct. App. 1981), in which this Court indicated that if the
improper threat “played a significant part in the plea negotiations,” then any resulting plea
is illusory). In sum, Young has failed to prove that his guilty plea was illusory.
Affirmed.
BAKER, J., and RILEY, J., concur.
a Class B felony. Young received a sentence of twelve years at the Department of Correction. See Sent.
Tr. p. 11.
14