Case law
Opinions from 1658 to today.
9,074 results
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673 N.E.2d 787 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Nov 27, 1996
The Court held that the test established in Frye v. … In so holding, we stress that we are not establishing a per se rule of inadmissibility for microscopic hair analysis.
Cited 16 timesPublishedEric Manual Montgomery v. State of Indiana
Indiana Court of Appeals · Dec 31, 2024
[9] Here, we take counsel from two well-established principles: stare decisis and legislative acquiescence. … Noting the phrase “mental disability or deficiency” is qualified by the resultant inability to give consent, the meaning has been expanded for purposes of [the rape and criminal
Cited 0 timesPublished577 N.E.2d 221 · Indiana Supreme Court · Aug 29, 1991
The mere repetition of similar crimes will not suffice to qualify as an exception to the general rule. Gibbs, 588 N.E.2d at 939; Malone, 441 N.E.2d at 1346 . … Because identity was still at issue, it was proper to admit evidence of the extrinsic offense to establish identity.
Cited 29 timesPublished280 B.R. 444 · United States Bankruptcy Court, S.D. Indiana · May 1, 2002
Some expenditures, such as reasonable amounts for food, clothing and shelter, are clearly “reasonably necessary” for the debtor’s maintenance. … As suggested above, the Debtors are qualified to file under Chapter 13 of the Code, see 11 U.S.C. § 109 (e).
Cited 2 timesPublished911 N.E.2d 621 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Aug 13, 2009
The trial court determined that juror Karner "clearly and unequivocally" indicated that he was too distracted to pay attention to the proceedings. Id. at 235-36. … Kimbrough argues that the trial court erroneously determined that the statements qualified under the excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule.
Cited 86 timesPublishedCity of Fishers, Indiana v. Dish Network L.L.C.
Indiana Court of Appeals · May 30, 2025
The Dague Court concluded the “broad subject” of Public Law 141 was “the construction, operation and jurisdiction of Indiana courts,” so it was not “clearly unreasonable to conclude that the Product Liability Act should … Section 44 was special because it not only excluded “all other groups that ordinarily qualify for exemptions,” but it also excluded “fraternities that are not connected with Indiana University.”
Cited 0 timesPublishedCitizens' Street Railroad Co. of Indianapolis v. Stoddard
10 Ind. App. 278 · Indiana Court of Appeals · May 29, 1894
In this case, we are of the opinion that the construct *291 ive admission of the truth of the facts established by appellee’s evidence, and the implied waiver of the objections and exceptions previously taken and reserved … The transaction can not be varied, qualified or explained by a declaration in the nature of the narrative of a past occurrence. Parker v. State, 136 Ind. 284 .
Cited 18 timesPublishedMeridian Mutual Insurance v. Auto-Owners Insurance
698 N.E.2d 770 · Indiana Supreme Court · Aug 31, 1998
Evidence on these and other points will tend to establish whether the arrangement is a joint venture of shared burden or an enterprise existing for the profit of the driver. … For example, in Gonzales “[t]he deposition testimony clearly reflect[ed] that the employees considered themselves car pooling.” Gonzales, 86 F.3d at 674 .
Cited 41 timesPublishedDistrict Court, S.D. Indiana · Sep 30, 2021
APPEAL The United States of America (the "United States"), on behalf of the Internal Revenue Service ("IRS"), appeals the Bankruptcy Court's April 29, 2020 and October 5, 2020 Orders establishing … To do so, the debtors "calculate a tax return for all income, and then a second, pro forma tax return removing all qualifying sales income." Id.
Cited 0 timesUnknownIndiana Court of Appeals · Dec 17, 2020
[7] Clearly, Lynn was dilatory, rather than diligent, in procuring counsel to represent her at the hearing. … Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-GU-26 | December 17, 2020 Page 10 of 23 which we may not set aside unless they are clearly erroneous.”
Cited 0 timesPublishedDistrict Court, S.D. Indiana · Aug 4, 2022
On September 20, 2013, a petition to establish paternity was filed in the Circuit Court of Vigo County, Indiana. (Dkt. 25-1 at 1.) … The parties moving for judgment on the pleadings must clearly demonstrate "that there are no material issues of fact to be resolved . . . ." Moss v. Martin, 473 F.3d 694, 698 (7th Cir. 2007).
Cited 0 timesUnknown75 Ind. Dec. 657 · Indiana Court of Appeals · May 7, 1980
This is accomplished by insuring that both parties understand that the issuer is relying on the buyer’s investment intent in order to qualify for the exemption. … The relevant statute, IC 23-2-l-l(b)(10), clearly requires a written representation of the purchaser’s investment intent.
Cited 21 timesPublishedJanowiak v. Corporate City of South Bend
576 F. Supp. 1461 · District Court, N.D. Indiana · Dec 29, 1983
The moving party bears the burden of clearly establishing the absence of any genuine issues of fact material to judgment in his favor. Adickes v. S.H. … Hiring needs were and are to be met by filling available employment slots with the most qualified applicants from each pool, with a numerical slant in favor of the minority pool’s applicants until the Fire Department’s racial
Reversed by Janowiak v. Corporate City of South Bend, 750 F.2d 557 (1984)Cited 8 timesPublishedDistrict Court, N.D. Indiana · Mar 5, 2026
. § 1915A, the court must screen the complaint and dismiss it if it is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such … Ellis satisfies the first prong because filing a grievance or complaint qualifies as protected activity. Holleman v. Zatecky, 951 F.3d 873, 879 (7th Cir. 2020).
Cited 0 timesUnknownDaveon L. Hendricks v. State of Indiana
Indiana Court of Appeals · Jan 14, 2021
Brionna’s testimony about Balfour’s statement, which was admitted for the truth of the matter asserted, qualifies as hearsay. … None of these statutes clearly permit multiple punishments.
Cited 0 timesPublishedDistrict Court, S.D. Indiana · May 16, 2023
The FTCA waives the federal government's sovereign immunity as to certain tort claims but expressly preserves sovereign immunity as to "[a]ny claim arising out of the combatant activities of the military or naval forces … This is not the type of incidental activity that should qualify as 'combatant' for purposes of the FTCA.").
Cited 0 timesUnknownPerkins Furniture Transport, Inc. v. United States
333 F. Supp. 879 · District Court, S.D. Indiana · Mar 23, 1971
The Commission was entrusted by Congress with the execution of the United States of America’s national transportation policy established by Congress. … The Commission was warranted by the facts before it in finding that Ferree qualified and was entitled to a certificate under Section 207 of the Interstate Commerce Act (Title 49 U.S.C.
Cited 2 timesPublishedSean M. Keith v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.)
Indiana Court of Appeals · Nov 13, 2018
under our fundamental-error analysis, the defendant must show that, “under the circumstances, the trial judge erred in not sua sponte raising the issue because [the] alleged errors (a) constitute clearly … Keith has failed to establish fundamental error. II.
Cited 0 timesPublishedDistrict Court, S.D. Indiana · Dec 10, 2020
And, in any event, even if Bridges applied, Defendants contend they are entitled to qualified immunity because "it was not clearly established at the time that a state agency and its employees were prohibited from taking … Finally, Defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity, Wade argues, because "'the law [wa]s settled that . . . the First Amendment prohibits government officials from subjecting an individual to retaliatory actions
Cited 0 timesUnknownGabriel Kowalskey v. State of Indiana
42 N.E.3d 97 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Jul 30, 2015
[7] After questioning Kowalskey about his finances and finding that he qualified for a court-appointed lawyer, the court appointed Eric Oliver as his counsel in Cause Nos. 39 and 142. … The Court also noted that, while there is evidence that the defendant chose to work and sleep rather than take the time to hire an attorney, his conduct did not result in gross delays or clearly appear
Cited 7 timesPublished
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