WARD v. STATE OF INDIANA

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA

INDIANAPOLIS DIVISION

BRIAN ELONZO WARD, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) Case No. 1:22-cv-00226-TWP-MG

)

STATE OF INDIANA, )

OFFICE OF THE PROSECUTING ATTORNEY: )

CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT VIGO )

COUNTY COURT, )

VIGO COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT: JUVENILE )

DIVISION, )

VIGO COUNTY SHERIFF'S OFFICE Official )

Capacity, )

TERRY MODESITT Prosecutor, Official )

capacity, )

MEGAN N RAMSEY Deputy Prosecutor, )

Individual and Official agent of MEGAN N ILIFF, )

and AMANDA THOMPSON Deputy Prosecutor, )

Individual and Official, )

)

Defendants. )

ORDER ON DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS

This matter is before the Court on a Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings filed by

Defendants the State of Indiana, Office of the Prosecuting Attorney: Child Support Enforcement

Vigo County Court, the Vigo County Circuit Court: Juvenile Division, Vigo County Sheriff's

Office ("Sheriff's Office"), Terry Modesitt ("Modesitt"), Megan N. Ramsey ("Ramsey"), and

Amanda Thompson ("Thompson") (collectively, "Defendants"). (Filing No. 25.) Pro se Plaintiff

Brian Elonzo Ward ("Ward") initiated this case against Defendants alleging violations of his civil

and constitutional rights, as well as the Servicemembers Civil Relief Act ("SCRA"), from a state

court paternity proceeding. For the reasons discussed below, the Court grants the Defendants'

Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings.

I. BACKGROUND

The following statement of facts is taken from the factual allegations in the Amended

Complaint (Dkt. 3) and, as required in evaluating a motion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

12(c), the facts are presented in the light most favorable to the Ward, the nonmovant. Nat'l Fid.

Life Ins. Co. v. Karaganis, 811 F.2d 357, 358 (7th Cir. 1987). Ward is pro se, therefore his

Amended Complaint is liberally construed. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007).

Additionally, because his claims involve proceedings in Indiana state court, this Court may "take

judicial notice of matters of public record without converting [this motion] . . . into a motion for

summary judgment." Gen. Elec. Cap. Corp. v. Lease Resol. Corp., 128 F.3d 1074, 1080 (7th Cir.

1997); see also Guar. Bank v. Chubb Corp., 538 F.3d 587, 591 (7th Cir. 2008) ("court is of course

entitled to take judicial notice of judicial proceedings").

On September 20, 2013, a petition to establish paternity was filed in the Circuit Court of

Vigo County, Indiana. (Dkt. 25-1 at 1.) The allegations in that case, Cause Number 84C01-1309-

JP-1000 ("the Paternity Case"), were that Ward was the biological father of a minor child born out

of wedlock. Id. A previous paternity case involving Ward and the same minor child had been

initiated in 2012 but was later dismissed without prejudice. (Dkt. 3 at 5; Dkt. 25-1 at 13.) On

January 24, 2014, Ward was served with a subpoena by the Sheriff's Office, and an attorney

appeared on his behalf on January 31, 2014. (Dkt. 25-1 at 1.)

Prior to being served the subpoena, Ward alleges that Defendants Modesitt, Ramsey, and

Thompson submitted documentation to certify that Ward had been "properly served and his

military status verified which allowed the court to enter a 'failure to appear.'" (Dkt. 3 at 5.) This

"failure to appear" entry, according to Ward, caused the issuance of the subpoena that was

eventually served on Ward while he was on active duty. Id. Ward asserts that after the Sheriff's

Office was informed of his active duty status by military leadership, he was followed until he

completed his work day and served the subpoena. Id. Ward, attended the Paternity Case hearings

under the "false premise" that if he did not, he would be arrested. Id. At this same time, the

Sheriff's Office began making telephone calls to Ward's superiors "defaming" his character and

causing the military to review his eligibility to maintain his security clearance. Id.

In June 2014, Ward discovered the previous "failure to appear" entry for the first time and

fired his counsel. Id. After seeking advice from an unidentified Judge Advocate General, Ward

learned that his civil rights, constitutional rights, and rights under the SCRA were being violated.

Id. Ward notified the court, and the judge issued a nunc pro tunc order. Id. As he proceeded with

these allegations, Ward was threatened with contempt charges; however, on August 15, 2014,

Ward filed a motion to dismiss the Paternity Case. (Dkt. 3 at 5; Dkt. 25-1 at 10.) In his motion to

dismiss, Ward argued that the Paternity Case should be dismissed due to violations of his

constitutional and civil rights, as well as violations of the SCRA. (Dkt. 25-1 at 10.) The state court

judge denied Ward's motion on August 29, 2014. Id. at 13. In that same order, the court also

found that Ward was the biological father of the minor child and ordered weekly support

obligations. Id. at 14.

On September 17, 2014, Ward filed a motion to terminate the Paternity Case in the state

court action. (Dkt. 25-1 at 17.) In this motion, Ward made the same allegations included in his

previous motion to dismiss, including complaints that two child support orders had been sent to

the military to garnish his wages and that this was done "without proper notification, information

and due process, i.e. a hearing." Id. Ward argued that the prosecutors submitted false affidavits

and he accused the Defendants of violating his constitutional rights and racial discrimination. Id.

The state court parties responded on September 22, 2014, asserting that all of Ward's claims had

been previously heard by the court, but also advising that his claims were "more properly addressed

on an appeal or in a Court with proper jurisdiction over any alleged civil claims." Id. at 20. The

state court never ruled on the motion, and Ward never filed an appeal. Id. at 1-3.

Instead, on February 5, 2022, Ward filed an Amended Complaint with this Court alleging

that while on active duty, the Defendants allowed multiple income withholding orders to be

submitted against him and hearings took place without verifying his status and without Ward being

properly served. (Dkt. 3 at 5.) Through his Amended Complaint, Ward seeks injunctive relief

from the garnishment of his wages and tax liens, as well as compensatory damages based on his

allegations of fraudulent proceedings in the Paternity Case, which deprived him of his due process

rights and violated the SCRA. Id. at 5-6. After the Defendants answered the Amended Complaint,

they filed the instant Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings on May 25, 2022. (Filing No. 25.)

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c) provides, "[a]fter the pleadings are closed—but early

enough not to delay trial—a party may move for summary judgment on the pleadings." In

evaluating a motion brought under Rule 12(c), the court applies the same standards as a motion to

dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). Pisciotta v. Old Nat'l Bancorp, 499 F.3d 629, 633 (7th Cir. 2007).

The parties moving for judgment on the pleadings must clearly demonstrate "that there are no

material issues of fact to be resolved . . . ." Moss v. Martin, 473 F.3d 694, 698 (7th Cir. 2007).

"As with a motion to dismiss, the court views all facts and inferences in the light most favorable

to the non-moving party." Federated Mutual Ins. Co. v. Coyle Mech. Supply Inc., 983 F.3d 307,

313 (7th Cir. 2020).

III. DISCUSSION

In their Motion, the Defendants have presented several reasons why Ward's Amended

Complaint should be dismissed: (1) none of the Defendants are a "person" subject to suit, and all

are entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity; (2) the Rooker-Feldman doctrine prevents this

Court from exercising subject-matter jurisdiction; (3) Younger abstention bars Ward's claims; (4)

the individual prosecutors are protected by absolute prosecutorial immunity; (5) the statute of

limitations has expired; (6) issue preclusion; and (7) Ward failed to adequately plead his claims.

(Dkt. 26 at 4-5.) Because Defendants have raised a subject-matter jurisdiction argument, the Court

must first address that claim before proceeding with Defendants' remaining arguments. See

Norfolk S. Ry. Co. v. Guthrie, 233 F.3d 532 (7th Cir. 2000) ("Article III jurisdiction . . . is an

antecedent question of every case.").

Subject-matter jurisdiction refers to "prescriptions delineating the classes of cases …

falling within a court's adjudicatory authority." Kontrick v. Ryan¸ 540 U.S. 443, 455 (2004).

Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. Insurance Corp. v. Compagnie des Bauxites, 456

U.S. 694, 701-02 (1982). "If the court determines at any time that it lacks subject-matter

jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action." Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3).

Defendants argue that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine prevents this Court from exercising

jurisdiction over Ward's claims. (Dkt. 26 at 6-8.) The Rooker-Feldman doctrine derives from two

decisions of the United States Supreme Court: Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923),

and District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983). According to this

doctrine, lower federal courts are precluded from exercising jurisdiction over claims seeking

review of state court judgments or over claims "inextricably intertwined" with state court

determinations. See, e.g., Long v. Shorebank Dev. Corp., 182 F.3d 548, 554 (7th Cir. 1999). "The

Rooker-Feldman doctrine precludes federal jurisdiction over these claims because, no matter how

erroneous or unconstitutional the state court judgment may be, the Supreme Court of the United

States is the only federal court that could have jurisdiction to review a state court judgment."

Remer v. Burlington Area Sch. Dist., 205 F.3d 990, 996 (7th Cir. 2000).

Defendants assert that Ward's Amended Complaint seeks review of the state court's

findings in the Paternity Case. (Dkt. 26 at 7.) They argue that Ward essentially seeks to set aside

the resolution of the Paternity Case where he failed to appeal the decision to the state appellate

courts. Id. Defendants contend that Ward's alleged injuries come directly from the Paternity Case

as he seeks relief from the garnishment damages, and removal of liens caused by the garnishment.

Id. While he did respond to Defendants' Motion, Ward did not address Defendants' Rooker-

Feldman arguments. (Dkt. 32.)

The Court agrees with the Defendants. A review of the state court docket shows that Ward

is reasserting many of the claims that were made in the Paternity Case. To the extent Ward asks

this Court to review and reverse the ruling of the state court, this Court does not have the

jurisdiction to do so. Likewise, Ward's remaining claims related to garnishment and tax liens,

while not directly addressed in his state court motion to dismiss, are clearly "inextricably

intertwined" with the decisions made in the Paternity Case. This Court has no jurisdiction to decide

these claims and cannot allow Ward to proceed. Thus, the Court does not need to address

Defendants' remaining arguments and the Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings is granted.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Defendants the State of Indiana, Office of the Prosecuting

Attorney: Child Support Enforcement Vigo County Court, the Vigo County Circuit Court: Juvenile

Division, Vigo County Sheriff's Office, Terry Modesitt, Megan N. Ramsey, and Amanda

Thompson's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings (Dkt. [25]) is GRANTED. All other pending

motions are DENIED as moot including Plaintiff's Motion for Emergency Injunctive Relief (Dkt.

19). Plaintiff Brian Elonzo Ward's Amended Complaint (Dkt. 3) is DISMISSED with prejudice,

given that any amendment would be futile, and final judgment will issue under a separate order.

SO ORDERED.

Date: 8/4/2022 ( Nan A 4 \ Jaton \rcatt

Hon. Tanya Walton Pratt, Chief Judge

United States District Court

Southern District of Indiana

DISTRIBUTION:

Brian Elonzo Ward

5900 Barclay Drive, 151324

Alexandria, Virginia 22315

Erica Lee Sawyer

INDIANA ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OFFICE

Erica.Sawyer@atg.in.gov