Case law

Chivers v. Central Noble Community Schools

423 F. Supp. 2d 835 · District Court, N.D. Indiana · Mar 23, 2006

Chivers’s § 1983 claim is not foreclosed for failure to establish that Gillespie was acting under color of state law. 3. Qualified Immunity Gillespie contends that he is entitled to qualified immunity. … Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 , 107 S.Ct. 3034 , 97 L.Ed.2d 523 (1987) (describing “clearly established” requirement of qualified immunity).

JAW v. State

687 N.E.2d 1202 · Indiana Supreme Court · Nov 21, 1997

A court should (1) establish a presumption as to a public entity's status, (2) balance five general "[i]ndicators of immunity," 513 U.S. at 44 , 115 S.Ct. at 402 , and, if these indicators point *1206 in different directions … indicators of immunity to see if they consistently support or contradict the presumptive immunity status.

Turpin v. State

272 Ind. 629 · Indiana Supreme Court · Feb 22, 1980

In the instant case, the destruction of the exculpatory statement did not preclude defendant from showing its materiality, since the fact that he made such a statement and its approximate contents were clearly brought out … The presence of the gun in the room was relevant to establishing the threat of force. There was no error in the admission of this evidence.

HECKE v. COMMISSIONER OF INDIANA POLICE DEPARTMENT

District Court, S.D. Indiana · Sep 16, 2025

Qualified Immunity Standard "[Q]ualified immunity shields officials from civil liability so long as their conduct 'does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which … Hecke, therefore, cannot defeat the second, "clearly established" prong to overcome Sgt. Brice's invocation of qualified immunity. The Court finds that Sgt. Brice is not liable to Mr.

LOCKETT

District Court, S.D. Indiana · Aug 24, 2026

Qualified Immunity Standard "[Q]ualified immunity shields officials from civil liability so long as their conduct 'does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional … Bashua argues that he is entitled to qualified immunity because there are no closely analogous cases clearly establishing that a correctional officer would violate the Eighth Amendment by briefly closing the cuff port on

State v. Carter

658 N.E.2d 618 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Dec 7, 1995

This policy prohibiting punitive damage awards against the State is established in other areas as well. … The general sanction provision does not warrant the trumping of the State's long established immunity from sanctions. See generally Atascadero State Hosp. v.

SAINTIGNON

District Court, S.D. Indiana · Mar 31, 2026

Yarber assert that they are entitled to qualified immunity because it was not clearly established that their actions violated the Constitution. … Saintignon does not address qualified immunity at all. See dkt. 52; Villalobos v.

STATE EX REL. INDIANA ST. BAR ASSOC. v. Moritz

244 Ind. 156 · Indiana Supreme Court · Jun 10, 1963

The relator is not immune from these well established rules of practice. … The term Prosecuting Attorney in the context of its setting provides only the authority for the establishment of that office.

6787 Steelworkers Hall, Inc. v. Scott

933 N.E.2d 591 · Indiana Tax Court · Sep 2, 2010

demonstrate to the Court that the Indiana Board's final determination is: (1) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law; (2) contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege, or immunity … Local 6787 claims that the Assessor's admission during the Indiana Board hearing, that Local 6787's organizational purposes and its uses of the banquet facility were both charitable and educational, clearly established Local

Mason v. Hamilton County

13 F. Supp. 2d 829 · District Court, S.D. Indiana · Jul 14, 1998

Police officers are entitled to qualified immunity so long as their conduct did "not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Harlow v. … The court therefore has not treated qualified immunity as a basis for denying plaintiff's motion for judgment as a matter of law.

CRAIG

District Court, S.D. Indiana · Feb 11, 2026

"Qualified immunity is a doctrine that protects government officials from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable … right was clearly established at the time of the alleged violation."

In re Leach

21 L.R.A. 701 · Indiana Supreme Court · Jun 14, 1893

The special finding of the court discloses, that the petitioner, a citizen of this State, is a woman over the age of twenty-one years, and of good moral character; that she possesses sufficient knowledge of the law to qualify … S. 1881, section 962), and providing a procedure in establishing the right of such persons to be admitted to practice.

Americanos v. State

728 N.E.2d 895 · Indiana Court of Appeals · May 23, 2000

As a result, he contends, less qualified applicants were hired for the positions. … Given this conclusion, we need not address the State’s claims of immunity and res judicata. Judgment affirmed. DARDEN, J., and FRIEDLANDER, J„ concur. . Ind.Code § 4-15-2-1 et seq.

Bartholomew County and Bartholomew County Commissioners v. Doug Johnson and Lucretia Johnson v. C & H/M Excavating and Construction, Inc., and Christopher B. Burke Engineering, LTD.

Indiana Court of Appeals · Sep 17, 2013

The party seeking immunity bears the burden of establishing its conduct comes within the Act. 2 See Gary Cmty. Sch. Corp. v. … Thus, for example, governmental immunity is not clearly conferred to shield a government-employed lifeguard, otherwise liable for a swimmer’s injuries by reason of the lifeguard’s intoxication and inattention

Chestnet v. K-Mart Corp.

529 N.E.2d 131 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Oct 18, 1988

Taken as true for our present purposes, this assertion does not establish that France made a defamatory statement. Rather, it merely establishes that France was screaming. … Screaming for help certainly does not qualify as a defamatory statement.

Board of Commissioners of Adams County v. Price

587 N.E.2d 1326 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Feb 6, 1992

Clearly, there are cases on either end of the spectrum which will fall automatically into the category of discretionary or non-discretionary functions. … Immunity may be established by governmental defendants who can show that the challenged decision was discretionary because it resulted from a policy oriented decision-making process.

Northern Indiana Public Service Co. v. Dabagia

721 N.E.2d 294 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Dec 27, 1999

Because there was no defamatory statement here, we do not reach NIPSCO’s defense of qualified immunity. See Conwell, 667 N.E.2d at 775 . … We do not reach NIPSCO’s defense of qualified immunity because there was no defamatory statement here. See Conwell, 667 N.E.2d at 775 .

MORRIS v. TALABI

District Court, S.D. Indiana · Mar 14, 2025

Existing precedent need not be "directly on point" to clearly establish a right. Id. (cleaned up). … Application Officer Talabi argues that he is entitled to qualified immunity because his actions were reasonable and not clearly unconstitutional. Dkt. 53 at 9–10.

Veolia Water Indianapolis, LLC, City of Indianapolis, Department of Waterworks, and City of Indianapolis v. National Trust Insurance Company and FCCI Insurance Company a/s/o Ultra Steak, Inc.

Indiana Supreme Court · Feb 6, 2014

The party seeking immunity bears the burden of establishing that its conduct comes within the Act. Id. at 800. … But as it stands, the City cannot establish that it is entitled to statutory immunity for a discretionary function under Ind. Code § 34-13-3-3(7). II.

Dzierba v. City of Michigan City

798 N.E.2d 463 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Nov 10, 2003

Courts decide as a matter of law whether the ITCA confers immunity in a particular circumstance. Catt v. Board of Com'rs of Knox County, 779 N.E.2d 1 . The party seeking immunity bears the burden of establishing it. Id. … Clearly, in Garner, the natural condition of the waters of Lake Michigan was the "condition" referred to in I.C. § 34-18-8-8(1).