LOCKETT

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA

INDIANAPOLIS DIVISION

CHRISTOPHER LOCKETT, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) No. 1:24-cv-01297-JPH-TAB

)

M. BENEVIDES, )

BASHUA, )

)

Defendants. )

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT BASHUA'S UNOPPOSED MOTION FOR

SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND DIRECTING FURTHER PROCEEDINGS

Plaintiff Christopher Lockett alleges that the Defendants violated his

Eighth Amendment rights by using excessive force. See dkt. 22. Defendant Ofc.

Bashua moved for summary judgment. For the reasons below, the Court

GRANTS the motion for summary judgment, dkt. [60]. Mr. Lockett has also filed

two motions for default judgment, dkts. [45], [48], a motion for settlement

conference or to set trial, dkt. [64], and a motion for case status, dkt. [69], which

are addressed below.

I. Mr. Lockett's Motions for Default Judgment, Settlement Conference

or Trial, and Case Status

On November 13, 2025, the Clerk entered default against Defendant Sgt.

Benevides. Dkts. 46, 47. The Court ordered Mr. Lockett to file a motion for

default judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55(b)(2) and provide

evidence of the damages he seeks against Sgt. Benevides. Dkt. 46 at 2–3. Mr.

Lockett filed two motions for default judgment, neither of which provide evidence

of damages. Instead, both motions reiterate the claims in the amended complaint

against Sgt. Benevides and request that the Court enter default judgment.

When a court enters default under Rule 55(a), "the well-pleaded allegations

of a complaint relating to liability are taken as true." VLM Food Trading Int'l., Inc.

v. Ill. Trading Co., 811 F.3d 247, 255 (7th Cir. 2016). While the Court must accept

as true allegations relating to liability, "damages must be proved unless they are

liquidated or capable of calculation." Wehrs v. Wells, 688 F.3d 886, 892 (7th Cir.

2012). Indeed, the complaint's allegations regarding the amount of damages are

not deemed to be true. e360 Insight v. The Spamhaus Project, 500 F.3d 594, 602

(7th Cir. 2007).

This means that the Court may not enter default judgment as to Sgt.

Benevides until Mr. Lockett provides evidence of damages. If the amount claimed

cannot be ascertained by documentary evidence, the Court must conduct an

evidentiary hearing. See id. ("[J]udgment by default may not be entered without

a hearing on damages unless 'the amount claimed is liquidated or capable of

ascertainment from definite figures contained in the documentary evidence or in

detailed affidavits.'").

Accordingly, the Court denies Mr. Lockett's motions for default judgment,

dkts. [45], [48] without prejudice. Mr. Lockett shall have through October 16,

2026 to refile his motion for default judgment and provide evidence of damages,

such as an affidavit or documentary evidence. If Mr. Lockett instead believes that

an evidentiary hearing will be required to prove damages, his motion for default

judgment must include a witness list with a summary of each witness's

anticipated testimony, and an exhibit list. If Mr. Lockett does not renew his

motion for default judgment by the deadline, the Court will dismiss Mr.

Lockett's claims against Sgt. Benevides without prejudice for failure to

prosecute and enter final judgment in this matter.

Mr. Lockett's motion for settlement conference or trial asks the Court to

order a settlement conference or trial because Sgt. Benevides did not respond to

the amended complaint. That motion is denied because, as explained above, Mr.

Lockett is instead required to file a motion for default judgment to proceed

against Sgt. Benevides. Dkt. [64]. Mr. Lockett's motion for case status is granted

to the extent that the Court issues this order. Dkt. [69].

II. Motion for Summary Judgment

A motion for summary judgment asks the Court to find that a trial is

unnecessary because there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and,

instead, the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Fed. R. Civ.

P. 56(a). When reviewing a motion for summary judgment, the Court views the

record and draws all reasonable inferences from it in the light most favorable to

the nonmoving party. Khungar v. Access Cmty. Health Network, 985 F.3d 565,

572–73 (7th Cir. 2021). It cannot weigh evidence or make credibility

determinations on summary judgment because those tasks are left to the fact-

finder. Miller v. Gonzalez, 761 F.3d 822, 827 (7th Cir. 2014). A court only has to

consider the materials cited by the parties, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(3); it need

not "scour the record" for evidence that might be relevant. Grant v. Trs. of Ind.

Univ., 870 F.3d 562, 573−74 (7th Cir. 2017) (cleaned up).

A party seeking summary judgment must inform the district court of the

basis for its motion and identify the record evidence it contends demonstrates

the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S.

317, 323 (1986). Whether a party asserts that a fact is undisputed or genuinely

disputed, the party must support the asserted fact by citing particular parts of

the record, including depositions, documents, or affidavits. Fed. R. Civ.

P. 56(c)(1)(A). Failure to properly support a fact in opposition to a movant's

factual assertion can result in the movant's fact being considered undisputed,

and potentially in the grant of summary judgment. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e).

Mr. Lockett failed to respond to the summary judgment motion.

Accordingly, facts alleged in the motion are "admitted without controversy" so

long as support for them exists in the record. S.D. Ind. L.R. 56-1(f); see S.D. Ind.

L.R. 56-1(b) (party opposing judgment must file response brief and identify

disputed facts). "Even where a non-movant fails to respond to a motion for

summary judgment, the movant 'still [has] to show that summary judgment [is]

proper given the undisputed facts,'" Yancick v. Hanna Steel Corp., 653 F.3d 532,

543 (7th Cir. 2011), "with those facts taken as usual in the light most favorable

to the nonmovant." Robinson v. Waterman, 1 F.4th 480, 483 (7th Cir. 2021).

A. Factual Background

Because Ofc. Bashua moved for summary judgment under Rule 56(a), the

Court views and recites the evidence in the light most favorable to Mr. Lockett

and draws all reasonable inferences in his favor. Khungar, 985 F.3d at 572–73.

Mr. Lockett is an inmate in the custody of the Indiana Department of

Correction ("IDOC"). During the events in this lawsuit, Mr. Lockett was

incarcerated in G Cellhouse, a restricted housing unit, at Pendleton Correctional

Facility. Dkt. 61-1 at 10:2-6 (Lockett Dep.). Ofc. Bashua was a correctional officer

at Pendleton during the events in this lawsuit.

On July 17, 2024, Mr. Lockett went to the medical unit for diabetic

treatment. Dkt. 61-1 at 5:6-11, 6:19-7:11. Mr. Lockett asked correctional officers

to let him speak to Sgt. Benevides when he got back to his cell. Id. at 6:19-7:11.

Mr. Lockett was told that he had to wait, but he ignored the instructions and

held onto the cuff port, refusing to remove his arms after correctional officers

uncuffed him. Id. at 8: 1-16. Ofc. Bashua told Mr. Lockett to remove his arms

from the cuff port, but he refused and again asked to speak with Sgt. Benevides.

Id. Ofc. Bashua "grabbed the cuff port and slammed both [Mr. Lockett's] arms in

it." Id. at 7:3-4. Ofc. Bashua held the cuff port closed for about three seconds.

Id. at 11:22–12:1

Mr. Lockett kept his arms in the cuff port until Sgt. Benevides arrived

about five minutes later. Id. at 7:4-6, 12:13-15. When Sgt. Benevides arrived, he

sprayed Mr. Lockett with OC spray and then walked away. Id. at 7:8-11.

B. Discussion

Ofc. Bashua argues that summary judgment should be granted because

he did not use excessive force, he is entitled to qualified immunity, and because

Mr. Lockett did not suffer recoverable damages. The Court begins with qualified

immunity.

1. Qualified Immunity Standard

"[Q]ualified immunity shields officials from civil liability so long as their

conduct 'does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of

which a reasonable person would have known.'" Mullenix v. Luna, 577 U.S. 7, 11

(2015) (quoting Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232 (2009)). Although

qualified immunity is an affirmative defense, plaintiffs have the burden of

defeating it once defendants raise it. Archer v. Chisolm, 870 F.3d 603, 613 (7th

Cir. 2017). Thus, to overcome the defense, Mr. Lockett must show that: (1) Ofc.

Bashua violated his statutory or constitutional rights; and (2) the right was

clearly established at the time of the challenged conduct. Sabo v. Erickson, 128

F.4th 836, 843 (7th Cir. 2025). Courts may exercise their discretion to choose

which element to address first. Id. (citing Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236

(2009)). The Court begins and ends its analysis with the second element because

it is dispositive.

To be "clearly established," a constitutional right "must have a sufficiently

clear foundation in then-existing precedent." District of Columbia v. Wesby, 583

U.S. 48, 63 (2018). "Existing precedent must place the constitutional or statutory

question beyond debate" so that "every reasonable official would understand that

what he is doing is unlawful." Sabo, 128 F.4th at 844. Given this emphasis on

notice, clearly established law cannot be framed at a "high level of

generality." Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 742 (2011). Doing so evades the

crucial question "whether the official acted reasonably in the particular

circumstances that he or she faced." Plumhoff v. Rickard, 572 U.S. 765, 779

(2014). The right has been defined "too generally if the unlawfulness of the

officer's conduct does not follow immediately from the conclusion that [the rule]

was firmly established." Sabo, 128 F.4th at 844. "The Supreme Court's message

is unmistakable: Frame the constitutional right in terms granular enough to

provide fair notice because qualified immunity protects all but the plainly

incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law." Campbell v. Kallas, 936

F.3d 536, 546 (7th Cir. 2019) (cleaned up).

To meet his burden on this element, Mr. Lockett must "show either a

reasonably analogous case that has both articulated the right at issue and

applied it to a factual circumstance similar to the one at hand, or that the

violation was so obvious that a reasonable person necessarily would have

recognized it as a violation of the law." Leiser v. Kloth, 933 F.3d 696, 701 (7th

Cir. 2019). Meeting that burden "is a 'do or die' requirement for the plaintiff's

suit. If a plaintiff fails to identify analogous precedent clearly establishing the

law, the district court must grant summary judgment for the defendant."

Villalobos v. Picicco, 168 F.4th 1057, 1063 (7th Cir. 2026); accord Thomas v.

Carmichael, 164 F.4th 1058, 1067 (7th Cir. 2026).

2. Application

The Eighth Amendment protects inmates from cruel and unusual

punishment, including excessive force. McCottrell v. White, 933 F.3d 651, 662

(7th Cir. 2019). This rule does not bar de minimis force unless the force is

repugnant to the "conscience of mankind." Wilkins v. Gaddy, 559 U.S. 34, 37−38

(2010) (per curiam). Even if the force applied is not de minimis, it remains

permissible if used "in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline."

McCottrell, 933 F.3d at 664. But malicious or sadistic force—even if it does not

cause a serious injury—is prohibited. Id. To distinguish between good-faith and

malicious force, courts consider the following factors:

(1) the need for the application of force; (2) the relationship between

the need and the amount of force that was used; (3) the extent of

injury inflicted; (4) the extent of the threat to the safety of staff and

inmates, as reasonably perceived by the responsible officials on the

basis of the facts known to them; and (5) any efforts made to temper

the severity of a forceful response.

Id. at 663 (citing Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 321 (1986)). Additionally, to

survive summary judgment, a plaintiff must present evidence supporting "a

reliable inference of wantonness in the infliction of pain." Whitley, 475 U.S. at

322.

Here, Ofc. Bashua argues that he is entitled to qualified immunity because

there are no closely analogous cases clearly establishing that a correctional

officer would violate the Eighth Amendment by briefly closing the cuff port on

the arms of an inmate who was actively refusing an order to remove his arms.

Dkt. 62 at 12–13. Mr. Lockett has not responded and thus has not carried his

burden of pointing to closely analogous precedent. See Villalobos, 168 F.4th at

1063; accord Thomas, 164 F.4th at 1067.

Indeed, caselaw in the Seventh Circuit tends to establish that Ofc.

Bashua's conduct would not violate the Eighth Amendment because the three

second hold was de minimis and did not cause significant pain or identifiable

injuries. For example, in Outlaw v. Newkirk, 259 F.3d 833, 839–40 (7th Cir.

2001), the Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment for a correctional officer

who closed a cuff port on a prisoner's hands, causing minor superficial injuries.

The facts in this case are almost identical. See also Jones v. Anderson, 116 F.4th

669, 677–78 (7th Cir. 2024) (affirming summary judgment for correctional

officers who used minimal force to handcuff and restrain a prisoner in a restraint

chair when the video footage did not show any evidence of pain and the record

showed no evidence of injury); Small v. Pittman, 2026 WL 2036277 at *2 (7th Cir.

July 15, 2026) (nonprecedential) (affirming summary judgment for correctional

officer who closed a cell door on a non-compliant prisoner's foot, causing minimal

swelling and pain).

Additionally, the Seventh Circuit has held that non-de minimis force does

not violate the Eighth Amendment when it is used in a good faith effort to restore

order. McCottrell, 933 F.3d at 662. For example, in Whitaker, the Seventh Circuit

affirmed summary judgment for a correctional officer who deployed a single

spray of mace to get the plaintiff to comply with his orders to stop spilling blood

on staff members. 144 F.4th at 923. Here, Ofc. Bashua momentarily closed the

cuff port on Mr. Lockett's arms to gain his compliance with the order to remove

his arms so that he could close the cuff port. Clearly established precedent

therefore does not show that Ofc. Bashua violated Mr. Lockett's rights.

In the absence of reasonably analogous precedent, Mr. Lockett has not

shown that Ofc. Bashua's conduct was "so egregious that it is an obvious

violation of a constitutional right." Leiser, 933 F.3d at 701. Instead, the

circumstances here align with cases where the Seventh Circuit has found that

defendants did not use excessive force. Ofc. Bashua is therefore entitled to

summary judgment based on qualified immunity.

III. Conclusion

Mr. Lockett's motions for default judgment, dkts. [45], [48], are DENIED

WITHOUT PREJUDICE. Mr. Lockett shall have through October 16, 2026 to

file a motion for default judgment, following the instructions in this order. If Mr.

Lockett does not renew his motion for default judgment by the deadline with the

required supporting materials as ordered, the Court will dismiss Mr. Lockett's

claims against Sgt. Benevides without prejudice for failure to prosecute and

enter final judgment in this matter. The motion for settlement conference or

to set trial, dkt. [64], is DENIED. The motion for case status, dkt. [69], is

GRANTED to the extent that the Court issues this order.

Defendant Ofc. Bashua's motion for summary judgment, dkt. [60], is

GRANTED. The clerk is directed to remove Ofc. Bashua as a Defendant on the

docket.

SO ORDERED.

Date: 8/24/2026 anni Pat tanbor—

James Patrick Hanlon

United States District Judge

Southern District of Indiana

Distribution:

CHRISTOPHER LOCKETT

903486

PENDLETON - CF

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