SAINTIGNON

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA

TERRE HAUTE DIVISION

DANNY L. SAINTIGNON, JR., )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) No. 2:24-cv-00027-JPH-MJD

)

YARBER Lt., )

IVY Sgt., )

)

Defendants. )

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT,

GRANTING MOTION TO STRIKE, GRANTING MOTION FOR DECISION AND

DENYING MOTION TO COMPEL

This cause of action is pending on Plaintiff Danny L. Saintignon, Jr.'s claim

that Defendants Lt. Yarber and Sgt. Ivy were deliberately indifferent to his

serious medical need in violation of the Eighth Amendment. See Dkt. 8 at 3

(Screening Order). Lt. Yarber and Sgt. Ivy have moved for summary judgment.

Dkt. [46]. For the reasons below, that motion is GRANTED.

I. MOTION FOR DECISION AND MOTION TO COMPEL

Mr. Saintignon filed a motion asking the Court to issue a decision on the

pending motion for summary judgment, dkt. [67], and a motion to compel a

response to the motion for a decision, dkt. [72]. Because this order resolves the

motion for summary judgment, those motions are granted.

II. MOTION TO STRIKE

Lt. Yarber and Sgt. Ivy filed a motion to strike Mr. Saintignon's surreply.

Dkt. 63. Southern District of Indiana Local Rule 56-1(d) permits surreplies only

when movants cite new evidence in their reply briefs or object to the admissibility

of evidence in a response brief. Any such surreply "must be limited to the new

evidence and objections." S.D. Ind. L.R. 56-1(d). Lt. Yarber and Sgt. Ivy argue

that while Mr. Saintignon could have filed a surreply limited to their objections

to evidence he submitted in his response brief, he did not address those

evidentiary objections and instead raised arguments outside the scope permitted

by the local rule. Dkt. 63 at 2.

Because Mr. Saintignon's surreply is not limited to new evidence and

objections, the motion to strike is granted and the Court does not consider the

surreply. Dkt. [63].

III. MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

A. Summary Judgment Standard

A motion for summary judgment asks the Court to find that a trial is

unnecessary because there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and,

instead, the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Fed. R. Civ.

P. 56(a). When reviewing a motion for summary judgment, the Court views the

record and draws all reasonable inferences from it in the light most favorable to

the nonmoving party. Khungar v. Access Cmty. Health Network, 985 F.3d 565,

572–73 (7th Cir. 2021). It cannot weigh evidence or make credibility

determinations on summary judgment because those tasks are left to the fact-

finder. Miller v. Gonzalez, 761 F.3d 822, 827 (7th Cir. 2014). A court only has to

consider the materials cited by the parties, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(3); it need

not "scour the record" for evidence that might be relevant. Grant v. Trs. of Ind.

Univ., 870 F.3d 562, 573−74 (7th Cir. 2017) (cleaned up).

A party seeking summary judgment must inform the district court of the

basis for its motion and identify the record evidence it contends demonstrates

the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S.

317, 323 (1986).

Whether a party asserts that a fact is undisputed or genuinely disputed,

the party must support the asserted fact by citing to particular parts of the

record, including depositions, documents, or affidavits. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A).

Failure to properly support a fact in opposition to a movant's factual assertion

can result in the movant's fact being considered undisputed, and potentially in

the grant of summary judgment. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e).

B. Factual Background

Because Defendants have moved for summary judgment under Rule 56(a),

the Court views and recites the evidence in the light most favorable to Mr.

Saintignon and draws all reasonable inferences in his favor. Khungar, 985 F.3d

at 572–73.

Mr. Saintignon was incarcerated in cell 409 of the A East 400 range, a

segregation unit of the Wabash Valley Correctional Facility ("Wabash"). Dkt. 52-

1 at 23. Id. Sgt. Ivy was a correctional sergeant at Wabash. Dkt. 47-2 ¶ 1. Lt.

Yarber was a correctional lieutenant at Wabash. Dkt. 47-3 ¶ 3.

Mr. Saintignon tested positive for COVID in December 2020 and has had

breathing issues since that time, for which he has been prescribed inhalers to

use as needed, which is "[p]robably at least once a day." Dkt. 47-1 at 14–16. He

had his inhaler with him during the events at issue. Id. at 16.

On July 14, 2023, incarcerated individuals in the A East 400 range were

"banging and making a lot of noise" because they were not getting recreation

time that day, but Mr. Saintignon had nothing to do with it. Dkt. 52-1 at 23.

Sgt. Ivy came on the range, yelling that the inmates needed to "shut the

fuck up or he would cell extract" the entire range. Id. He started cell extraction

at cell 402 with inmate Jonah Henderson. Id. at 23, 30. Cell 402 was on the floor

below Cell 409 and two cells over. Dkt. 47-1 at 23–24. Sgt. Ivy used a "fogger" a

couple of times with 2-3 second bursts of "pepper spray"—Oleoresin Capsicum.

Dkt. 52-1 at 23, 27; dkt. 47-3 ¶ 8.

After the first burst, the entire range was "engulfed" with the chemical.

Dkt. 52-1 at 23–24. The cell doors are not solid but have numerous small holes

in a grid-like pattern that allowed the chemical to enter Mr. Santignon's cell "as

though [he] was directly hit with the spray as well." Id. at 24. Mr. Santignon was

coughing and choking, felt like he was being smothered, vomited, and scratched

his skin to the point of bleeding. Id. He was in a great deal of pain. Id. He told

Sgt. Ivy that he had lingering effects from COVID and needed fresh air due to his

difficulty breathing, to which Sgt. Ivy responded "deal with it Saintignon, you are

the one who started all this bullshit." Id.

Sgt. Ivy then sprayed cell 402 again. Id. He then used a pepperball gun to

shoot at least 20 pepperball rounds into the cell. Id. Mr. Saintignon told Sgt. Ivy

that he uses an inhaler for his COVID side effects and that he couldn't breathe,

and he asked to see medical. Id. Sgt. Ivy told him "I don't give a fuck," and "you

get what you deserve." Id. at 24, 28. Mr. Saintignon asked for a decontamination

shower, which Sgt. Ivy refused. Id. at 25.

Lt. Yarber was present for some of the above exchanges, and Mr.

Saintignon got Lt. Yarber's attention, explained that he could not breathe, and

asked for medical and a decontamination shower. Id. Mr. Saintignon explained

his COVID side effects to Lt. Yarber. Id. at 27–28. Lt. Yarber said "who gives a

shit," threatened to cell extract the rest of the range, and blamed Mr. Saintignon

for the actions of others. Id. at 25. Lt. Yarber said "nobody is seeing medical." Id.

at 31.

Later, Mr. Saintignon again told Sgt. Ivy and Lt. Yarber that he could not

breathe due to the "excess amounts" of chemical agents in the air and coming

through the air vents and requested to see medical or to receive a

decontamination shower. Id. at 25. Sgt. Ivy and Lt. Yarber refused. Id. After the

cell extraction, Mr. Saintignon again asked Sgt. Ivy for a decontamination

shower, which was refused.1 Dkt. 52-1 at 28.

The air was "heavily mixed with the chemical agents" for at least three

hours. Id. at 27. Other people on the range, even those without breathing

problems, experienced uncontrollable coughing, choking, shortness of breath,

tearing up, and burning sensations on skin, eyes, lungs, and throat. Id. at 27,

32.

1 Sgt. Ivy contests this, but the Court considers the designated evidence in the light

most favorable to Mr. Saintignon.

Mr. Saintignon put in a medical slip and was seen three to four days later,

which was around the time when he began to feel better. Id. at 25. Neither Sgt.

Ivy nor Lt. Yarber cleaned or decontaminated cell 402. Id. The chemicals lingered

in A East 400 range until late on July 18, 2024. Id. The humidity in the air mixed

with the lingering chemical "is not a pleasant mixture," and the humidity

"reactivates" the chemical. Id. at 26, 28. Mr. Saintignon had four days and nights

of "difficulty breathing[,] again feeling as if I'm drowning and/or being smothered,

on top of scratching my body until I bleed." Id. at 26. His inhaler relieved some

of the lung pain, but he was in pain for four days before his lungs began to feel

better. Dkt. 52 at 9.

Neither Sgt. Ivy nor Lt. Yarber were involved in the decontamination

process of cell 402. Dkt. 47-2 ¶ 49, dkt. 47-3 ¶ 33. Decontamination procedures

can only begin once the situation requiring use of pepper spray is under control.

Dkt. 47-3 ¶ 14. Lt. Yarber left the range before the cell extraction team arrived.

Id. ¶ 25. He is generally not involved in the decontamination process as a

correctional lieutenant. Id. ¶ 32. When Sgt. Ivy was completing his paperwork,

he told the night shift sergeant that cell 402 still needed to be decontaminated

and was told it would be taken care of. Dkt. 47-2 ¶ 49.

The air handler remained on during the events and was blowing the air

and pepper spray into every cell.2 Dkt. 52 at 5. The exterior door on the range

was opened to circulate fresh, outside air. Dkt. 47-3 ¶ 21.

2 Sgt. Ivy and Lt. Yarber contest this, but the Court considers the designated evidence

in the light most favorable to Mr. Saintignon.

During the relevant events, Sgt. Ivy and Lt. Yarber never came to Mr.

Santignon's cell, but they both answered questions from him and addressed him

by name. Dkt. 52 at 8.

C. Discussion

Mr. Saintignon's only claim is whether Sgt. Ivy and Lt. Yarber were

deliberately indifferent to his serious medical need in violation of the Eighth

Amendment.3 See dkts. 8, 65.

Additionally, to the extent that Mr. Saintignon bases his claim on the

timing of cell 402's decontamination, there is no designated evidence that Sgt.

Ivy or Lt. Yarber were personally involved in that timing. See dkt. 47-2 ¶ 49, dkt.

47-3 ¶ 33. After Sgt. Ivy informed the night shift sergeant that the cell needed to

be decontaminated, Sgt. Ivy "was told it would be taken care of," so the multiple-

day delay in the cell's decontamination is not attributable to Sgt. Ivy or Lt. Yarber

for § 1983's purposes. See Whitfield v. Spiller, 76 F.4th 698, 706 (7th Cir. 2023)

("'To recover damages under § 1983, a plaintiff must establish that a defendant

was personally responsible for the deprivation of a constitutional right.'" (quoting

Gentry v. Duckworth, 65 F.3d 555, 561 (7th Cir. 1995))).

Mr. Saintignon's Eighth Amendment medical care claim is therefore

cabined to Sgt. Ivy's and Lt. Yarber's refusals to take Mr. Saintignon to medical

or give him a decontamination shower on July 14, 2023.

3 When the Court screened Mr. Saintignon's complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the

Court provided him an opportunity to identify other claims that he believed he alleged

in his complaint. See dkt. 8. Mr. Saintignon did not identify any other claim before his

deadline to do so expired.

Sgt. Ivy and Lt. Yarber argue that they did not violate Mr. Saintignon's

Eighth Amendment rights by refusing medical attention or a shower and,

alternatively, that they are protected by qualified immunity. Dkt. 48 at 18–27.

"[Q]ualified immunity shields officials from civil liability so long as their

conduct 'does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of

which a reasonable person would have known.'" Mullenix v. Luna, 577 U.S. 7, 11

(2015) (quoting Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232 (2009)). "Whether

qualified immunity applies turns on two questions: first, whether the facts

presented, taken in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, describe a violation

of a constitutional right; and second, whether the federal right at issue was

clearly established at the time of the alleged violation." Smith v. Finkley, 10 F.4th

725, 737 (7th Cir. 2021) (citing Tolan v. Cotton, 572 U.S. 650, 655–56 (2014) (per

curiam)). Once the defense is raised, the burden is on the plaintiff to defeat it.

Id. (citing Jewett v. Anders, 521 F.3d 818, 823 (7th Cir. 2018)). The Court may

take up either question first. Id. (citing Jones v. Clark, 630 F.3d 677, 682 (7th

Cir. 2011)).

This "clearly established" standard ensures "that officials can 'reasonably

. . . anticipate when their conduct may give rise to liability for damages.'" Reichle

v. Howards, 566 U.S. 658, 664 (2012) (quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S.

635, 646 (1987)). To be "clearly established," a constitutional right "must have a

sufficiently clear foundation in then-existing precedent." District of Columbia v.

Wesby, 583 U.S. 48, 63 (2018). Given this emphasis on notice, clearly

established law cannot be framed at a "high level of generality." Ashcroft v. al-

Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 742 (2011). "A rule is too general if the unlawfulness of the

officer's conduct 'does not follow immediately from the conclusion that [the rule]

was firmly established.'" Wesby, 583 U.S. at 64 (quoting Anderson, 483 U.S. at

641).

While "a case directly on point" is not required, "precedent must have

placed the . . . constitutional question beyond debate." White v. Pauly, 580 U.S.

73, 79 (2017) (cleaned up). Put slightly differently, a right is clearly established

only if "every reasonable official would have understood that what he is

doing violates that right." Taylor v. Barkes, 575 U.S. 822, 825 (2015). "The

Supreme Court's message is unmistakable: Frame the constitutional right in

terms granular enough to provide fair notice because qualified immunity

'protects all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.'"

Campbell v. Kallas, 936 F.3d 536, 546 (7th Cir. 2019) (quoting Kisela v. Hughes,

138 S. Ct. 1148, 1152 (2018) (quotation marks omitted)).

Qualified immunity thus "balances two important interests—the need to

hold public officials accountable when they exercise power irresponsibly and the

need to shield officers from harassment, distraction, and liability when they

perform their duties reasonably." Pearson, 555 U.S. at 231.

Here, Mr. Saintignon has not met his burden to show that the right at

issue was clearly established. The Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel

and unusual punishment imposes a duty on the states, through the Fourteenth

Amendment, "to provide adequate medical care to incarcerated individuals."

Boyce v. Moore, 314 F.3d 884, 889 (7th Cir. 2002) (citing Estelle v. Gamble, 429

U.S. 97, 103 (1976)). "Prison officials can be liable for violating the Eighth

Amendment when they display deliberate indifference towards an objectively

serious medical need." Thomas v. Blackard, 2 F.4th 716, 721–22 (7th Cir. 2021).

"Thus, to prevail on a deliberate indifference claim, a plaintiff must show '(1) an

objectively serious medical condition to which (2) a state official was deliberately,

that is subjectively, indifferent.'" Johnson v. Dominguez, 5 F.4th 818, 824 (7th

Cir. 2021) (quoting Whiting v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc., 839 F.3d 658, 662

(7th Cir. 2016)). Sgt. Ivy and Lt. Yarber assert that they are entitled to qualified

immunity because it was not clearly established that their actions violated the

Constitution. In their brief in support of summary judgment, they identify cases

where the effects of air-borne irritants on inmates with lung issues were held to

not be serious medical conditions.

In Oliver v. Deen, the Seventh Circuit concluded that aggravation of

asthma from second-hand smoke exposure, including chest pains, difficulty

breathing, dizziness, and nausea, did not demonstrate a serious medical need

for a non-smoking environment. 77 F.3d 156, 158–61 (7th Cir. 1996). The Court

affirmed that decision on similar facts in Henderson v. Sheahan, 196 F.3d 839,

846 (7th Cir. 1999) ("[T]he injuries of which Henderson complains—breathing

problems, chest pains, dizziness, sinus problems, headaches and a loss of

energy—are, objectively speaking, relatively minor. While we do not doubt that

these ailments caused him some distress and discomfort, they are not the sort

of objectively serious injury or medical need that amounts to a denial of the

minimal civilized measure of life's necessities necessary to state a [constitutional]

violation." (quotation marks, citations omitted)).

Several district courts within the Seventh Circuit have taken similar

approaches. In Trotter v. Kingston, the Eastern District of Wisconsin found that

the plaintiff's asthmatic attacks with shortness of breath, difficulty in breathing,

nausea, and tightness in the chest after being exposed to pepper spray that was

directed toward other inmates was "not sufficiently serious to be constitutionally

actionable" even though he was denied a decontamination shower. No. 05-C-

1032, 2007 WL 984089, at *2, *6 (E.D. Wis. Mar. 27, 2007). In Kadamovas v.

Caraway, this district found that no reasonable jury would find that the

plaintiff's asthma and breathing problems were an objectively serious medical

need despite evidence of "breathing problems, diarrhea, vomiting, crying,

sneezing, psychological anguish, headache, fear of death, high blood pressure,

accelerated heartbeat, respiratory stress, wheezing, chest pains, and excessive

sweating" from exposure to pepper spray and smoke fumes. No. 2:17-cv-00050-

WTL-MJD, 2018 WL 6415588, *7 (S.D. Ind. Dec. 6, 2018), aff'd, 775 F. App'x

242 (7th Cir. 2019).4

In his response in opposition to summary judgment, Mr. Saintignon does

not address qualified immunity at all. See dkt. 52; Villalobos v. Picicco, 168 F.4th

1057, 1062 (7th Cir. 2026) ("Importantly, the plaintiff bears the burden of

proving the law is clearly established—not the defendant."). And he does not cite

any binding precedent about medical care after exposure to lung irritants. See

4 In affirming, the Seventh Circuit assumed for purposes of the decision that a serious

medical need existed.

dkt. 52. But meeting the burden to overcome qualified immunity "is a 'do or die'

requirement for the plaintiff's suit. If a plaintiff fails to identify analogous

precedent clearly establishing the law, the district court must grant summary

judgment for the defendant." Villalobos, 168 F.4th at 1063; accord Thomas v.

Carmichael, 164 F.4th 1058, 1067 (7th Cir. 2026). Instead, Mr. Saintignon

identifies a decontamination policy that he believes was not followed, but a

violation of policy by itself is insufficient to establish a constitutional violation.

"Section 1983 protects against 'constitutional violations, not violations of . . .

departmental regulation and . . . practices[.]'" Estate of Simpson v. Gorbett, 863

F.3d 740, 746 (7th Cir. 2017) (quoting Scott v. Edinburg, 346 F.3d 752, 760 (7th

Cir. 2003)). As Mr. Saintignon bears the burden to show why qualified immunity

does not apply and he has failed to do so, the Court finds that Sgt. Ivy and Lt.

Yarber are entitled to qualified immunity.5

5 Also, this Court issued an order on summary judgment a few months ago regarding

this same use-of-force incident and likewise found that Sgt. Ivy and Lt. Yarber were

protected by qualified immunity for the deliberate indifference claims brought against

them in that case. See Coy v. Yarber, No. 1:23-cv-1920-JPH-KMB, 2025 WL 2782829,

at *4 (S.D. Ind. Sept. 30, 2025). There, plaintiff produced evidence that he experienced

coughing, choking, shortness of breath, chest burning, tearing up, dizziness, and

lightheadedness and had a history of heart palpitations. Id. at *2. The Court granted

summary judgment in favor of the defendants on the constitutional violation prong of

the qualified immunity analysis, noting that "whether the effects of pepper spray rise to

the level of deliberate indifference is a fact-intensive injury" and determined that the

plaintiff had "not proven that his exposure rose to the level of objective seriousness." Id.

at *4 (citing McCloud v. Vanschoyck, No. 2:21-cv-0049-JPH-MKK, 2024 WL 229740, at

*7 (S.D. Ind. Jan. 19, 2024).

IV. CONCLUSION

The Court GRANTS the motions to issue a decision and to compel a

response. Dkt. [67]; dkt. [72]. The Court GRANTS the motion to strike surreply,

dkt. [63], and did not consider the surreply, dkt. 61.

Defendants’ motion for summary judgment is GRANTED. Dkt. [46].

Final judgment will issue in a separate entry.

SO ORDERED.

Date: 3/31/2026 omnis tanbove

James Patrick Hanlon

United States District Judge

Southern District of Indiana

Distribution:

DANNY L. SAINTIGNON, JR.

978030

WABASH VALLEY - CF

WABASH VALLEY CORRECTIONAL FACILITY - Inmate Mail/Parcels

6908 S. Old US Hwy 41

P.O. Box 1111

CARLISLE, IN 47838

Allison Mauk

Office of Indiana Attorney General

allison.mauk@atg.in.gov

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