Case law

Boner v. Jones

56 Ill. App. 3d 286 · Appellate Court of Illinois · Jan 13, 1978

Charles Brunk, research and test division of the Department of Personnel, testified that the current ranking system to be 25% well-qualified, 30% qualified, 40% minimally qualified, and 5% failure. … Quite clearly, everyone, including the supreme court, was looking only at the tip of the iceberg if in fact anyone recognized it as an iceberg.

Johnson v. City Of Chicago

District Court, N.D. Illinois · Sep 28, 2021

Qualified immunity shields officers from civil liability stemming from discretionary functions so long as their conduct did not violate a clearly established statutory or constitutional right of which a reasonable person … To survive a qualified immunity defense at this stage, the complaint must plausibly allege that the Officers violated Johnson’s clearly established rights by arresting him without probable cause.

Jackson v. Heck

District Court, S.D. Illinois · Sep 28, 2023

Finally, Defendants argue that they are entitled to qualified immunity. … Qualified immunity shields government officials from liability for civil damages when “their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have

Spear v. Board of Education

Appellate Court of Illinois · Jul 31, 1997

Act (Immunity Act) (745 ILCS 10/8--101 (West 1994)). … Assuming arguendo (without deciding) that the successor district ought ordinarily to assume all the assets and liabilities of the defunct district, this plaintiff's claim would still not qualify as a liability or obligation

Evans v. Godinez

2014 IL App (4th) 130686 · Appellate Court of Illinois · Dec 3, 2014

immunity shielded them from liability. … immunity shielded defendants from liability.

Alvarez v. Wilson

600 F. Supp. 706 · District Court, N.D. Illinois · Jan 11, 1985

Congress established that procedure to address internal military matters. … We believe that the potential for disruption of “the unique disciplinary structure of the military establishment,” Chappell v.

People v. Quinn

Appellate Court of Illinois · Jun 24, 2002

An offer of proof "is not required where it is apparent that the trial court clearly understood the nature and character of the evidence sought to be introduced, or where the question itself and the circumstances surrounding … Most notably for purposes of the present appeal, the Knight court did not establish an absolute rule but, rather, recognized that a qualified privilege does exist at trial for the disclosure of a surveillance location.

People v. Arthur H.

212 Ill. 2d 441 · Illinois Supreme Court · Oct 28, 2004

Gloria testified that she spoke to Lorraine about Earl’s apnea monitor and whether his immunizations were current. … A finding is against the manifest weight of the evidence only if the opposite conclusion is clearly evident. In re Edward T., 343 Ill. App. 3d 778, 794 (2003).

Molner v. United States

175 F. Supp. 271 · District Court, N.D. Illinois · May 22, 1959

If it qualifies, plaintiffs are entitled to judgment in the amount of $4,648.55, plus statutory interest thereon from July 23, 1954, and costs of this suit; if it does not qualify, defendant is entitled to judgment and plaintiffs … The decision in Rensenhouse clearly supports plaintiffs’ case. The statutes of' both Michigan and Illinois are fundamentally the same.

State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance v. Differding

46 Ill. App. 3d 15 · Appellate Court of Illinois · Feb 10, 1977

The issues presented for review are (1) whether Miss Differding qualified for insurance coverage, as a resident of the Differding household; (2) whether the automobile driven by Miss Differding qualifies as a nonowned automobile … One furnished for all purposes and at all times and places would clearly be for regular use.

In Re Connelly

59 B.R. 421 · United States Bankruptcy Court, N.D. Illinois · Mar 27, 1986

It is for the court to say whether his silence is justified, * * * and to require him to answer ‘if it clearly appears that he is mistaken’ * * Hoffman v. … “[A] witness need not establish that an answer to a question or an explanation why an answer cannot be given will in fact incriminate.

In Re Sae Young Westmont-Chicago, L.L.C.

276 B.R. 888 · United States Bankruptcy Court, N.D. Illinois · May 2, 2002

In 1997, Debtor established five separate land trusts to acquire leasehold interests in five buildings at the former world headquarters of Sears & Roebuck Company (the “properties”). … However, the present case is clearly distinguishable. First, there has been no compulsory process used to require the state to appear in this forum. In fact, the State only appeared here to challenge jurisdiction.

Osborne v. Meyers

District Court, S.D. Illinois · Dec 6, 2021

Even if the Court had concluded that probable cause did not exist, qualified immunity applies. … Qualified immunity shields “government officials from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person

Austin Liquor Mart, Inc. v. Department of Revenue

51 Ill. 2d 1 · Illinois Supreme Court · Jan 28, 1972

It is firmly established that where the public revenues are involved, public policy ordinarily forbids the application of estoppel to the State. Department of Revenue v. … While it is true that the State has no absolute immunity from the application of equitable principles, our opinion in Hickey reaffirms the general rule that the State cannot be estopped in the exercise of its power of taxation

Council 31, American Federation of State Employees v. Ward

771 F. Supp. 247 · District Court, N.D. Illinois · Jul 30, 1991

a disparate impact race discrimination claim; (5) Title VII does not authorize “legal relief;” and (6) defendant Ward is immune from damages under the doctrine of qualified immunity. … In Griggs the Court held that a plaintiff did not necessarily have to prove intentional discrimination in order to establish that an employer violated Title VII.

People ex rel. Holdom v. Sweitzer

280 Ill. 436 · Illinois Supreme Court · Oct 23, 1917

Section 5 of the schedule provided that “at the first election fixed by the constitution for the election of judges, there shall be elected one circuit judge in each of the nine judicial circuits now established in this State … , as it was, before they could qualify, and certainly they could not thereafter qualify under a charter that had ceased to exist.

Gaffney v. City of Chicago

302 Ill. App. 3d 41 · Appellate Court of Illinois · Dec 4, 1998

IMMUNITY The material in this section is nonpublishable under Supreme Court Rule 23. 166 111. 2d R. 23. IV NEW TRIAL A. … Restatement (Second) § 229(1) & Comment a, at 506. 8 The City admits in its brief to this court that the fact that the City disciplines officers for failing to safeguard their weapons was established at trial and was never

Sheriff of Jackson County v. Illinois State Labor Relations Board

302 Ill. App. 3d 411 · Appellate Court of Illinois · Jan 7, 1999

The merit commission waived the assessment-panel component of the promotional exam for Jacquot and certified him as qualified for the position. … The Sheriff does not argue that Brown did not establish a prima facie case, but instead he contends that his actions do not constitute an unfair labor practice.

Yale Club of Chicago v. Dept. of Revenue

214 Ill. App. 3d 468 · Appellate Court of Illinois · May 9, 1991

We do not agree that the failure of an organization to qualify for tax exemption necessarily means that it is primarily a social club, although a purely social club obviously would not qualify. … We conclude, however, that the YCC’s activities are not so clearly related to the educational goals or administrative needs of Yale as to require this court to reverse the Department’s denial of the purchaser’s sales tax

Cline v. Jones

111 Ill. 563 · Illinois Supreme Court · May 19, 1884

Wash, 2 Gilm. 557 , it was said a delivery is essential to the validity of every deed, and that “anything which clearly manifests the intention of the grantor and the person to whom it is delivered, that the deed shall presently … And we think the authorities establish that an instrument may be good as a voluntary settlement though it be retained by the grantor in his possession until his death. (Souverbye v. Arden, 1 Johns. Ch. 240 ; Bunn v.