The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
PHYNELOPHA ALLENE
JOHNSON,
Plaintiff,
v. Case No. 19-CV-00426-SPM
SHAWN MEYERS,
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
McGLYNN, District Judge:
Former-plaintiff Phillip Osborne initiated this action on April 16, 2019 (Doc. 1).
Following his death, the Administrator of his estate, Phynelopha Allene Johnson,
became the named plaintiff (Doc. 36). This matter comes before the Court for
consideration of Defendant Shawn Meyers’1 Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc.
56). Plaintiff Johnson filed a response to Defendant’s motion (Doc. 65) and Meyers
replied (Doc. 67). For the reasons set forth below, the Court grants the motion for
summary judgment.
RELEVANT FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
This case centers around the alleged mistaken identity of a drug dealer after
several controlled drug purchases utilizing a confidential source. Johnson alleges
that Osborne was falsely arrested and detained for seven days in Pulaski County,
Illinois (on behalf of Alexander County, Illinois) based on an affidavit that lacked
1 In the Complaint, the Defendant’s last name is spelled “Meyers,” however, it appears from his
deposition that his name is spelled “Myers.”
probable cause. The affiant, Officer Myers with the Illinois State Police, had
conducted several controlled purchases of crack cocaine at a house in Cairo, Illinois
through a confidential source. At the beginning of the investigation, the informant
did not know the identity of the seller. Myers later stated in his affidavit that the
seller was Osborne. Osborne was arrested and charged with six counts of unlawful
delivery of a controlled substance, but those charges were eventually dismissed.
Osborne then filed this suit, asserting false imprisonment under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
against Myers and liability under § 1983 and Monell against both Alexander and
Pulaski County, Illinois. The count against Alexander and Pulaski County was later
dismissed (Doc. 30). Myers then moved for summary judgment (Doc. 38). The parties
set forth the following undisputed facts:
Through Myers’ investigation, an individual in a house in Cairo sold crack
cocaine to a confidential source on at least seven occasions. The purchases were
captured on video, and the likeness of the seller can be seen on the video. To get to
his conclusion that Osborne was the seller, Myers stated in his declaration that he
obtained a name, ran that name through a database to obtain the individual’s
driver’s license photograph, compared the photograph with the video from the
purchases, and presented the photograph to the confidential source for another layer
of verification (Doc. 58-2, p. 10).
In his deposition, Myers stated that the person he saw in the video was
Osborne (Doc. 58-1, pp. 35, 39). Like in his declaration, he then detailed the steps he
took to get to that conclusion (Id. at 36-40). As a part of that testimony, Myers stated
that the confidential source that he relied on, which he developed a year or more
before the purchases, “emphatically, unequivocally” identified Osborne as the seller
after looking at his driver’s license photograph (Id. at 35, 44).
APPLICABLE LAW AND LEGAL STANDARDS
Summary judgment is the moment in a lawsuit where a party lays its
proverbial cards on the table, showing what evidence it possesses to convince a trier
of fact to agree with its version of events. Steen v. Myers, 486 F.3d 1017, 1022 (7th
Cir. 2007) (quoting Hammel v. Eau Galle Cheese Factory, 407 F.3d 852, 859 (7th Cir.
2005) (other citations omitted)). Summary judgment is only appropriate if the
movant “shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Spurling v. C & M Fine Pack,
Inc., 739 F.3d 1055, 1060 (7th Cir. 2014) (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a)). That “burden
on the moving party may be discharged by ‘showing’—that is, pointing out to the
district court—that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party’s
case.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986). Once the moving party has
set forth the basis for summary judgment, the burden then shifts to the nonmoving
party who must go beyond mere conclusory allegations and offer specific facts
showing that there is a genuine issue of fact for trial. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(e); see Lujan
v. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n, 497 U.S. 871, 888 (1990); see also Celotex, 477 U.S. at 232-24.
In determining the existence of a genuine dispute of material fact, the Court
construes all facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and draws all
reasonable inferences in favor of that party. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477
U.S. 242, 255 (1986); Spath v. Hayes Wheels Intern.-Indiana, Inc., 211 F.3d 392, 396
(7th Cir. 2000). While the Court must view the evidence and draw all reasonable
inferences in favor of the opposing party, “[i]nferences and opinions must be
grounded on more than flights of fancy, speculations, hunches, intuitions, or
rumors[.]” Bennington v. Caterpillar Inc., 275 F.3d 654, 658 (7th Cir. 2001); Rand v.
CF Industries, Inc., 42 F.3d 1139, 1146 (7th Cir. 1994); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,
Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). “[A] complete failure of proof concerning an essential
element of the nonmoving party’s case necessarily renders all other facts
immaterial.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. Furthermore, when opposing parties tell two
different stories, one of which is blatantly contradicted by the record, so that no
reasonable jury could believe it, a court should not adopt that version of the facts for
purposes of ruling on a motion for summary judgment. Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372,
380 (2007); Henning v. O’Leary, 477 F.3d 492, 496 (7th Cir. 2007).
ANALYSIS
“A claim of false arrest is an allegation that a plaintiff was arrested without
probable cause, in violation of the Fourth Amendment.” Hurt v. Wise, 880 F.3d 831,
841 (7th Cir. 2018) (citation omitted). “The existence of probable cause to arrest is
an absolute defense to any § 1983 claim against a police officer for false arrest or
false imprisonment.” Abbott v. Sangamon Cty., 705 F.3d 706, 713–14 (7th Cir. 2013)
(citing Mustafa v. City of Chicago, 442 F.3d 544, 547 (7th Cir. 2006). “Probable cause
to justify an arrest exists if the totality of the facts and circumstances known to the
officer at the time of the arrest would warrant a reasonable, prudent person in
believing that the arrestee had committed . . . a crime.” Id. at 714 (citing Thayer v.
Chiczewski, 705 F.3d 237, 246 (7th Cir. 2012).
Probable cause “is a fluid concept that relies on the common-sense judgment
of the officers based on the totality of the circumstances.” Williams v. City of Chicago,
733 F.3d 749, 756 (7th Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted). “Probable
cause is only a probability or substantial chance of criminal activity, not a certainty
that a crime was committed.” Beauchamp v. City of Noblesville, 320 F.3d 733, 743
(7th Cir. 2003). “In determining whether information submitted to a judicial officer
in support of a warrant application was sufficient to establish probable cause, we
look only at what the officer knew at the time he sought the warrant, not at how
things turned out in hindsight.” Id.
While the existence of probable cause is often a jury question, “summary
judgment is appropriate when there is no room for a difference of opinion concerning
the facts or the reasonable inferences to be drawn from them.” Qian v. Kautz, 168
F.3d 949, 953 (7th Cir. 1999); Lanigan v. Vill. of East Hazel Crest, 110 F.3d 467, 473
(7th Cir. 1997).
Johnson insists that the identification of Osborne as the seller at the house
was incorrect and provides a picture of Osborne several years later as proof that
Myers misidentified Osborne (Doc 65-2). Myers states that this picture was not
produced in discovery (Doc. 67, p. 2). Johnson also states that during the time that
the videos were taken, Osborne was in Michigan and South Carolina. She asserts
that he had not lived in Cairo since he was a small child and that, while the seller
had a mustache, Osborne did not have facial hair at the time of the purchases.
Whether or not the seller resembled Osborne’s picture or whether Osborne had not
lived in Cairo in years are not the issues here. Even if the Court were to consider
this evidence, it does not bear fruit because the Court looks only to what the officer
knew at the time he sought the warrant. The Court, and the factfinder for that
matter, cannot armchair quarterback Myers. The pivotal question is whether a
reasonable officer would have reason to believe that Osborne, based on the
information at the time, was the seller.
Several circumstances made it reasonable for Myers to believe that Osborne
was the seller. The purchases were captured on video, and the likeness of the seller
is visible. To identify Osborne as the seller, Myers stated in his declaration that he
obtained Osborne’s name, obtained his driver’s license photograph, compared the
photograph with the video from the purchases, and presented the photograph to the
confidential source for another layer of verification. These steps would lead a
reasonable officer to believe that he had the right man. Johnson simply has not
presented any admissible evidence showing that Myers falsified any statements that
were included in the affidavit.
Even if the Court had concluded that probable cause did not exist, qualified
immunity applies. Qualified immunity shields “government officials from liability
for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established
statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.”
Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009). The doctrine “balances two important
interests – the need to hold public officials accountable when they exercise power
irresponsibly and the need to shield officials from harassment, distraction, and
liability when they perform their duties reasonably.” Id. It protects an official from
suit “when she makes a decision that, even if constitutionally deficient, reasonably
misapprehends the law governing the circumstances she confronted.” Brosseau v.
Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 198 (2004). “[T]he Court must determine whether a
reasonably competent official would know that the conduct was unlawful in the
situation he confronted.” Burritt v. Ditlefsen, 807 F.3d 239, 249 (7th Cir. 2015)
(internal quotation omitted).
“Although closely related, a determination of actual probable cause is separate
and distinct from a determination of what is sometimes referred to as ‘arguable
probable cause’ for qualified immunity purposes.” Burritt, 807 F.3d at 250. “An
officer is entitled to qualified immunity if a reasonable officer could have mistakenly
believed that probable cause existed.” Id. (internal quotation omitted). “Thus, as long
as [the officer] reasonably, albeit possibly mistakenly, believed that probable cause
existed to arrest [the plaintiff], then [the officer] is entitled to qualified immunity.”
Id. (internal quotation omitted). “The fact that criminal charges are eventually
dropped . . . has no consideration in the determination of arguable probable cause at
the time of arrest.” Id. at 249. Based on the processes used in determining the
identity of the seller as Osborne, even if probable cause did not exist, the Court finds
that a reasonable officer could have mistakenly believed that probable cause existed.
Therefore, in the alternative, Myers would be entitled to qualified immunity.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the Court GRANTS Defendant Shawn
Meyers’ Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 56). Plaintiff Phynelopha Allene
Johnson’s claim against Myers is DISMISSED with prejudice. All pending
motions are DENIED as MOOT. The Court DIRECTS the Clerk of Court to enter
judgment accordingly.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: December 6, 2021
s/ Stephen P. McGlynn
STEPHEN P. McGLYNN
U.S. District Judge