Case law

Rivera v. Houser

District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania · Jul 30, 2024

Regarding this standard of review, the Third Circuit has explained that: A state court decision is “contrary to” clearly established federal … Accordingly, this court cannot conclude that the Superior Court’s decision to reject this ground was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law.

Klemm

District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania · Jun 3, 2026

While another inmate was having his blood drawn, Craig observed phlebotomist Jane Doe #6 “touching [the inmate’s] puncture site with her gloved hand and freely touching other surfaces that clearly had not … To establish a Section 1983 claim, a plaintiff must establish that the defendants, acting under color of state law, deprived the plaintiff of a right secured by the United States Constitution.

COLON v. WINGARD

District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania · Jan 27, 2022

In only the extraordinary case will a petitioner be able to establish a “fundamental miscarriage of justice.” Petitioner does not argue that his case qualifies. It clearly does not. C. … In applying it, this Court’s first task is to ascertain what law falls within the scope of the “clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States[,]” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1).

Warner v. United Natural Foods, Inc.

District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania · Jan 13, 2021

But even if we found that clearly-established public policy was implicated— that is, if we were inclined to let this case proceed given the obvious public health concerns inherent in dismissing an employee who reports ( … Upholding the legality of the terminations would have also frustrated clearly- established legal rights that were statutorily granted to employees.

Samuels v. Kauffman

District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania · Jan 27, 2020

merits in state court proceedings, habeas relief cannot be granted unless: the adjudication of the claim – (1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly … The two-pronged test established in Strickland “qualifies as ‘clearly established Federal law’” for purposes of the AEDPA. See Rainey v. Varner, 603 F.3d 189, 197 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting Williams v.

Edwards v. Kijakazi

District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania · Oct 7, 2025

At the second step, claimant must establish that he suffers from a “severe medically determinable . . . … Contrary to Edwards’s contention that the “ALJ clearly considered only Dr.

Schneider v. Berryhill

District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania · Feb 18, 2020

It is well-settled that “[a] claimant bears the burden of establishing each element of a Listing, or “all of the criteria in the listing.” Weidman v. Colvin, 164 Supp.3d 650, 659 (M.D.Pa. … No doubt that the ALJ “must clearly set forth the reasons for his decision.” Diaz v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 577 F.3d 500, 504 (3d Cir. 2009) (citation omitted).

Faurelus v. Overmayer

District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania · Aug 23, 2022

The “clearly established Federal law” governing sufficiency of the evidence claims is set forth in the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979). … For AEDPA purposes, the Strickland test qualifies as “clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court.” Williams, 529 U.S. at 391, 120 S.Ct. 1495.

Adams v. Superintendent SCI-Huntingdon

District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania · Oct 21, 2020

Foster fails to make a sufficient showing of one.”). 9 The two-pronged test established in Strickland “qualifies as ‘clearly … Upon review of the record, the Court concludes that the Superior Court’s disposition of Petitioner’s claim did not result in a decision contrary to, or involve an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal

Nelson v. Hauser

District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania · Dec 12, 2023

except Lwekamaw.13 The Court then sua sponte dismissed Nelson’s state-law negligence claims, as it was clear that Defendants’ alleged conduct was performed within the scope of their employment and was thus statutorily immune … Nelson next points to page 2 of CM/ECF Document 123-4, contending that it “clearly confirms Defendant Redick dispensed [his] 4:30pm Geod[o]n” on September 16, thereby creating a discrepancy (and dispute of fact) with the

Dickson v. Salamon

District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania · Sep 14, 2021

The petitioner bears the burden of establishing that he is entitled to benefit from equitable tolling. See Pace, 544 U.S. at 418. … He asserts that the documents provided by Respondents do “not even remotely establish that [his] time to appeal the conviction was ever legally triggered.

Moss v. DeBlaso

District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania · Jul 14, 2021

established federal law. … The two-pronged test established in Strickland “qualifies as ‘clearly established Federal law’” for purposes of the AEDPA. See Rainey v. Varner, 603 F.3d 189, 197 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting Williams v.

Sanchez v. Cameron

District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania · Apr 1, 2022

(1) [the decision] was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) [the decision] was … The two-pronged test established in Strickland “qualifies as ‘clearly established Federal law” for purposes of the AEDPA. See Rainey v. Varner, 603 F.3d 189, 197 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting Williams v.

Malusky v. Schuylkill County

District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania · Aug 28, 2024

Neither did Plaintiff’s request amount to asking to establish the conditions of her employment. See id. at 581 (quoting Weiler v. Household Fin. Corp., 1010 F.3d 519, 526 (7th Cir. 1996)). … The word “person” used in a Pennsylvania statute enacted after 1937 “includes … a government entity (other than the Commonwealth),” “unless the context clearly indicates otherwise.” 1 Pa. Cons. Stat.

Mastrella v. DeJoy

District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania · Nov 18, 2021

To make out a claim of discrimination under the Rehab Act, a plaintiff must establish that (1) he is disabled within the meaning of the Rehab Act; (2) he is otherwise qualified for the position, with or without reasonable … It clearly does.

Clews v. County of Schuylkill

District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania · Feb 23, 2024

Lastly regarding this theme, the Third Circuit decided that, although deputy coroners may represent the coroner to the public, “the record does not clearly show whether Dr. Moylan or Dr. … Plaintiffs counter that County has the burden to negate the reasonable inference established by Plaintiffs’ estimates because County failed to keep proper records.

Lee-Chima v. Hughes

District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania · Mar 11, 2025

Once such a showing has been made, the non-moving party must offer specific facts contradicting those averred by the movant to establish a genuine issue of material fact. Lujan v. … Alternatively, they assert that Lee-Chima’s claims fail on the merits or are barred by qualified immunity. The Court begins, as it must, with the issue of exhaustion of administrative remedies. A.

Colon-Santiago v. Prime Care, Inc.

District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania · Jul 7, 2025

any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities … (“Only ‘persons’ are subject to suit under Section 1983, and entities such as prisons, medical departments, or private medical companies generally do not qualify as ‘persons’ for purposes of Section 1983.”

Rasheed v. Saez

District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania · Oct 24, 2022

Summary judgment is appropriate where the non-moving party “fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof … Monetary damages qualify as “compensation or other legal relief normally available from a court.” Sanders, 2013 WL 1703582, at *6.

United States v. Robinson

513 F. Supp. 2d 169 · District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania · Jun 8, 2007

This does not mean that omissions are immune from Franks scrutiny, only that an affiant is not re *178 quired to share all that he or she knows about the investigation in an affidavit in support of a search warrant. … I have set forth only those facts that I believe are essential to establish foundation necessary to support an order authorizing the interception of wire communications.