Nelson v. Hauser

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

MICHAEL NELSON, No. 4:22-CV-00686

Plaintiff, (Chief Judge Brann)

v.

C. HAUSER, et al.,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

DECEMBER 12, 2023

Plaintiff Michael Nelson, an inmate in state custody, filed the instant pro se

action under 42 U.S.C. § 19831 regarding events that allegedly occurred while he

was confined at the State Correctional Institution, Mahanoy (SCI Mahanoy), in

Frackville, Pennsylvania. Nelson claims that several SCI Mahanoy medical

providers violated his Eighth Amendment rights regarding his medical care.

Presently pending are Defendants’ motions for summary judgment pursuant to

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. For the following reasons, the Court will grant

Defendants’ Rule 56 motions.

1 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Section 1983 creates a private cause of action to redress constitutional

wrongs committed by state officials. The statute is not a source of substantive rights; it serves

as a mechanism for vindicating rights otherwise protected by federal law. See Gonzaga Univ.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND2

At all times relevant to the instant case, Nelson was incarcerated at SCI

Mahanoy in the Diversionary Treatment Unit (DTU).3 Nelson claims that, during a

one-week period in the DTU in September 2021, five nurses—Yarisa Polanco,

Marissa Redick, Angela Landmesser, Amy Silinskie, and Victor Lwekamaw—

failed to dispense his afternoon medication “Geodon.”4 He additionally contends

that C. Hauser, the Corrections Health Care Administrator, was informed about the

nursing staff’s shortcomings and failed to take corrective action.5

Nelson filed suit in May 2022.6 He primarily asserted Section 1983 claims

sounding in deliberate indifference to serious medical needs.7 His allegations

involved purported failure to dispense afternoon Geodon on September 15 (by

Polanco), 16 (by Redick), 18 (by Landmesser), 19 (by Silinskie), 20 (by

Lwekamaw), and 21 (also by Lwekamaw).8 He also appeared to assert state-law

2 Local Rule of Court 56.1 requires that a motion for summary judgment be supported “by a

separate, short, and concise statement of the material facts, in numbered paragraphs, as to

which the moving party contends there is no genuine issue to be tried.” LOCAL RULE OF COURT

56.1. A party opposing a motion for summary judgment must file a separate statement of

material facts, responding to the numbered paragraphs set forth in the moving party’s statement

and identifying genuine issues to be tried. Id. Defendants filed their statements of material

facts concurrently with their Rule 56 motions. See Docs. 121, 123. Nelson has not responded

to either statement of facts. Accordingly, Defendants’ statements of facts will be deemed

admitted unless plainly contradicted by the record. See LOCAL RULE OF COURT 56.1.

3 Doc. 123 ¶ 2.

4 See Doc. 106 at 2. According to Nelson’s medical records, it appears that he was receiving a

generic version of Geodon, “ziprasidone.” See Doc. 123-4 at 2.

5 See Doc. 106 at 2.

6 See generally Doc. 1.

7 See Doc. 106 at 3.

8 See id. at 2, 7-8 & n.39.

negligence and medical malpractice claims against all Defendants.9 Nelson

requested millions of dollars in compensatory damages and also sought unspecified

punitive, injunctive, and declaratory relief.10

Defendants moved to dismiss Nelson’s complaint, targeting only his federal

Section 1983 claims and the relief requested.11 The Court granted those motions in

part and denied them in part.12 Specifically, the Court denied Defendants’ Rule

12(b)(6) motions with respect to Nelson’s Eighth Amendment medical indifference

claims against all Defendants except Lwekamaw.13 The Court then sua sponte

dismissed Nelson’s state-law negligence claims, as it was clear that Defendants’

alleged conduct was performed within the scope of their employment and was thus

statutorily immune from Nelson’s negligence claims.14 The Court likewise sua

sponte dismissed Nelson’s state-law medical malpractice claims pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), as he had failed to plead any type of compensable

physical injury from the alleged malpractice, as required by Pennsylvania law.15

Consequently, only Nelson’s Eighth Amendment medical indifference claims

remained against five defendants: Polanco, Redick, Landmesser, Silinskie, and

Hauser.

9 See id. at 2.

10 See id. at 4.

11 See generally Docs. 42, 82, 87.

12 See generally Docs. 106, 107.

13 See Doc. 106 at 6-9.

14 See id. at 9-10.

15 See id. at 10-11.

The Court next addressed Nelson’s various claims for relief. First, the Court

determined that Nelson was barred from recovering compensatory damages under

Section 1983 because he had not pled that he suffered a physical injury from the

alleged short-term denial of Geodon.16 Punitive damages were likewise ruled out

because Nelson’s allegations involving failure to provide a single dose of a

prescription medication simply did not implicate the type of “callous” or

“malicious” conduct or “evil motive or intent” required for such damages.17

Lastly, although Nelson claimed that he was seeking unspecified “injunctive

relief,” the Court noted that his separate motions for preliminary injunctive relief

had been denied and that his claims implicated a finite window of treatment in

September 2021, thus mooting any request for prospective or permanent injunctive

relief.18 Nelson’s recovery in the instant case was accordingly limited to the

possibility of declaratory relief or nominal damages only.19

Defendants now move for summary judgment on Nelson’s remaining Eighth

Amendment claims, primarily relying on his failure to exhaust administrative

remedies.20 Nelson concedes that nearly all his claims are unexhausted and

therefore most of Defendants’ Rule 56 motions must be granted, but maintains that

16 See id. at 12.

17 See id.

18 See id. at 12-13.

19 See id. at 13.

20 See generally Docs. 119, 122.

he can survive Rule 56 scrutiny with respect to his Eighth Amendment claim

against Redick.21 Defendants’ Rule 56 motions are ripe for disposition.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

“One of the principal purposes of the summary judgment rule is to isolate

and dispose of factually unsupported claims or defenses.”22 Summary judgment is

appropriate where “the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any

material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”23 Material

facts are those “that could alter the outcome” of the litigation, and “disputes are

‘genuine’ if evidence exists from which a rational person could conclude that the

position of the person with the burden of proof on the disputed issue is correct.”24

At the Rule 56 stage, the Court’s function is not to “weigh the evidence and

determine the truth of the matter” but rather “to determine whether there is a

genuine issue for trial.”25 The Court must view the facts and evidence presented

“in the light most favorable to the non-moving party” and must “draw all

reasonable inferences in that party’s favor.”26 This evidence, however, must be

adequate—as a matter of law—to sustain a judgment in favor of the nonmoving

21 See Doc. 138 at 1.

22 Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-24 (1986).

23 FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a).

24 EBC, Inc. v. Clark Bldg. Sys., Inc., 618 F.3d 253, 262 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting Clark v. Modern

Grp. Ltd., 9 F.3d 321, 326 (3d Cir. 1993)).

25 Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986).

26 Thomas v. Cumberland County, 749 F.3d 217, 222 (3d Cir. 2014).

party on the claim or claims at issue.27 A “scintilla of evidence” supporting the

nonmovant’s position is insufficient; “there must be evidence on which the jury

could reasonably find for the [nonmovant].”28 Succinctly stated, summary

judgment is “put up or shut up time” for the nonmoving party.29

III. DISCUSSION

Defendants contend that Nelson failed to exhaust his administrative

remedies. They alternatively argue that, even if the Court were to reach the merits

of Nelson’s Eighth Amendment claims, those claims cannot survive Rule 56

scrutiny. The Court will consider each argument in turn.

A. Administrative Exhaustion

The Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PLRA)30 requires prisoners to

exhaust available administrative remedies before suing prison officials for alleged

constitutional violations.31 Proper exhaustion is mandatory, even if the inmate is

seeking relief—like monetary damages—that cannot be granted by the

administrative system.32 The exhaustion process a prisoner must follow is

27 Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 250-57; Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475

U.S. 574, 587-89 (1986).

28 Daniels v. Sch. Dist. of Phila., 776 F.3d 181, 192 (3d Cir. 2015) (quoting Liberty Lobby, 477

U.S. at 252) (alteration in original).

29 Daubert v. NRA Grp., LLC, 861 F.3d 382, 391 (3d Cir. 2017) (quoting Berkeley Inv. Grp.

v. Colkitt, 455 F.3d 195, 201 (3d Cir. 2006)).

30 42 U.S.C. § 1997e et seq.

31 See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a); Ross v. Blake, 578 U.S. 632, 639, 642 (2016) (explaining that only

“available” remedies must be exhausted).

32 Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 85 (2006).

governed by the contours of the prison grievance system in effect where the inmate

is incarcerated.33

Pennsylvania’s Department of Corrections (DOC) employs a three-step

grievance process that must be completed to properly exhaust administrative

remedies in most cases.34 If informal resolution attempts do not solve the problem,

the first step is to file a written grievance (using form DC-804, Part 1) with the

Facility Grievance Coordinator within 15 working days after “the event upon

which the claim is based.”35 An adverse decision by the grievance coordinator

must be appealed to the Facility Manager within 15 working days of the initial-

review response or rejection.36 Finally, an adverse decision by the Facility

Manager must be appealed to “Final Review” with the Secretary’s Office of

Inmate Grievances and Appeals (SOIGA), and again must be submitted within 15

working days of the date of the Facility Manager’s decision.37

The DOC has specific requirements for grievances submitted by inmates.

Those requirements include, among other things, that the grievance “be legible

[and] understandable”; “include a statement of the facts relevant to the claim” as

well as “the date, approximate time, and location of the event(s) that gave rise to

33 Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 218 (2007); see also Woodford, 548 U.S. at 90-91.

34 See Booth v. Churner, 206 F.3d 289, 292 n.2 (3d Cir. 2002); COMMONWEALTH OF PA., DEP’T

OF CORR., INMATE GRIEVANCE SYS., Policy No. DC-ADM 804 (May 1, 2015) (hereinafter

“DC-ADM 804”).

35 DC-ADM 804 § 1(A)(3)-(5).

36 Id. § 2(A)(1).

37 Id. § 2(B)(1).

the grievance”; that the prisoner “identify individuals directly involved in the

event(s)”; and that the grievance include “the specific relief sought,” including

“compensation or other legal relief normally available from a court.”38

The Court need not expend significant time on the Rule 56 motions with

respect to defendants Polanco, Silinskie, Hauser, and Landmesser. Nelson does

not oppose their motions for summary judgment; in fact, he explicitly concedes

that he did not exhaust any Section 1983 claim against them and thus summary

judgment should be granted in their favor.39 Nelson maintains, however, that he

exhausted his medical indifference claim against Redick and it should be “allowed

to go [to] trial.”40 The Court will therefore examine whether Nelson exhausted his

Eighth Amendment claim against Redick.

It is undisputed that only one grievance was filed and appealed to final

review with the SOIGA that is relevant to the claims in this case: grievance

number 946717.41 Nelson even attached the SOIGA’s final denial of this

grievance to his complaint.42 Nelson filed grievance 946717 on September 18,

2021, and it was received by the grievance coordinator on September 21, 2021.43

His grievance alleges as follows:

38 Id. § 1(A)(11).

39 See Doc. 138 at 1 (conceding that summary judgment should be granted in favor of all

Defendants except Redick).

40 See id.

41 See Doc. 123 ¶¶ 9-13; Doc. 121 ¶ 3.

42 See Doc. 1-27.

43 See Doc. 123-3 at 1.

On 9-16-21 Medical personal [sic] said that I refused my medication

that was never off[ered.] Unit Correctional Officer called medical a

number of times for my medication, but I never got them [sic]. On 9-

17-21 the Correctional Officers notified Unit Psychologist for H-Block

Ms. G that I not [sic] offer [sic] my medication, so couldn’t [sic] have

refused. This is a [sic] intentional denial of treatment once prescribed

to my serious mental Illness and Deliberate Indifference. I’m humbly

requesting $250,000.00 in punitive damages.44

This grievance was fully investigated, appealed all the way to the SOIGA, and

denied on the merits.45

As noted above, proper exhaustion under Pennsylvania DOC policy requires

that initial grievances explicitly identify “the specific relief sought,” including

“compensation or other legal relief normally available from a court.”46 It is plainly

evident that the only relief Nelson requested in his grievance was “$250,000.00 in

punitive damages.”47 He did not request compensatory damages (likely because

there was no injury), declaratory or injunctive relief, or nominal damages.

The problem for Nelson, as this Court has previously explained,48 is that the

failure of a nurse to dispense a single dose of a prescription medication on one day

simply does not “implicate the type of ‘callous’ or ‘malicious’ conduct or ‘evil

motive or intent’ required for punitive damages to be available.”49 Consequently,

44 Id.

45 See generally Doc. 123-3.

46 DC-ADM 804 § 1(A)(11)(d) (emphasis supplied).

47 Id.

48 See Doc. 106 at 12.

49 Id. (citing Springer v. Henry, 435 F.3d 268, 281 (3d Cir. 2006); Allah v. Al-Hafeez, 226 F.3d

247, 251 (3d Cir. 2000) (citing Coleman v. Kaye, 87 F.3d 1491, 1497 (3d Cir. 1996))).

Nelson failed to exhaust his administrative remedies with respect to the only types

of relief possibly available in the instant lawsuit, i.e., declaratory relief or nominal

damages.50

B. Eighth Amendment Medical Indifference

Assuming that Nelson fully exhausted his Eighth Amendment claim against

Redick (including any relief sought), that claim still fails on the merits.

In the context of prison medical care, the Eighth Amendment “requires

prison officials to provide basic medical treatment to those whom it has

incarcerated.”51 To establish an Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim

regarding inadequate medical care, a plaintiff must show “(i) a serious medical

need, and (ii) acts or omissions by prison officials that indicate deliberate

indifference to that need.”52 A serious medical need is “one that has been

diagnosed by a physician as requiring treatment or one that is so obvious that a lay

person would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor’s attention.”53

50 The Court observes that under Third Circuit precedent, nominal damages do not need to be

alleged in the complaint. See Mitchell v. Horn, 318 F.3d 523, 533 n.8 (3d Cir. 2003) (citing

Allah v. Al-Hafeez, 226 F.3d 247, 251 (3d Cir. 2000)). Consequently, it is unclear whether a

request for such damages must be administratively exhausted. But cf. Everett v. Robinson,

2023 WL 6458850 (3d Cir. 2023) (nonprecedential) (finding that claims for “monetary

damages and injunctive relief” were procedurally defaulted because they were not raised in

prisoner’s “initial grievance, as required by DC-ADM 804” and because prisoner failed to

complete DOC’s appeal process).

51 Rouse v. Plantier, 182 F.3d 192, 197 (3d Cir. 1999).

52 Natale v. Camden Cnty. Corr. Facility, 318 F.3d 575, 582 (3d Cir. 2003).

53 Monmouth Cnty. Corr. Inst. Inmates v. Lanzaro, 834 F.2d 326, 347 (3d Cir. 1987).

Deliberate indifference by prison officials may be evidenced by intentional

refusal to provide care known to be medically necessary, delayed provision of

medical treatment for non-medical reasons, denial of prescribed medical treatment,

or denial of reasonable requests for treatment resulting in suffering or risk of

injury.54 Deliberate indifference to serious medical needs is an exacting standard,

requiring a showing of “unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.”55 Claims

sounding in mere medical negligence will not suffice.56

Nelson claims that Redick never offered him Geodon on the afternoon of

September 16, 2021. Nelson, however, has failed to carry his burden at summary

judgment because he has not identified any evidence that would rebut Defendants’

contention (and supporting evidence) that there was no Eighth Amendment

violation by Redick on September 16. Nelson has not, for example, proffered a

declaration or affidavit, medical records, witness statements, or any other

competent evidence that could sustain a verdict in his favor. He instead cites to

several pages of the documentary evidence Defendants provided in support of their

Rule 56 motion. These minimal citations are unpersuasive.

Nelson first claims that, on page 2 of CM/ECF Document 123-3, “line 5

states Plaintiff refused his 4:30pm Geod[o]n” on September 16, but then “in line

54 See Durmer v. O’Carroll, 991 F.2d 64, 68 & n.11 (3d Cir. 1993) (quoting Lanzaro, 834 F.2d

at 346).

55 Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976) (citation omitted).

56 Rouse, 182 F.3d at 197.

10 . . . it states that [he] was compliant with morning and evening medication[.]”57

Nelson posits that lines 5 and 10 of the grievance coordinator’s initial review

response (Doc. 123-3 at 2) are therefore “inconsistent.”58

There is nothing inconsistent about lines 5 and 10 of the initial review

response. Nelson receives various medications in the morning (6:30 a.m.),

afternoon (4:30 p.m.), and evening (7:00 p.m.).59 The fact that he was compliant

with his “morning and evening” medications on September 16 does not contradict

the grievance coordinator’s assertion that he was noncompliant and refused his

afternoon Geodon that day.

Nelson next points to page 2 of CM/ECF Document 123-4, contending that

it “clearly confirms Defendant Redick dispensed [his] 4:30pm Geod[o]n” on

September 16, thereby creating a discrepancy (and dispute of fact) with the

grievance coordinator’s initial review response (Doc. 123-3 at 2) and his Drug

Administration History Report (Doc. 123-6 at 11), which both indicate that he

refused his afternoon Geodon that day.60 But Nelson is again mistaken. On page 2

of CM/ECF Document 123-4, which contains Nelson’s detailed prescription

medication records for September 2021, the entry on the 4:30 p.m. or “afternoon”

Geodon block for September 16 contains an “MR” for “Marissa Redick” and,

57 Doc. 138 ¶ 2.

58 See id. ¶¶ 2, 9.

59 See generally Doc. 123-4.

60 Id. ¶¶ 2-4, 6-7, 9.

beneath those initials, an “R” that indicates that Geodon was “refused.”61 Hence,

there is no inconsistency in the records. Rather, the records submitted by

Defendants on which Nelson relies all unequivocally reflect that Nelson refused his

afternoon Geodon on September 16, 2021, not that it was never offered to him as

he alleges. Nelson, therefore, has failed to provide or point to any evidence that

would support his Eighth Amendment medical indifference claim against Redick.

Furthermore, because Nelson failed to comply with Local Rule 56.1,

Defendants’ statements of fact are deemed admitted.62 Upon Nelson’s admission

of these material facts, it follows that Nelson cannot succeed on his Eighth

Amendment claim against Redick. The undisputed, admitted facts establish that

(1) Nelson cannot produce any competent admissible evidence to support his

allegation that Redick took any action to deny him medical treatment63; (2) Nelson

cannot produce any competent admissible evidence to support his allegation that

Redick took any action to delay his medical treatment64; (3) Nelson cannot produce

any competent admissible evidence to support his allegation that Redick refused to

provide him with any prescribed medical treatment65; and (4) Nelson cannot

produce any competent admissible evidence to support his allegation that Redick

61 See Doc. 123-4 at 2 (Geodon entry for September 16, 2021, 16:30 hours).

62 See LOCAL RULE OF COURT 56.1.

63 Doc. 123 ¶ 20(b).

64 Id. ¶ 20(c).

65 Id. ¶ 20(d).

had reason to believe or actual knowledge that Nelson was being denied treatment

or otherwise mistreated by medical providers.66

Under these admitted facts, and with no evidence to the contrary, no

reasonable juror could find in Nelson’s favor on his Eighth Amendment claim

against Redick. The Court, therefore, must grant Redick’s motion for summary

judgment.

IV. CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, the Court will grant Defendants’ motions for

summary judgment. An appropriate Order follows.

BY THE COURT:

s/ Matthew W. Brann

Matthew W. Brann

Chief United States District Judge

66 Id. ¶ 21(b).