Case law

Sourovelis v. City of Philadelphia

320 F.R.D. 12 · District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania · Feb 23, 2017

The Court finds that Plaintiffs’ proposed counsel, the Institute for Justice and local counsel David Rudovsky, are qualified to represent the putative class. … P. 23(c)(2)(A), the rules do not establish a basis for the provision of opt-out rights in a Rule 23(b)(2) class.

Roxane Laboratories, Inc. v. Smithkline Beecham Corp.

798 F. Supp. 2d 619 · District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania · Jul 14, 2011

USA Petroleum Co., 495 U.S. 328, 334 , 110 S.Ct. 1884 , 109 L.Ed.2d 333 (1990) ("[An] injury, although causally related to an antitrust violation, nevertheless will not qualify as an ‘antitrust injury' unless it is attributable … Exxon Mobil Corp., 471 F.Supp.2d 20, 37 (D.D.C. 2007) (“When government action is the source of an alleged antitrust violation, the private party is immune because the intervening government action breaks the causal chain

BUTLER v. DJINDJIEV

District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania · Jan 23, 2020

Butler raises many claims against numerous Defendants and does not clearly connect the named Defendants to the allegations against them. … The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania has expressly withheld consent and has not waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity. See 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 8521-22.

Edward J. Sweeney & Sons, Inc. v. Texaco, Inc.

478 F. Supp. 243 · District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania · Sep 4, 1979

Clearly, Texaco gasoline is more interchangeable with other gasoline than Cadillac automobiles are with other automobiles. … Sweeney has clearly failed to do that in this case. See note 24, supra. 73 .

KELLY v. KINDER MORGAN, INC.

District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania · Aug 28, 2024

Kinder Morgan does not contend that Plaintiff was not “qualified” for the position he held. … While Kinder Morgan was clearly concerned about Kelly’s performance prior to his utilization of FMLA leave on November 30, 2021, there was not yet any documentation that termination had been decided upon.

WRIGHT v. FEDDER

District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania · Oct 3, 2025

In the alternative, Wright argues that even if these terms do not qualify, the phrase “I reserve all rights and remedies” should have served as a catch-all for any available relief, including monetary. Pl. Br. at 7-8. … Oct. 24, 2022) (“Plaintiff's initial grievance[] clearly does not request any monetary relief but asks that the officer involved in the incident be fired.”).

Kia v. Imaging Sciences International, Inc.

735 F. Supp. 2d 256 · District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania · Aug 20, 2010

As a general rule, corporate officers are immune from interfering with the contracts of their corporation, as the officers and the corporation are considered a single entity when the officer is acting within the scope of … Any statements by Singh during this meeting regarding Kia’s work-related performance or the amount Kia was to receive as a discretionary bonus were clearly made pursuant to his authority as an owner and officer of ISI. 8

HUSICK

District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania · Nov 21, 2025

As Plaintiff acknowledges, “[e]vidence should not be excluded pursuant to a motion in limine, unless it is clearly inadmissible on all potential grounds.” Seawright v. Banning, 677 F. Supp. 3d 310, 313 (E.D. … “It is well-established under Pennsylvania law that the burden rests on the party asserting estoppel to establish the defense by clear, precise and unequivocal evidence.” Chrysler Credit Corp. v. First Nat.

NOTHSTEIN v. USA CYCLING

District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania · Oct 19, 2020

Rather, courts have applied a qualified privilege with firm boundaries. … “Good cause is established on a showing that disclosure will work a clearly defined and serious injury to the party seeking closure. The injury must be shown with specificity.” Publicker Indus., Inc. v.

James v. O'BANNON

557 F. Supp. 631 · District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania · Jun 18, 1982

Plaintiff James’ claim would appear to be typical of the claims, and plaintiff James is most assuredly represented by counsel highly versed in these problems and well qualified to carry the banner of the class. … These regulations clearly indicate that all disregards were applied to gross income initially. See, for example, 233.20(a)(6)(iii), defining “earned income”.

Williams v. Empire Funding Corp.

227 F.R.D. 362 · District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania · Apr 11, 2005

As the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania determined, “[t]he statute clearly requires, in a private action, that a plaintiff suffer an ascertainable loss as a result of the defendant’s prohibited action.” Id. … Two criteria must be met to satisfy Rule 23's adequacy requirement: (1) The plaintiff's attorney must be qualified, experienced, and generally able to conduct the proposed litigation, and (2) the plaintiff must not have interests

FARHANGUI v. GROSSINGER

District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania · Mar 23, 2021

Prevailing Party “[T]he settled law of Pennsylvania is that attorneys’ fees are recoverable from an adverse party to a cause only when provided for by statute, or when clearly … Because this matter does not concern a statutory attorneys’ fee award and, further, because Pennsylvania law governs the parties’ loan agreements, the Third Circuit’s well-established framework for evaluating statutory

American Institute of Design v. Riley

969 F. Supp. 936 · District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania · Jun 24, 1997

Following this statutory directive, the Secretary has promulgated regulations establishing the prepublication rate process. See 34 C.F.R. § 668.17 (3). … This provision clearly sets out the factors which the Secretary has determined are relevant to a loan servicing appeal.

KOVALEV v. CLAIBORNE

District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania · Mar 2, 2020

Absent verified allegations to suggest the document was indeed fraudulent, we cannot find it qualifying as “retaliatory,” let alone temporally suggestive of retaliation when prepared in 2015. … “Establishing municipal liability on a failure to train claim under § 1983 is difficult.

Charles Shaid of Pennsylvania, Inc. v. George Hyman Construction Co.

947 F. Supp. 844 · District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania · Nov 13, 1996

According to Shaid, because “[l]ike the plaintiff in Pearl Assurance, Shaid was injured by intentional wrongful conduct which clearly violated the criminal law [extortion] ... … By an expansive view of justification, Holmes could immunize from liability conduct which might otherwise have been liable under another tort theory.

CHAMBERS v. CITY OF PHILADELPHIA

District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania · Feb 29, 2024

The plausibility standard does not require the complaint to establish a probability of relief or to demonstrate that all prima facie elements of a claim can be met. … This notice is especially important in the supervisory liability context, because unlike the City, supervisory defendants sued in their individual capacities may raise qualified immunity defenses. See Owen v.

United States v. Yokshan

658 F. Supp. 2d 654 · District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania · Oct 1, 2009

The Affidavits clearly convey that Person 1 and Person 2 stated to SIU *661 officers that the Defendant usually sold narcotics in bulk. (See id. at Ex. … The omission regarding the Defendant’s fear of selling narcotics in Bensalem Township may qualify as a fact that a judge would want to know under Wilson in order to weigh the reliability of the information that the Defendant

Abbotts Dairies Division of Fairmont Foods, Inc. v. Butz

389 F. Supp. 1 · District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania · Jan 9, 1975

Clearly every price increase in the Delaware Valley during this emergency period was in bracket type integers. … These words hardly qualify as a clear statement that prices will change thereafter on a penny-by-penny basis as prices in another market area go up or down.

BURKE v. DEPUY SYNTHES COMPANIES

District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania · Jun 30, 2020

Here, by contrast, the undisputed record before me does not clearly establish that Plaintiff’s certifications as to her being disabled (as contained either in her ERISA lawsuit or request for social security benefits … Aug. 20, 2015) (“[T]he weight of authority in the Third Circuit, as well as other Circuits, clearly establishes that a leave of absence for an indefinite duration is not a reasonable accommodation.”

RANSOM-ELLISON

District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania · Feb 17, 2026

Ransom-Ellison argues her requested accommodation was reasonable because it would not have interfered with her ability to perform the essential functions of her job and was not clearly ineffective or outlandishly costly … If established, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to show that the defendant’s justification is pretextual. Id.