WRIGHT v. FEDDER

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

____________________________________

SEAN WRIGHT, :

Plaintiff, :

:

v. : Civil No. 2:23-cv-5099

:

UNIT MANAGER FEDDER, et al., :

Defendants. :

____________________________________

O P I N I O N

Defendants’ Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, ECF No. 73 – Granted

Plaintiff’s Motion for Jury Trial Demand, ECF No. 81 - Granted

Joseph F. Leeson, Jr. October 3, 2025

United States District Judge

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Sean Wright initiated this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against

Defendants Patrick Fedder, Robert Kalb, Wayne Styles, and Thomas Fondi (collectively,

“Defendants”), alleging failure to protect and excessive force. These claims arise out of an attack

on Wright by other inmates on December 28, 2021, and an incident involving Defendant Kalb on

January 4, 2022, all of which occurred while Wright was incarcerated at SCI–Phoenix.

Before the Court is Defendants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on the failure to

protect claim. After review of the initial pleadings, Defendants’ Motion, Wright’s Response,

Wright’s Motion for Jury Trial Demand, and in consideration of the Court’s previous Orders,1

this Court finds that Wright failed to exhaust his administrative remedies with respect to the

1 See, specifically, the Court’s Orders dated May 17, 2024, July 22, 2024, August 22 and

26, 2024, October 22 and 28, 2024, November 18, 2024, December 5 and 16, 2024, January 22

and 28, 2025, June 3 and 26, 2025, and August 1, 2025. ECF Nos. 24, 36, 39, 42, 45-46, 52, 56,

60, 64, and 66.

failure to protect claim. For the reasons stated below, Defendants' Motion for Partial Summary

Judgment and Wright’s Motion for Jury Trial Demand are both granted.

II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. Parties

Pro se Plaintiff, Sean Wright, is an inmate at SCI–Forest, however the facts of his claims

relate to Wright’s time at SCI–Phoenix. See Am. Compl., ECF No. 20. Defendants Patrick

Fedder, Robert Kalb, Wayne Styles, and Thomas Fondi were all corrections officers at SCI–

Phoenix during Wright’s imprisonment term.2 Id. at 2, 21. Fedder was also the Unit Manager. Id.

at 2. As of the date of this opinion, they are the only four remaining defendants in this case.3

B. Undisputed Material Facts4

2 The Amended Complaint and Opposition to the Partial Motion for Summary Judgment

state that Fedder was a COIII, Fondi was a COII, Kalb was a COI, and Styles was a COI. See

Am. Compl., ECF No. 20; Plaintiff’s Brief in Opposition to the Motion for Partial Summary

Judgment (Pl. Br.), ECF No. 83. Wright uses “CO” to abbreviate “Correctional Officer” and

roman numerals to correspond with each officer’s rank.

3 Between the Complaint and Amended Complaint, Wright originally brought claims

against more than a dozen defendants. The Court has since dismissed all but the four defendants

mentioned above: Fedder, Fondi, Styles, and Kalb. These remaining defendants have collectively

moved for partial summary judgment.

4 Defendants, in their Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, provide a list of material

facts. See ECF No. 73. Wright, in his Opposition to Defendants’ Motion, states that the material

facts section of Defendants’ brief “cannot be stipulated by Plaintiff,” see ECF No. 83 at 2, then

provides a “Statement of Disputed Factual Issues” (consisting of an objection to Defendants’ use

of Wright’s deposition transcript as an exhibit, followed by four legal questions), see id. at 4-5,

and attaches as “Exhibit 1” to his brief an identical copy of the fact sheet in his Amended

Complaint, see id. at 11-15.

Wright’s objection to Defendants’ use of his deposition transcript as an exhibit to their

Motion does not demonstrate a genuine dispute of fact because Wright does nothing to contradict

the facts as stated therein or to show that Defendants’ list of material facts is unsupported by the

deposition testimony. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1) (“A party asserting that a fact . . . is genuinely

disputed must support the assertion by . . . (A) citing to particular parts of materials in the record

. . . or (B) showing that the materials cited do not establish the absence or presence of a genuine

dispute, or that an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact.”). Nor

does Wright’s blanket refusal to stipulate to Defendants’ material facts in their Motion

demonstrate a genuine dispute of fact. See id. at (e)(2) (“If a party fails to properly support an

assertion of fact or fails to properly address another party’s assertion of fact as required by Rule

On December 23, 2021, Wright received a write-up at SCI–Phoenix for refusing to leave

the Restricted Housing Unit (“RHU”) and move to a cell in J-Block. Id. at 11; Brief in Support of

Defendants’ Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (Def. Br.), ECF No. 73, at 1.5 Wright

informed the Unit Manager, Defendant Fedder, that he feared for his safety due to a conflict he

had with two other inmates, Green and Johnson, who were housed on J-Block. Am. Compl. at

11; Def. Br. at 2. On December 28, 2021, Wright attended a misconduct hearing for his refusal to

leave the RHU. Id. Fedder had the misconduct citation dropped. Id. Later that evening, Wright

was released from the RHU and spoke with Defendant Fondi about the conflict he had with

inmates Green and Johnson. Id. Fondi ignored Wright’s concerns and denied him a place to put

his personal property, so Wright had to carry the contents of his cell in a large bag from A-Block

to J-Block.6 Id.

56(c), the court may . . . consider the fact undisputed for purposes of the motion.”); Celotex

Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986) (finding that, to defeat a motion for summary

judgment, the non-moving party must go beyond the pleadings with affidavits, depositions,

answers to interrogatories or the like in order to demonstrate specific material facts which give

rise to a genuine issue). Wright has not offered any factual evidence in contrast to Defendants’

facts, nor has he shown that evidentiary facts essential to his opposition are otherwise

unavailable to him. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)-(d). Considering this, the Court will deem

Defendants’ facts undisputed for purposes of the Motion, see id. at (e)(2), insofar as they do not

clearly contradict Wright’s facts as listed in his Amended Complaint and appended, verbatim, to

his Opposition Brief, see ECF Nos. 20 and 83, at 11-15. Factual citations in this section will

reference Defendants’ Brief and Wright’s Amended Complaint; though, any fact citation to the

Amended Complaint can also be found on the same page number in the Opposition Brief.

5 The Brief in Support of Defendants’ Motion for Partial Summary Judgment begins on

page three of ECF No. 73, following the Motion and Proposed Order. Because the Brief in

Support has its own pagination (1 through 7), any page references to Defendants’ Brief will use

these page numbers, not the ECF page numbers (3 through 9).

6 This undisputed fact appears relevant to Wright’s tort claim. Wright separately alleges

that Defendants failed to secure his property or to allow him to secure it, and that this provided

an opportunity for other inmates to steal items from his bag of personal belongings during or

after his attack on December 28, 2021. See Am. Compl. at 11; Pl. Br. at 11. Defendants do not

speak to whether Wright’s property was left unsecured or stolen, and this detail is not relevant to

the issue before us.

Upon arriving at J-Block, Wright spoke with Defendant Styles about his conflict with

inmates Green and Johnson. Id. Styles then opened the cell door for one of these inmates,7 and

both Green and Johnson proceeded to attack Wright. Id. After the attack, Wright was transported

to medical to check on his injuries. Id.

C. Wright’s Initial Grievance

On January 11, 2022, Wright filed Grievance No. 963398 against Defendants Fedder and

Fondi,8 along with several other non-parties, for orchestrating the December 28, 2021, assault on

him by inmates Green and Johnson. See Grievance, ECF No. 73-2, at 3. See also Def. Br. at 6;

Pl. Br. at 13. On the grievance form, underneath the instruction to “[s]tate all relief that you are

seeking,” Wright wrote the following: “I want each employee involved to hand over their bond

for liquidation purposes and I reserve all rights and remedies.” See Grievance. On February 3,

2022, Wright’s Grievance was denied as having “no validity.” See ECF No. 73-2 at 4. Wright

filed an appeal, claiming inadequate investigation, restating the events of December 28, 2021,

7 Defendants’ Brief states that Styles opened the door “for either Inmate Green or

Johnson.” Def. Br., ECF No. 73, at 2. Wright’s Amended Complaint and Opposition Brief state

that “Styles opened the door for inmate Johnson,” and that Green and Johnson “were both being

housed on J-blk.” See Am. Compl. and Pl. Br., at 11. By contrast, however, Wright’s Amended

Complaint also says inmate Johnson “was housed on a different Pod,” see Am. Compl. at 11, and

his Deposition appears to suggest that at least one of the two inmates, either Green or Johnson,

was not housed on J-Block, but that Styles opened the door to the block so that said inmate could

enter the unit. See ECF No. 73-1 at 12-13. Nevertheless, all parties appear to agree, at base, that

Styles is responsible for opening a door which gave at least one of the two inmates—either

Green or Johnson—access to Wright in the moments before his attack.

8 Grievance Number 963398 is the only prison grievance appended to the parties’ briefing

and filed in this case, and both parties concede that it is Wright’s “initial” grievance; the Court

will accept and refer to it as such.

In Wright’s initial grievance there is no mention of Defendants Styles or Kalb, except

under the section that reads “[l]ist actions taken and staff you have contacted, before submitting

this grievance,” where Defendant Kalb’s name is barely cognizable in light ink, along with

Fondi, Fedder, and the names of other non-party corrections officers. See ECF No. 73-2.

Defendants appear to concede, however, that this January 11, 2022, grievance is brought against

Styles inasmuch as it is against Fedder and Fondi. See Def. Br. at 6.

and implicating Defendant Styles seemingly for the first time. See id. at 5. On March 1, 2022,

Wright’s grievance appeal was denied. See id. at 6. On March 13, 2022, Wright filed an Inmate

Appeal to Final Review, in which he again recalled the events of December 28, 2021, and added

several new allegations, including one against Defendant Kalb for assaulting him on January 4,

2022. See id. at 7. Wright ended his final appeal with the following request for relief: “I want

$3,000,000.00 and all my legal rights restored and transferred to the institution of my choice. I

reserve all rights and remedies.” Id.

D. Procedural History

On December 21, 2023, Wright filed a Complaint in this Court against the Defendants,

alleging they violated his Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment

by failing to protect him from violence at the hands of other inmates. See ECF No. 2. In his

Amended Complaint, filed March 14, 2024, Wright asserted First Amendment violations, Eighth

Amendment violations, and a tort claim relating to his personal property. See ECF No. 20. In a

May 17, 2024, Memorandum Opinion and Order, this Court struck all claims except those for

excessive force, failure to protect, and battery. See ECF Nos. 23-24. As of October 22, 2024, the

Court had also dismissed the battery claim and terminated the defendants against whom it was

brought. See ECF Nos. 42, 45.

On May 12, 2025, the four remaining defendants, Patrick Fedder, Robert Kalb, Wayne

Styles, and Thomas Fondi (collectively, “Defendants”), filed a Motion for Partial Summary

Judgment on the failure to protect claim, arguing that Wright did not exhaust his administrative

remedies as required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act because his current request for

monetary relief was not clearly stated in his initial prison grievance. See ECF No. 73. On June 3,

2025, the Court ordered Wright to respond to the Motion. See ECF No. 76. Wright then filed a

Motion for Jury Trial Demand, dated June 13, 2025, see ECF No. 81, and a Declaration and

Brief in Opposition to Defendants’ Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (“Response in

Opposition”), dated June 30, 2025, see ECF No. 83. Wright also filed a Motion for Leave to file

a second amended complaint, dated July 21, 2025, see ECF No. 84, which the Court denied on

August 1, 2025, see ECF No. 85.

III. LEGAL STANDARDS

A. Motion for Partial Summary Judgment – Review of Applicable Law

Summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute

as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P.

56(a). A disputed fact is “material” if proof of its existence or nonexistence might affect the

outcome of the case under substantive law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248

(1986). An issue of material fact is “genuine” if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could

return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Id. at 248, 257.

The party moving for summary judgment bears the burden of showing the absence of a

genuine issue as to any material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). Once

such a showing has been made, the non-moving party must go beyond the pleadings with

affidavits, depositions, answers to interrogatories or the like in order to demonstrate specific

material facts which give rise to a genuine issue. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324;

Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986) (stating that the

non-moving party “must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to

the material facts”). A party asserting that a fact cannot be or is genuinely disputed must support

that assertion by “citing to particular parts of materials in the record” or by “showing that the

materials cited do not establish the absence or presence of a genuine dispute, or that an adverse

party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A)-(B).

The party opposing the motion must produce evidence to show the existence of every element

essential to its case, which it bears the burden of proving at trial, because “a complete failure of

proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party’s case necessarily renders all other

facts immaterial.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. The court must consider the evidence in the light

most favorable to the non-moving party. Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 378 (2007). “If a party

fails to properly support an assertion of fact or fails to properly address another party’s assertion

of fact as required by Rule 56(c),” the court may “give an opportunity to properly support or

address the fact;” “consider the fact undisputed for purposes of the motion;” or “grant summary

judgment if the motion and supporting materials—including the facts considered undisputed—

show that the movant is entitled to it.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e).

B. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Claims – Review of Applicable Law

42 U.S.C. § 1983 is the vehicle by which federal constitutional claims may be brought in

federal court. “To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right

secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and must show that the alleged

deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S.

42, 48 (1988). Additionally, a “defendant in a civil rights action must have personal involvement

in the alleged wrongs.” See Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1988).

Moreover, “[b]ecause vicarious liability is inapplicable to … § 1983 suits, a plaintiff must plead

that each Government-official defendant, through the official’s own individual actions, has

violated the Constitution.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676 (2009).

“In actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, federal courts apply the state’s statute of limitations

for personal injury.” Sameric Corp v. City of Phila., 142 F.3d 582, 599 (3d Cir. 1998). The

statute of limitations for personal injury actions in Pennsylvania is two years. See id.; 42 Pa.

C.S.A. § 5524. “A section 1983 cause of action accrues when the plaintiff knew or should have

known of the injury upon which its action is based.” Sameric Corp., 142 F.3d at 599. “Rule 15(c)

can ameliorate the running of the statute of limitations on a claim by making the amended claim

relate back to the original, timely filed complaint.” Singletary v. Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 266 F.3d

186, 193 (3d Cir. 2001). The Rule provides: an “amendment to a pleading relates back to the date

of the original pleading when . . . the amendment asserts a claim or defense that arose out of the

conduct, transaction, or occurrence set out—or attempted to be set out—in the original

pleading.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c)(1)(B). “The rationale of Rule 15(c) is that a party who has not

been notified of litigation concerning a particular occurrence has been given all the notice that

statutes of limitations were intended to provide.” Baldwin Cty. Welcome Ctr. v. Brown, 466 U.S.

147, 149 n.3 (1984).

a. Failure to Protect Claim – Review of Applicable Law

Prison administrators “are under an obligation to take reasonable measures to guarantee

the safety of the inmates.” Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 526-27 (1984). “It is not, however,

every injury suffered by one prisoner at the hands of another that translates into constitutional

liability for prison officials responsible for the victim’s safety.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S.

825, 834 (1994). An Eighth Amendment claim for failure to prevent harm has two requirements:

(1) “the deprivation alleged must be, objectively, sufficiently serious;” and (2) the “prison

official must have a sufficiently culpable state of mind.” See id. (internal quotations and citations

omitted). “To state a claim for damages against a prison official for failure to protect from

inmate violence, an inmate must [also] plead facts that show . . . the official’s deliberate

indifference caused him harm.” Bistran v. Levi, 696 F.3d 352, 367 (3d Cir. 2012), abrogated on

other grounds, Mack v. Yost, 968 F.3d 311, 319 n.7 (3d Cir. 2020). Under the first element, “the

inmate must show that he is incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial risk of serious

harm.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. Under the second element, the “state of mind is one of

‘deliberate indifference’ to inmate health or safety.” Id. “In light of Farmer, [the Third Circuit

Court of Appeals] adopted a subjective knowledge standard to establish deliberate indifference,

requiring a showing that prison officials actually knew of and disregarded constitutional

violations.” Thomas v. Tice, 948 F.3d 133, 138-39 (3d Cir. 2020). The defendant prison officials

“must actually [have been] aware of the existence of the excessive risk; it is not sufficient that

[prison officials] should have been aware.” Beers-Capitol v. Whetzel, 256 F.3d 120, 133 (3d Cir.

2001). A defendant’s knowledge can be proven by circumstantial evidence that the risk was so

obvious the official must have known. See id.

C. Exhaustion under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”) – Review of

Applicable Law

The Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”) requires prisoners to exhaust all available

administrative remedies before bringing suit related to the conditions of their confinement. 42

U.S.C. § 1997e(a). See Perttu v. Richards, 605 U.S. 460, 465 (2025); Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S.

81, 88 (2006) (explaining that proper exhaustion under the PLRA requires a prisoner to

“complete the administrative review process in accordance with the applicable procedural rules

. . . as a precondition to bringing suit in federal court”). See also Alexander v. Forr, No. 3:04-

0370, 2005 WL 2416099 at *7 (M.D. Pa. July 26, 2005) (“If a prisoner does not exhaust

available administrative remedies, the claims should be dismissed.”) (citing Moscato v. Fed.

Bureau of Prisons, 98 F.3d 757, 761-62 (3d Cir. 1998)). An inmate's failure to exhaust these

administrative remedies is an affirmative defense that, if brought, must be proven by the

defendant. See Rinaldi v. United States, 904 F.3d 257, 268 (3d Cir. 2018) (citing Ray v. Kertes,

285 F.3d 287, 295 (3d Cir. 2002). “[I]t is the prison's requirements and not the PLRA that define

the boundaries of proper exhaustion.” Woods v. Terra, No. 23-2178, 2024 WL 5047853, at *5

(E.D. Pa. Dec. 9, 2024) (citing Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 218 (2007)).

“The purpose of the grievance process is to ‘put the prison officials on notice of the

persons claimed to be guilty of wrongdoing.’” White v. Wireman, No. 16-675, 2018 WL

10456721, at *12 (M.D. Pa. Oct. 15, 2018) (quoting Spruill v. Gillis, 372 F.3d 218, 234 (3d Cir.

2004)), adopted by 2020 WL 869863 (M.D. Pa., Feb. 21, 2020). Therefore, to put officials on

notice, the relief requested in an inmate's initial grievance must be stated “with specificity[,]”

subject to the applicable prison grievance policy. See Wright v. Sauers, No. 13-358, 2017 WL

3731957 at *6–7 (W.D. Pa. Aug. 30, 2017) (quoting Spruill, 372 F.3d at 233-234). See also

Preacher v. Overmyer, No. 17-18, 2020 WL 43420, at *8 (W.D. Pa. Jan. 3, 2020) (“[A]n inmate

who ‘desires compensation or other legal relief normally available from a court’ must ‘request

the relief with specificity in his/her initial grievance.’”) (internal citation omitted). However, for

exhaustion purposes, an inmate's grievance need not “perfect[ly] overlap” with the claims in the

complaint, so long as there is a “shared factual basis between the two[.]” See Jackson v. Ivens,

244 Fed. App’x. 508, 513 (3d Cir. 2007) (citing Woodford, 548 U.S. at 95 (“The benefits of

exhaustion can be realized only if the prison grievance system is given a fair opportunity to

consider the grievance.”)).

IV. ANALYSIS

A. Requesting Monetary Relief

The narrow issue presented in Defendants’ Motion is whether Wright has properly

exhausted his administrative remedies under the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (“PLRA”)

by requesting monetary damages in his initial prison grievance. Here, the applicable prison

grievance procedure is Section 1(A)(11) of Pennsylvania Department of Corrections Policy DC-

ADM 804, which states: “If the inmate desires compensation or other legal relief normally

available from a court, the inmate must request the specific relief sought in his/her initial

grievance.” “While a request for monetary relief in a grievance need not set forth a specific

dollar amount, the inmate must make a clear request for compensation.” Stanley v. Little, No. 23-

4571, 2024 WL 3678987, at *5 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 6, 2024) (cleaned up; internal quotations

omitted); see also Sides v. Pennsylvania Dep't of Corr., No. 2:18-145, 2020 WL 1493549, at *7

(W.D. Pa. Mar. 27, 2020) (“DC-ADM 804 § 1.A.11.d does not require that an inmate must set

forth a certain dollar amount in his grievance. It requires only that if an inmate desires

compensation, he must ‘request that specific relief[.]’”). This requirement serves to place the

prison “on notice of the prisoner’s demand or valuation of his or her claim, and furthers the

PLRA’s underlying litigation avoidance goals by supporting early settlement or

accommodation.” Wright, 2017 WL 3731957, at *7.

Defendants Fedder, Fondi, Styles, and Kalb argue that they are entitled to judgment on

Wright’s failure to protect claim because Wright’s Amended Complaint states a request for

monetary relief on this count, but his initial prison grievance does not. See Def. Br. at 3-5.

Defendants assert that Wright’s demand that “each employee involved . . . hand over their bond

for liquidation purposes” is “vague and non-specific” and “does not qualify as a specific request

for monetary compensation, as required by DC-ADM 804.” Id. at 6. Wright argues that the

words “bond” and “liquidation” should qualify as a request for monetary compensation because

the 2022 edition of the Merriam-Webster Dictionary defines “bond” as a verb meaning “to insure

against losses caused by acts of,” and “liquidate” as a verb meaning “to pay off.” Pl. Br. at 7-8.

In the alternative, Wright argues that even if these terms do not qualify, the phrase “I reserve all

rights and remedies” should have served as a catch-all for any available relief, including

monetary. Pl. Br. at 7-8. Wright further contends that he made clear his request for monetary

relief when he asked for $3,000,000 in damages in his final grievance appeal. See id.

The Court is rarely presented with an exhaustion issue that hinges on its interpretation of

the words used by a prisoner in his initial grievance. More often than not, a prisoner will

explicitly state his request for relief, see, e.g., Woods, 2024 WL 5047853, at *6 (“I would like

$300,000 in relief for the assault”); Tootle v. Long, No. 20-235, 2022 WL 17095603, at *5 (W.D.

Pa. Oct. 31, 2022) (“I seek the following relief of Monetary Damages”), or will state no request

for relief at all, see Walker v. Little, No. 22-3451, 2023 WL 2570562, at *2 (3d Cir. Mar. 20,

2023). Wright’s choice of the words “bond” and “liquidation” are unique, and certainly atypical,

in a prison grievance which forms the basis for a section 1983 failure-to-protect claim. Courts

within the Third Circuit have before found that prisoners seeking monetary relief in federal court

met the exhaustion requirement under DC-ADM 804 where their initial grievance requested

either (a) a dollar amount in desired compensation, see Woods, 2024 WL 5047853, at *6 (“Also,

I would like $300,000 in relief for the assault.”); West v. Letizio, No. 23-3694, 2024 WL

1977153, at *4 (E.D. Pa. May 2, 2024) (West “requested $350,000 dollars in compensatory and

punitive damages.”); or (b) “money” or “monetary” damages, in no sum certain, see Tootle, 2022

WL 17095603, at *5 (“The grievance then reads in pertinent part as follows: . . . I seek the

following relief of Monetary Damages.”). Courts within the Third Circuit have also found that

prisoners seeking monetary relief did not meet the exhaustion requirement where their initial

grievance sought: (a) no relief, see Walker, 2023 WL 2570562, at *2; (b) “whatever relief may

be available,” see Stanley, 2024 WL 3678987, at *5 (“Stanley's request for ‘whatever the courts

may deem necessary’ does not satisfy the requirements of DC-ADM 804.”); or (c) some other

non-monetary relief, see Mills v. Rogers, No. 20-00266, 2024 WL 3034099, at *18 (M.D. Pa.

June 17, 2024) (“Plaintiff requested the following forms of relief in his initial grievance . . . a

written apology . . . to receive adequate medical treatment . . . [and] no retaliation.”); Cramer v.

Bohinski, No. 22-583, 2024 WL 1557377, at *3 (M.D. Pa. Apr. 10, 2024) (“In his initial

grievance, Cramer's only requested relief was to be granted access to the law library.”); Perez v.

Reno, No. 22-01021, 2023 WL 6051258, at *3 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 15, 2023) (Plaintiff’s request for

relief said “I want to be separated from all inmates and staff that were involved in this

incident.”); Ivy v. Oberlander, No. 21-00109, 2023 WL 3766018, at *3–4 (W.D. Pa. June 1,

2023) (Plaintiff’s grievances requested as relief “access to paper [and] adequate access to the law

library,” as well as “more time in the law library.”); Rasheed v. Saez, No. 20-00154, 2022 WL

14068766, at *5 (M.D. Pa. Oct. 24, 2022) (“Plaintiff's initial grievance[] clearly does not request

any monetary relief but asks that the officer involved in the incident be fired.”). None of these

cases, however, involved a prison grievance which featured quasi-monetary terms but forwent

the use of words like “monetary,” “payment,” “compensation,” or “money damages.”

Essentially, Wright’s grievance would satisfy the exhaustion requirement if it made

Defendants aware of Wright’s claims and his desire for monetary compensation. See White, 2018

WL 10456721, at *12 (explaining that the purpose of the grievance process is to “put the prison

officials on notice” of the aggrieved plaintiff’s claims and basis for relief). The Court, however,

finds that the language “I want each employee involved to hand over their bond for liquidation

purposes” did not serve to put Defendants on notice of Wright’s claim for money damages. See

Grievance. Wright has not provided any facts in support of the assertion that Defendants owed

him a preexisting financial obligation or were otherwise indebted to him before January 11,

2022. Thus, it is not clear to what obligation Wright refers by his use of the word “bond.”9 Still,

he asserts that Defendants were meant to interpret this as an indication of their potential liability.

The Court also does not read the grievance to communicate Wright’s desire to receive financial

compensation from Defendants. The grievance does not specify to whom Defendants should

deliver their “bonds” or how they would be “liquidated,” and this request is broadly addressed to

“each employee” involved. See id. In all, the Court finds that Wright did not clearly state in his

initial grievance a request for monetary relief, such that the Defendants would be privy to that

request.

Wright argues in the alternative that the statement “I reserve all rights and remedies”

serves to cover any available relief, but our sister districts have held that such a statement is not

enough to meet the exhaustion requirements of DC-ADM 804. See, e.g., Stanley, 2024 WL

9 The Court cannot confirm the accuracy of the definitions Wright cites from the 2022

edition of Merriam-Webster’s Dictionary, but the 2025 edition defines the noun form of “bond”

in part as: “a binding agreement;” “an obligation made binding by a forfeit of money;” or a

“certificate of public or private indebtedness.” See Bond, Merriam-Webster Dictionary (2025).

The same edition defines “liquidation” as a determination “by agreement or by litigation” of “the

precise amount of (indebtedness, damages, or accounts);” the determination of liabilities; or the

settlement of a debt by payment. See Liquidate, Merriam-Webster Dictionary (2025).

Similarly, Black’s Law Dictionary defines a “bond” as “[a]n obligation or promise,” or a

“written promise to pay money or do some act if certain circumstances occur or a certain time

elapses,” see Bond, Black’s Law Dictionary (12th ed. 2024). Black’s Law Dictionary also defines

“liquidation” as the “act of determining by agreement or by litigation the exact amount of

something (as a debt or damages) that before was uncertain;” the “act of settling a debt by

payment or other satisfaction;” or the “act or process of converting assets into cash, esp. to settle

debts,” see Liquidation, Black’s Law Dictionary (12th ed. 2024).

Crucially, all of these definitions depend on the pre-existence of an obligation between

parties that have contracted or otherwise agreed that the occurrence of a condition will make one

side indebted to the other. Though prison administrators “are under an obligation to take

reasonable measures to guarantee the safety of the inmates,” Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517,

526-27 (1984), not “every injury suffered by one prisoner at the hands of another[] translates into

constitutional liability for prison officials responsible for the victim’s safety,” Farmer v.

Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994), nor does it communicate a desire for financial compensation

without the prisoner explicitly stating so. Even so, a corrections officer’s “obligation” to take

reasonable measures with regard to inmate safety is rarely referred to by the word “bond.”

3678987, at *5 (“Stanley's request for “whatever the courts may deem necessary” does not

satisfy the requirements of DC-ADM 804.”). Also, to the extent Wright argues that his request

for $3,000,000.00 in the final appeal of his grievance counts as a request for monetary relief, this

does not comport with DC-ADM 804, which states that such a request must be made in the

prisoner’s initial grievance. See Rasheed, 2022 WL 14068766, at *5 (“Plaintiff asserts that he

did request $1.5 million in his grievance. However, Plaintiff cites to his appeal of the initial

grievance decision filed on a form DC-135A. As Plaintiff failed to request monetary damages in

his initial grievance, he may not pursue such damages now in his federal complaint.”) (internal

citations omitted). Everything considered, Wright still has not met the exhaustion requirement.

B. Exhaustion When Remedy is Unavailable

Wright argues separately that he was not obligated to exhaust his administrative remedies

because they were unavailable. See Pl. Br. at 7-8. In doing so, he cites to Ross v. Blake for the

principle that an administrative procedure is “unavailable” (i) “when[] it operates as a simple

dead end—with officers unable or consistently unwilling to provide any relief to aggrieved

inmates”; (ii) “[w]hen rules are ‘so confusing that ... no reasonable prisoner can use them’ . . .

[and] no ordinary prisoner can make sense of what it demands”; and (iii) “when prison

administrators thwart inmates from taking advantage of a grievance process through

machination, misrepresentation, or intimidation.” 578 U.S. 632, 643-44 (2016).

Here, Wright has not alleged facts in support of an assertion that the officers at SCI–

Phoenix were “unable or consistently unwilling to provide any relief” to him, or that prison

administrators attempted to prevent him from taking advantage of a grievance process through

machination, misrepresentation, or intimidation. Rather, the record indicates that Wright’s prison

grievance and appeals were all reviewed and responded to in a timely manner. See ECF No. 73-

2. Wright has also not alleged that the procedural requirements of DC-ADM 804 were “so

confusing” that he was unable to comply. To the contrary, Wright made clear in his Opposition

Brief that he understood that the rule required him to state any requested relief in his initial

grievance as a prerequisite to exhausting his administrative remedies. See Pl. Br. at 6, 8.

To the extent Wright argues that monetary relief was unavailable as an administrative

procedure through the prison, the Supreme Court has held that prisoners are still “required to

exhaust all ‘available’ remedies before pursuing any suit challenging prison conditions whether

under § 1983 or not, regardless of whether they do or do not meet federal standards, and even

where the relief sought – such as monetary damages – cannot be granted by the administrative

process.” Woods, 2024 WL 5047853, at *5 (emphasis added) (citing Woodford, 548 U.S. at 85;

Nyhuis v. Reno, 204 F.3d 65, 75, n. 10 (3d Cir. 2000)). “An inmate must make a request for

compensation even where monetary relief is unavailable through the grievance process and the

incarcerated plaintiff otherwise gives ‘a detailed account of the underlying incident’ in their

grievance.” Stanley, 2024 WL 3678987, at *5. Thus, it matters not whether Wright could have

obtained monetary relief through the prison; he still had to request that specific relief in his initial

grievance to satisfy the exhaustion requirement before filing suit in this Court.

V. CONCLUSION

Following a review of the administrative record and briefing, this Court concludes that

Wright failed to exhaust his administrative remedies with respect to the failure to protect claim.

Wright did not specifically request in his initial prison grievance the monetary relief that he now

seeks in this Court. Summary judgment is granted in favor of Defendants on the failure to protect

claim. Since the failure to protect claim is brought against Defendants Fedder, Fondi, and

Styles,10 these three defendants will be terminated. The excessive force claim, which is brought

against Defendant Kalb, only, and is not the subject of the instant Motion, shall continue.

Defendants’ Motion for Partial Summary Judgment is granted. Plaintiff’s demand for jury trial is

also granted.

A separate Order follows.

BY THE COURT:

/s/ Joseph F. Leeson, Jr.____________

JOSEPH F. LEESON, JR.

United States District Judge

10 The Court, having noted that Wright’s initial grievance makes clear allegations against

Fedder and Fondi and obscurely mentions Styles as having been notified of the same,

nonetheless follows the parties’ concession that the failure to protect claim outlined in Wright’s

initial grievance is brought against Fedder, Fondi, and Styles, but not against Defendant Kalb.

See Def. Br. at 6. Although all four Defendants bring the Motion, the order granting it will only

serve to terminate three of them, and the excessive force claim shall continue against Kalb.