HUSICK

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

LAWRENCE HUSICK :

: CIVIL ACTION

v. :

: NO. 21-cv-5599

UNUM LIFE INSURANCE CO. OF :

AMERICA

MEMORANDUM ORDER

AND NOW, this 21st day of November, 2025, upon consideration of the parties’ motions

in limine listed below, and all documents submitted in support thereof and in opposition thereto, it

is ORDERED as follows:

1. Plaintiff’s Motion in Limine Seeking to Preclude the Admission of the Opinions of

Kathleen Hancock, RN, Dr. Judith Cohen, Dr. Joseph Palermo and Dr. Peter Brown into Evidence

(ECF No. 67) is DENIED. Plaintiff Lawrence Husick (“Plaintiff” or “Husick”) does not seek to

preclude the opinions of these medical professionals entirely, but, rather, to bar Defendant Unum

Life Insurance Company of America (“Defendant” or “Unum”) from using these experts’ reports

to prove the truth of the matters asserted therein (theoretically, Plaintiff’s alleged lack of

disability). As Plaintiff acknowledges, “[e]vidence should not be excluded pursuant to a motion

in limine, unless it is clearly inadmissible on all potential grounds.” Seawright v. Banning, 677 F.

Supp. 3d 310, 313 (E.D. Pa. 2023) (quoting Leonard v. Stemtech Health Scis., Inc., 981 F. Supp.

2d 273, 276 (D. Del. 2013)). (See also Pl.’s Mem., ECF No. 67-1, at 13 (citing Leonard, 981 F.

Supp. 2d at 276).) Since Plaintiff concedes that the evidence at issue is relevant in certain respects,

his motion to preclude such evidence for other purposes is premature. Objections as to the use of

such evidence will be considered at trial.

2. Plaintiff’s Motion in Limine Seeking to Limit Defendant’s Defense to Plaintiff’s Claim

for Residual Disability Benefits to the Basis Articulated in its Denial Letters (ECF No. 68) is

DENIED. In his motion, Plaintiff argues that because Unum never requested any financial

information from Plaintiff when it was considering his claim and instead based its denial on a

purported lack of medical evidence of physical or cognitive limitations, Defendant should be

precluded from defending its coverage denial at trial with evidence or argument that Plaintiff did

not sustain sufficient income loss to be financially eligible for residual disability benefits. Plaintiff

bases this argument on two related legal theories—equitable estoppel and the “mend the hold”

doctrine—both of which are inapplicable to the present facts and circumstances.

“[T]he elements of equitable estoppel are (1) an inducement, whether by act,

representation, or silence when one ought to speak, that causes one to believe the existence of

certain facts; (2) justifiable reliance on that inducement; and (3) prejudice to the one who relies if

the inducer is permitted to deny the existence of such facts.” Firemen’s Ins. Co. of Washington,

D.C. v. Tray-Pak Corp., 130 F. Supp. 3d 973, 984 (E.D. Pa. 2015) (quoting Chem. Bank v.

Dippolito, 897 F. Supp. 221, 224 (E.D. Pa. 1995) (citing Zivari v. Willis, 611 A.2d 293, 295 (Pa.

Super. Ct. 1992))). “It is well-established under Pennsylvania law that the burden rests on the

party asserting estoppel to establish the defense by clear, precise and unequivocal evidence.”

Chrysler Credit Corp. v. First Nat. Bank & Trust Co. of Washington, 746 F.2d 200, 206 (3d Cir.

1984) (citing Blofsen v. Cutaiar, 333 A.2d 841, 844 (Pa. 1975)). The “mend the hold” doctrine

instructs that “[w]here a party gives a reason for his conduct and decision touching any thing

involved in a controversy, he cannot, after litigation has begun, change his ground, and put his

conduct upon another and a different consideration.” Ohio & Miss. Ry. Co. v. McCarthy, 96 U.S.

258, 267 (1877). Although more quaintly named, the “mend the hold” doctrine is essentially a

form of estoppel, requiring the party asserting the doctrine to “demonstrate prejudice that resulted

from Defendant’s change of position.” See Easy Corner, Inc. v. State Nat’l Ins. Co., Inc., 154 F.

Supp. 3d 151, 154 n.3 (E.D. Pa. 2016) (noting that Plaintiff’s assertion of “mend the hold” doctrine

was “an estoppel argument” requiring demonstration of prejudice resulting from change in the

basis for insurer’s coverage denial); Rock-Epstein v. Allstate Ins. Co., No. 07-2917, 2008 WL

4425059, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 29, 2008) (holding that “mend the hold” doctrine did not bar insurer

from asserting coverage defenses not included in denial letter, “particularly because Plaintiff

cannot show prejudice or even surprise from [insurer’s] defenses”). Although it largely skirts

analysis of the foregoing legal elements, Plaintiff’s argument as to both his equitable estoppel and

“mend the hold” theories seems to be that Unum’s failure to undertake financial calculations

during the claim-assessment process or to mention income in its denial letter induced Plaintiff to

believe that this breach of contract action would involve only a dispute over his medical condition,

which prejudiced Plaintiff by leading him to omit from evidence certain financial information and

analyses relevant to his claims. However, Plaintiff offers no facts suggesting that Unum intended

such an inducement or explaining how reliance thereon could be justifiable, nor does he offer any

rule or principle under Pennsylvania law requiring an insurer to provide all bases for a claim

rejection in its denial letter. Moreover, courts in this District applying Pennsylvania law have held

that “in the context of an insurer’s failure to assert all possible defenses to coverage, the courts

apply an estoppel only when there is actual prejudice, that is, when the failure to assert all possible

defenses causes the insured to act to his detriment in reliance thereon.” Mendel v. Home Ins. Co.,

806 F. Supp. 1206, 1215 (E.D. Pa. 1992); see also Easy Corner, Inc., 154 F. Supp. 3d at 154 n.3.

Regardless of the reasons for Defendant’s denial, the burden is on Plaintiff to establish the elements

of his breach of contract claim, and the fact that Defendant did not perform the calculations

necessary to substantiate damages does not justify Husick’s failure to collect and produce relevant

financial information during discovery. Since Plaintiff has not shown inducement, justifiable

reliance, or resulting prejudice, neither equitable estoppel nor the “mend the hold” doctrine applies.

Unum’s defense will not be limited to the basis articulated in its denial letters.

3. Plaintiff’s Motion in Limine Seeking to Exclude All Evidence Concerning the

Plaintiff’s Income from Sources Not Covered Under the Policy of Insurance (ECF No. 69) is

GRANTED IN PART, with respect to the specific amounts of supplementary income earned by

Plaintiff, and DENIED IN PART, with respect to descriptions of his alternative income sources.

We agree with Plaintiff that the probative value of discrete income amounts received by Plaintiff

from sources outside of his regular occupation is outweighed by a substantial risk of unfair

prejudice under Federal Rule of Evidence 403, as Plaintiff’s apparent wealth could affect a jury’s

willingness to grant him a monetary award for any reduction in his still substantial income. As

such, Unum is precluded from introducing evidence of specific income amounts received by

Plaintiff from sources outside of his regular occupation. However, Plaintiff’s Proposed Order

(ECF No. 69-2) asks for more than this. Specifically, Plaintiff requests that Defendant be

precluded “from entering into evidence any evidence concerning the Plaintiff’s sources of income;

other than, from his regular occupation.” (Id. (emphasis added).) However, general information

regarding Plaintiff’s range of activities both before and after his heart attack is relevant to a jury’s

assessment of Plaintiff’s eligibility for residual disability payments and does not present a

significant risk of unfair prejudice. Defendant may introduce evidence of Plaintiff’s professional

endeavors generally, without reference to the income amounts he received for endeavors beyond

his regular occupation.

4. Defendant’s Motion in Limine to Preclude Reference to a Speculative Hypoxic or

Anoxic Brain Injury and History of Cavernomas (ECF No. 70) is DENIED. Defendant argues

that Plaintiff should be precluded from introducing evidence suggesting that he suffered a hypoxic

or anoxic brain injury because there is no clinical evidence demonstrating the injury and no

medical expert has opined with any degree of medical certainty that Plaintiff suffered such injury.

In response, Plaintiff argues that his medical records do, in fact, indicate that he experienced an

extended period of hypotension while in the hospital; that his cardiologist, Dr. Richard Tucci,

believed he had suffered an anoxic brain injury; and that a medical expert, Dr. Mijail Serruya, has

opined that Plaintiff “suffered a permanent neurometabolic insult due to the myocardial infarction

and the immediate sequelae, in particular the prolonged hypotension and invasive aortic

interventions.” (Pl. Opp’n Mem., ECF No. 42-2, at 2–4.) Defendant’s arguments are inadequate

at this stage of the proceeding to bar Plaintiff from introducing any mention of potential brain

injury resulting from effects of the myocardial infarction. While it is true that Pennsylvania law

requires experts to testify with a reasonable degree of medical certainty when they provide an

opinion on causation, see In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 35 F.3d 717, 749–52 (3d Cir. 1994),

the testimony at issue is not a conclusion regarding causation but, rather, Dr. Serruya’s assessment

based on his own examination of Plaintiff, his review of Plaintiff’s medical history (including both

clinical tests and imaging and the examination notes of other medical professionals), and various

cited scientific studies and academic articles. Although Plaintiff’s medical records do not reflect

a definitive diagnosis of hypoxic or anoxic brain injury, categorically precluding any mention of a

potential brain injury resulting from limited blood flow to Plaintiff’s brain would be impractical

and unduly prejudicial where the degree to which Plaintiff’s brain might have been impacted by

his myocardial infarction is a key area of dispute. Defendant’s contention that Dr. Serruya’s report

does no more than conclude “that absence of the proof of any such injury does not mean it did not

occur” (Def. Mem., ECF No. 70-1, at 7) is misleading. Defendant’s argument focuses on specific

passages in Dr. Serruya’s report reacting to conclusions of Unum’s experts, which themselves

were based on an absence of specific data. As described above, Dr. Serruya’s findings regarding

the neurological impacts of Plaintiff’s myocardial infarction appear to rely on proper bases of

expert testimony under Federal Rules of Evidence 702 and 703, including a personal examination,

review of imaging and test results, and peer-reviewed studies. Plaintiff will not be barred from

referencing the particular types of injury addressed by the expert testimony of both parties.

Separately, Defendant’s motion contends that Plaintiff should be precluded from

mentioning his documented medical history of cavernomas “[b]ecause there is no medical

evidence that Plaintiff’s history of cavernomas is causative of his alleged cognitive impairments”

and because no medical testing indicated that there was any change in the cavernomas as a result

of the myocardial infarction. (Def. Mem. at 8.) Plaintiff did not respond to Defendant’s motion

with respect to cavernomas. Defendant’s argument that evidence of Plaintiff’s cavernomas would

be highly prejudicial is initially somewhat puzzling, since evidence suggesting that Plaintiff’s

alleged impairments might be caused by a preexisting condition (rather than the same injury or

sickness which qualified Plaintiff for disability benefits initially) would seemingly be favorable to

the defense. Defendant’s concern appears to stem from Dr. Serruya’s expert report, which opines

that the preexisting cavernomas put Plaintiff at greater risk of negative effects following a

myocardial infarction. (See Pl. Opp’n Mem. at 3.) Defendant contends that Dr. Serruya engaged

in inadmissible speculation by suggesting in his report that the absence of imaging showing any

post-heart attack change to the cavernomas does not indicate that they are not impacting Plaintiff’s

recovery. As with Dr. Serruya’s commentary regarding potential brain injury, Unum’s argument

isolates a specific aspect of Dr. Serruya’s report explaining that medical imaging does not illustrate

a particular biological process or effect. This observation does not make Plaintiff’s medical history

irrelevant. Undisputed evidence of Plaintiff’s physical condition prior to the myocardial infarction

is plainly a relevant consideration in determining the injury’s effects and is not unfairly prejudicial.

5. Defendant’s Motion in Limine to Limit the Testimony of Mijail Serruya, M.D. (ECF

No. 71) is GRANTED IN PART, with respect to conclusions specifically regarding Plaintiff’s

ability to function as a patent attorney, and DENIED IN PART, with respect to conclusions about

Plaintiff’s ability to perform various types of cognitive tasks.1 Defendant argues that Dr. Serruya

should not be permitted to opine about Plaintiff’s occupational capacity because he is not qualified

as a vocational expert. Defendant notes that, in the first of his two reports, Dr. Serruya opined not

only as to Plaintiff’s neurological condition, but also as to the implications of his neurological test

results for his ability to perform the occupation of a patent attorney. However, in his second report,

Dr. Serruya explicitly stated that he is not a vocational expert and is not able to assess a person’s

ability to function as a patent attorney. Defendant argues that allowing Dr. Serruya to testify

regarding Plaintiff’s ability to perform the duties of his occupation would mislead the jury because

the jury may give the doctor’s occupation-related conclusions the same weight as his medical

testimony. Plaintiff acknowledges that Dr. Serruya is not a vocational expert but contends that, as

1 Defendant also separately argues that, because Plaintiff has not offered Dr. Serruya as a fact

witness, his testimony should be limited to his medical examination of Plaintiff in October 2022 and should

not be based on the doctor’s previous personal interactions with Plaintiff, who has represented Dr. Serruya

in patent law matters and remained his professional contact over the years, with the two even co-founding

a company together. However, Plaintiff has since submitted a witness list that identifies Dr. Serruya as both

a fact and an expert witness. Although Defendant raises a valid concern that Dr. Serruya’s fact testimony

based on his personal interactions with Plaintiff may be misperceived by the jury as expert opinion, this

risk can be mitigated at trial by separating the doctor’s expert testimony from his examination as a fact

wtiness and/or by appropriate instructions to the jury. In addition, Defendant’s proposed order submitted

in connection with this motion in limine does not address this issue. Accordingly, we defer to a later date

the question of how Dr. Serruya’s dual testimony should be presented at trial.

a physician in the field of neurology, Dr. Serruya is qualified to render a general opinion regarding

Plaintiff’s cognitive function, including his ability to perform the customary responsibilities of a

patent attorney as described in an authoritative resource on occupational roles. Plaintiff notes that,

in evaluating his claim, Unum employed its own medical expert who similarly utilized a general

description of the duties of a patent attorney in connection with his medical assessment of

Plaintiff’s ability to fulfill such duties. Plaintiff argues that Dr. Serruya is simply rendering an

opinion on the same core medical issue. Although it is reasonable for Dr. Serruya to consider the

general responsibilities of a patent attorney in his assessment of Plaintiff’s cognitive capabilities,

we agree with Defendant that Dr. Serruya’s initial report treads too far into the realm of vocational

expertise. Dr. Serruya’s October 2022 report includes assertions that: (1) “[Plaintiff’s] inability to

achieve the processing speed, attention, and multi-tasking he had prior to the myocardial

infarction, render him unable to perform all the functions required of a patent attorney.”; (2)

“Validated testing demonstrated [Plaintiff’s] attention, visual scanning and processing speed are

average, and a person with average abilities cannot perform the occupation of patent attorney.”;

and (3) “[Defense expert’s] statement of the occupational requirements of a patent attorney are

incomplete to the point of being intentionally inaccurate, revealing a lack of knowledge necessary

to have competently conducted the review and undermining the opinion expressed.” (See Serruya

Oct. 21, 2022 Expert Report, ECF No. 71-7, at 11, 12.) Each of these statements purports to reflect

a level of expertise in the requirements of patent attorney practice that Dr. Serruya concedes he

does not possess and is unqualified to offer at trial. However, that is not to say that Dr. Serruya

must be qualified as a vocational expert to offer his medical opinion regarding Husick’s cognitive

abilities, including in particular contexts such as an occupational role. At trial, Dr. Serruya will

be permitted to provide his medical opinion on whether Plaintiff’s ability to undertake generic

activities, including those specifically listed in an accepted definition of the role of a patent

attorney, was likely to be impacted by his cognitive state, but he will be precluded from testifying

as to his understanding of the responsibilities of a patent attorney and from making assertions about

the specific demands of the role or Plaintiff’s overall ability to perform in such a role.

6. Defendant’s Motion in Limine to Preclude Plaintiff from Presenting a Calculation for

Residual Disability (ECF No. 72) is GRANTED IN PART, with respect to the income-related

conclusions in the report of vocational expert Sean Hanahue, and DENIED IN PART, with

respect to simple mathematical calculations to be drawn from otherwise admissible evidence. To

be admissible, expert testimony must be, among other things, “the product of reliable principles

and methods.” Fed. R. Evid. 702. Here, Plaintiff’s vocational expert’s opinions regarding

Plaintiff’s net income losses do not meet the reliability requirement. “Loss of net income” is a

term defined by the contract at issue and is determined with regard to Plaintiff’s “prior net income,”

itself a defined term that hinges on Plaintiff’s average monthly income. Plaintiff’s vocational

expert, Mr. Hanahue, did not consider Plaintiff’s monthly income in forming his opinions

regarding Plaintiff’s net income losses. Instead, he appears to have relied only on Plaintiff’s annual

Schedule C tax returns, which do not supply the monthly income and expense information needed

to determine “loss of net income” under the contract. Moreover, it is not clear that Mr. Hanahue

used any discernible methodology to reach his conclusion about Plaintiff’s “loss of net income”

as that phrase is defined in the contract. In sum, “there is simply too great an analytical gap

between the data and the opinion proffered.” General Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 146

(1997). Mr. Hanahue is therefore precluded from offering his opinion regarding Plaintiff’s loss of

net income.

The motion is denied in all other respects. The Court will not preclude Plaintiff from

attempting to calculate a residual disability benefit at trial using admissible evidence consistent

with this Order.

7. Defendant’s Motion in Limine to Limit the Testimony of Joely Esposito, Ph.D. (ECF

No. 73) is DISMISSED AS MOOT. The parties agreed during oral argument that Plaintiff does

not intend to present Dr. Esposito as a witness.

8. Defendant’s Motion in Limine to Preclude Plaintiff’s Untimely and Prejudicial

Declaration and Financial Documents (ECF No. 74) is GRANTED. Discovery in this matter

closed on July 18, 2023. Two months later—on September 18, 2023—Plaintiff submitted a

Declaration with exhibits as part of his response to Defendant’s then-pending motion for summary

judgment. (See ECF No. 21-3.) The exhibits include a spreadsheet prepared by Plaintiff, along

with monthly bank statements, none of which were produced during discovery. Defendant argues

that permitting Plaintiff to use these documents at trial would be unfairly prejudicial, given their

untimely disclosure, and potentially misleading to the jury, given the unclear origin of the

spreadsheet data and the absence of comprehensible descriptions of transactions on the bank

statement entries. In response, Plaintiff contends that (i) Defendant’s discovery requests did not

specifically seek the detailed monthly information contained in the spreadsheet and bank

statements, and (ii) Unum cannot claim to be prejudiced given that Plaintiff’s counsel emailed

these documents to Defendant’s counsel on August 29, 2023, four months before Defendant filed

its motion in limine, and Defendant “has done nothing with [them].” (Pl. Opp’n Mem., ECF No.

40, at 6–9.)

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(a), “a party must, without awaiting a

discovery request, provide to the other parties: . . . (ii) a copy—or a description by category and

location—of all documents, electronically stored information, and tangible things that the

disclosing party has in its possession, custody, or control and may use to support its claims or

defenses, unless the use would be solely for impeachment; [and] . . . (iii) a computation of each

category of damages claimed by the disclosing party—who must also make available for

inspection and copying as under Rule 34 the documents or other evidentiary material, unless

privileged or protected from disclosure, on which each computation is based, including materials

bearing on the nature and extent of injuries suffered . . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1)(A). Rule 26

further provides that a party who has made an initial disclosure under Rule 26(a) must supplement

or correct its disclosure “in a timely manner if the party learns that in some material respect the

disclosure or response is incomplete or incorrect, and if the additional or corrective information

has not otherwise been made known to the other parties during the discovery process or in writing.”

Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(e)(1)(A). Under this Court’s then-operative scheduling order, discovery was to

be completed “no later than July 18, 2023.” (ECF No. 14.)

Plaintiff should have produced the spreadsheet and bank statements during discovery,

either to supplement his Rule 26(a) Initial Disclosures, or in response to Defendant’s document

requests, which included a request for “[a]ny and all documents evidencing income earned by

[Plaintiff] . . . .” (ECF No. 74-5, at 7.) The spreadsheet—titled “Husick Income (June 2020 -

Present)”—and the bank statements on which it is based, are documents evidencing income, and

Plaintiff seeks to use them to prove his case. The documents are also relevant to Plaintiff’s claimed

damages with respect to his breach of contract claim. The Court agrees that Defendant would be

severely prejudiced by their admission at trial given that Defendant did not have the opportunity

to depose Plaintiff on these documents during discovery and Defendant’s expert was unable to

consider them. Moreover, Plaintiff offers no justification for his failure to produce these

documents during discovery beyond his contention that Defendant’s discovery requests did not

ask for them. Even if Unum’s discovery requests could be read as not encompassing the

spreadsheet and bank statements, Plaintiff should have produced them in connection with his

Initial Disclosures, which he was required to timely supplement. His failure to do so prejudices

Defendant and precludes Plaintiff from using the spreadsheet and bank statements at trial. Fed. R.

Civ. P. 37(c)(1).

In addition, Plaintiff’s argument that Defendant “has done nothing with” the documents

besides filing a motion in limine seeking to exclude them misses the mark. (See Pl. Opp’n Mem.

at 8–9.) Plaintiff does not explain what Defendant was purportedly obligated to do with respect to

the belatedly disclosed documents. By the time the documents were provided to Defendant, both

fact and expert discovery had been closed for over a month. Plaintiff did not file a motion to admit

the documents despite their untimely disclosure or to reopen discovery. While Unum could have

filed a motion to reopen discovery to retake depositions with respect to the new documents, it was

not required to do so, and to conclude otherwise would effectively shift Plaintiff’s Rule 26 and

discovery obligations onto Defendant. See, e.g., Buffington v. Nestle Healthcare Nutrition Inc.,

No. 18-106, 2019 WL 6646703, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 24, 2019) (preventing plaintiff from

presenting evidence of lost earnings because, despite disclosing a number, she did not disclose

support for her computation, and it was not defendant’s duty to track down that support);

Sanguinetti v. Rambosk, No. 21-529, 2024 WL 167265, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 16, 2024) (“It was

Plaintiff’s burden to ensure compliance with Rule 26. Having failed to do so, he cannot shift the

blame to Defendants.”); Dayton Valley Invs., LLC v. Union Pac. R. Co., No. 08-127, 2010 WL

3829219, at *4 (D. Nev. Sept. 24, 2010) (rejecting argument that failure to comply with disclosure

obligations was harmless where opposing party did not conduct discovery on the issue).

9. Defendant’s Motion in Limine to Preclude Evidence of Defendant’s Gross Profits

and/or Executive Compensation (ECF No. 76) is GRANTED IN PART, with respect to the

introduction of such evidence during consideration of Defendant’s liability for breach of contract

and bad faith, and DENIED IN PART, to the extent that the issue of punitive damages comes

before the jury. Taking a cue from Plaintiff’s requests for information regarding Unum’s gross

profits and the total pay package of its CEO during discovery, Defendant asks that the Court

prevent Plaintiff from presenting its gross profits and CEO pay to the jury at trial, arguing that

evidence of corporate affluence has no probative value in this case but is likely to prejudice a jury

against the insurer. In response, Plaintiff argues that case law establishes that information

regarding a defendant’s net worth is relevant to the calculation of punitive damages, which Plaintiff

seeks in connection with his bad faith claim. However, the cases cited by Plaintiff all pertain to

the discovery of financial information rather than its admissibility at trial. Although it is true that

“[a] company’s wealth may be considered in determining punitive damages,” it is not uncommon

for courts to restrict the introduction of such information until a later stage of proceedings given

the substantial risk of prejudice. See Pennsylvania Tr. Co. v. Dorel Juv. Grp., Inc., 851 F. Supp.

2d 831, 848 (E.D. Pa. 2011) (admitting evidence of defendant’s assets in products liability action

but noting that, “if appropriate at trial, the Court may exercise its discretion to bifurcate the trial to

allow for a separate punitive damages phase”); Smith v. Allstate Ins. Co., 912 F. Supp. 2d 242,

254–56 (W.D. Pa. 2012) (granting in part and denying in part defendant insurer’s motion in limine

to exclude evidence of insurer’s net worth, holding that the probative value of such evidence would

be substantially outweighed by a danger of unfair prejudice if the evidence were introduced before

the plaintiff had presented sufficient evidence to sustain claim for punitive damages); Lopez by

Ilarrava v. CSX Transp., Inc., No. 14-257, 2021 WL 2810117, at *8–9 (W.D. Pa. July 6, 2021)

(reserving ruling on whether jury may be charged as to punitive damages until the end of trial and

noting that the plaintiff may introduce evidence of the defendant’s wealth at that time if

appropriate); Hanna v. Giant Eagle Inc., No. 15-1009, 2018 WL 11474894, at *5 (W.D. Pa. Mar.

28, 2018) (bifurcating the issue of liability for employment discrimination from the issue of

punitive damages and holding that evidence of the defendant’s net worth would be admissible

during the second stage of trial). The Third Circuit Court of Appeals has held that it is not an

abuse of discretion for a trial court to bifurcate the question of liability for punitive damages from

the amount of punitive damages where a court is “understandably concerned that the jury’s

knowledge of the defendant’s net worth might influence its assessment of compensatory damages.”

See McCann v. Miller, 502 F. App’x. 163, 171 (3d Cir. 2012). Here, we find that evidence of

Defendant’s net worth has little to no probative value with respect to Plaintiff’s claims but presents

a substantial likelihood of prejudice. Accordingly, such evidence will not be admitted unless and

until Plaintiff has adequately substantiated his bad faith claim at trial.

10. Defendant’s Motion in Limine to Preclude Evidence of a Purported Work Review

Requirement (ECF No. 77) is DENIED. In this motion, Defendant requests that the Court

preclude Plaintiff from mentioning, suggesting, or eliciting testimony from any witnesses

suggesting that after the myocardial infarction, Plaintiff’s work as a patent attorney was required

to be reviewed by his law firm colleagues before being sent to clients or other parties. Defendant

argues that because Plaintiff’s law partners indicated during their depositions that they were not

aware of a strict requirement that all of Plaintiff’s work should be checked, allowing Plaintiff to

present evidence alluding to such a policy would mislead the jury by inaccurately suggesting that

Plaintiff was unable to work independently as a patent attorney following his heart attack.

However, other portions of Plaintiff’s colleagues’ depositions discuss their review of some of

Plaintiff’s work and related concerns, and Plaintiff maintains that the work-review requirement

was a self-instituted policy that constituted a formal requirement because of his position of

authority within his law firm. This is seemingly the evidence that Defendant seeks to preclude.

Unfortunately for Defendant, evidence is not unfairly prejudicial simply because it runs contrary

to one party’s interpretation of events. There appears to be a factual dispute as to the existence of

a work-review requirement, and both parties are entitled to elicit—and to challenge—witness

testimony on this topic, so that the jury may determine which side’s characterization of the facts

prevails.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

BY THE COURT:

/s/ R. Barclay Surrick

R. BARCLAY SURRICK, J.