Case law
Opinions from 1658 to today.
5,177 results
1.56s
Mitchell v. MG INDUSTRIES, INC.
822 F. Supp. 2d 490 · District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania · Sep 30, 2011
To prove a prima facie case of age discrimination under the ADEA, Plaintiffs must establish they were: (1) over forty years of age; (2) qualified for the position at issue; (3) subject to an adverse employment action; and … Harman clearly set forth his reasoning why sales representatives were not his focus, explaining they could not contribute to profitability in any meaningful way given the fact their customers were locked into long-term, fixed
Cited 4 timesPublishedT.L. ex rel. Latisha G. v. Pennsylvania Leadership Charter School
224 F. Supp. 3d 421 · District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania · Dec 12, 2016
While 20 U.S.C. § 1415 (f) only requires a single resolution meeting, § 1415(e) clearly contemplates multiple mediation sessions. … Plaintiffs have therefore established the protected activity element of their retaliation claim. 2.
Cited 13 timesPublished206 F. Supp. 2d 689 · District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania · Jun 13, 2002
According to Gould, after establishing a true conflict the court must next “select the choice of law rules of the state where the ‘acts or omissions’ occurred, not where the injury occurred.” Gould, 220 F.3d at 181 . … Here, the last act or omission having a causal effect clearly was committed by the air traffic controllers in Indiana.
Cited 2 timesPublished883 F. Supp. 2d 542 · District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania · Aug 7, 2012
.; or (B) showing that the materials [that the moving party has cited] do not establish the absence ... of a genuine dispute.... ” Fed. R.Civ.P. 56(c)(1). … MetLife further argues that the documents Plaintiff signed, the two Notices and the deed transferring his property to Mother, all clearly explained that Plaintiff would be giving up his share of the residence and that he
Cited 41 timesPublishedDistrict Court, E.D. Pennsylvania · Nov 24, 2025
Section 1915 accords judges “the unusual power to pierce the veil of the complaint’s factual allegations and dismiss those claims whose factual contentions are clearly baseless . . . .” Id. at 327. … Because DHS is immune from liability under § 1983, this claim will be dismissed. B.
Cited 0 timesUnknown684 F. Supp. 2d 641 · District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania · Feb 5, 2010
Byrne does not specifically allege that Chester County Hospital qualifies as a participating hospital governed by EMTALA. … Under Pennsylvania law, " '[a] cause of action for breach of contract must be established by pleading (1) the existence of a contract, including its essential terms, (2) a breach of a duty imposed by the contract and (3)
Cited 18 timesPublishedTravelers Indemnity Co. v. Stedman
895 F. Supp. 742 · District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania · Aug 17, 1995
Judgment pursuant to Rule 12(c) will only be *746 granted if it is clearly established that no material issue of fact remains to be resolved and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Jablonski v. … Should the checks in fact also bear forged maker’s signatures, then a depositary or collecting bank is immunized from liability for having honored such checks unless the depositary or collecting bank failed to meet the requirements
Cited 7 timesPublished498 F. Supp. 58 · District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania · Sep 17, 1980
To qualify for benefits conferred under 42 U.S.C. § 402 (a), an accumulation of twenty-six “quarters of coverage,” in the form of wages or self-employment income, must be demonstrated by the applicant. 42 U.S.C. § 414 (a) … The social security claimant in McDowell sought to establish that fees received as executor of the estate of a close relative constituted income derived from a “trade or business.”
Cited 1 timesPublishedHAMLITON v. NORRISTOWN STATE HOSPITAL
District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania · Aug 1, 2024
Under that structure, the plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case of employment discrimination, which requires showing: (1) that she was a member of a protected class; (2) that she was qualified for her position … Poor performance if clearly set forth by the Defendant through the introduction of admissible evidence may serve as a legitimate reason for a failure to promote. Narin v. Lower Merion Sch.
Cited 0 timesUnknownHorizon House Developmental Services, Inc. v. Township of Upper Southampton
804 F. Supp. 683 · District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania · Aug 28, 1992
Testimony of Fenster. 67.- Horizon House is in good standing with the Bucks County Office of Mental Health and Mental Retardation and is considered a prime qualified supplier of group home services. … The language of the ordinance clearly refers to people with handicaps. It extends to “any facility” where “permanent care or professional supervision is present.”
Cited 66 timesPublishedMOLLICHELLA v. WEST BRANDYWINE TOWNSHIP MUNICIPAL AUTHORITY
District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania · Apr 16, 2020
To qualify for the Section 207(k) exemption, the employer must demonstrate that (1) the employees at issue are engaged in fire protection or law enforcement, and (2) the employer established a qualifying work period. … Second, Plaintiff admits that Defendant Township established a 14-day work period (see SAC Ex.
Cited 0 timesUnknownDistrict Court, E.D. Pennsylvania · Mar 21, 2022
reported “no acute distress” related to sleep apnea and reported no symptoms while sleeping.30 Plaintiff disputes this record of his conversation with NP Kline, and avers that he clearly … scienter can be proven through circumstantial evidence and witness testimony.”74 Here, Plaintiff has not provided any evidence that policies or procedures, rather than the medical decisions of qualified
Cited 0 timesUnknownZenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Electric Industrial Co.
494 F. Supp. 1161 · District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania · Apr 23, 1980
MELCO further argues that, even if Alcoa is the law in some respects, the “intent plus effect” test announced there by Judge Learned Hand, see infra at 1182-1184, dubbed the “qualified” test by MELCO, applies only when (1 … This power clearly entails the extension of judicial jurisdiction where legislative jurisdiction does not exist.
Vacated by In Re Japanese Electronic Products Antitrust Litigation, 631 F.2d 1069 (1980)Cited 31 timesPublishedIn re Linerboard Antitrust Litigation
203 F.R.D. 197 · District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania · Sep 4, 2001
Defendants do not challenge the qualifications of plaintiffs’ counsel and the Court finds them to be well qualified. … Clearly, purchasers of corrugated products under contracts which did not key prices to the price of linerboard must be excluded from the class.
Cited 57 timesPublishedFresh Start Industries, Inc. v. ATX Telecommunications Services
295 F. Supp. 2d 521 · District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania · Dec 11, 2003
Unitronix Corp., 218 N.J.Super. 260 , 527 A.2d 875, 882 (1986) (finding that corporations were intended to qualify as “consumers” under the Act). … This interest would clearly be impaired if the Pennsylvania statute was applied in this case since, as a corporation, the plaintiff could not state a cause of action under the UTPCPL.
Cited 4 timesPublishedUnited States ex rel. Bowers v. Rundle
253 F. Supp. 926 · District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania · Jul 7, 1965
The state courts do not consider the fact that in a case such as this a motion to suppress has been made at the preliminary hearing significant enough to make an exception to the well-established rule stated in the above-cited … Supreme Court dealing squarely with the issue of the application of Mapp to post-Mapp proceedings challenged on collateral at■tack where the applicability of Mapp was not raised at trial. 3 There is no Third Circuit case clearly
Cited 0 timesPublishedALSTON v. CITY OF PHILADELPHIA
District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania · Aug 31, 2020
Alston has not submitted facts that tend to establish that Lt. Dougherty had actual or constructive knowledge of the harassment. He knew about Sgt. Gorman’s epithet because Sgt. Alston told him about it. … Dougherty had qualified immunity. An appropriate Order follows. BY THE COURT: /s/ Joshua D.
Cited 0 timesUnknownPearl Musical Instrument Company Co. Ltd. v. Hoshino Gakki Co., Ltd. et al.
District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania · Jul 7, 2026
The visual elements here are clearly stated. Cf Classic Touch Décor, Inc. v. Michael Aram, Inc., No. 15-CV-453 (NGG) (RLM), 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 144636 at *12 (E.D.N.Y. … The Court disagrees, however, with Plaintiff's presumption that copying alone is sufficient, instead viewing it as one of many factors that may establish secondary meaning.
Cited 0 timesUnknownESTATE OF PEREZ v. City of Philadelphia
701 F. Supp. 2d 658 · District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania · Apr 5, 2010
Kneipp, like Ye, required something more than a “mere assurance” to establish an affirmative act. ii. … Reliance on a 911 operator, by itself, cannot establish a constitutionally recognized harm because plaintiffs had no constitutionally-recognized reliance interest in the first place: the Third Circuit has clearly stated that
Cited 4 timesPublishedSmith v. HireRight Solutions, Inc.
711 F. Supp. 2d 426 · District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania · May 12, 2010
The United States Supreme Court has clarified that reckless disregard of FCRA requirements also qualifies as willful violation within the meaning of section 1681n(a) 4 . Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. … Second, quite unlike Safeco, where the statute at issue was “less-than-pellucid” and there was a “dearth of guidance,” id. at 70, the statutory text at issue here has a plain and clearly ascertainable meaning.
Cited 16 timesPublished
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