MURRAY

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

IRVIN G. MURRAY, :

Plaintiff, :

:

v. : CIVIL ACTION NO. 25-CV-5808

:

U.S. TREASURY, et al., :

Defendants. :

MEMORANDUM

MARSTON, J. November 24, 2025

Plaintiff Irvin G. Murray initiated this civil action by filing a pro se Complaint against the

U.S. Treasury (“Treasury”); the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (“HUD”);

the Philadelphia Housing Authority (“PHA”); the Department of Human Services (“DHS”); the

Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority (“SEPTA”);1 the “U.S Treasury Mexico

LLC-HUD;” “FHA;” “OSH;”2 Poor People’s Army; Alec Incorp.; Former U.S. Senator Rick

Santorum; Philadelphia City Councilmembers Kendra Brooks and Jamie Gaultier;3 Pennsylvania

State Representative Amen Brown; Philadelphia District Attorney Larry Krasner; Dowan Harris;

Sterling Johnson; Cheri Honkala; James Lafayette; and Renee Williams. For the following

1 Murray used abbreviations for Defendants HUD, PHA, DHA, and SEPTA. The Court identifies

these agencies based on commonly abbreviated references.

2 Murray does not state any allegations identifying “OSH” or describing its involvement. The

Court construes “OSH” to be either the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (“OSHA”) or the

Occupational Safety and Health Act, but is unable to discern any viable claim against OSHA, or pursuant

to the Act.

3 Murray names a “Janie” Gaultier as a member of the City Council. According to the

Philadelphia City Council website, her first name is Jamie. See https://phlcouncil.com/jamiegauthier/

(last viewed Nov. 19, 2025). The Court may consider matters of public record when conducting a

screening under § 1915. See Buck v. Hampton Twp. Sch. Dist., 452 F.3d 256, 260 (3d Cir. 2006). The

Court will use the spelling of this Defendant’s name that is contained in public records.

reasons, the Court will grant Murray leave to proceed in forma pauperis and dismiss the

Complaint in its entirety.

I. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS4

The majority of Murray’s allegations are difficult to understand or are completely

incomprehensible, containing numerous fragmented claims regarding non-party individuals, and

failing to set forth allegations regarding most of the named Defendants. At base, Murray’s

claims appear to stem from an inheritance allegedly stolen by Defendants DHS, Philadelphia

City Councilmembers Brooks and Gaultier, Former U.S. Senator Santorum, Cheri Honkala, the

Poor People’s Army, HUD, and a non-defendant named Sherry Huntler. (Doc. No. 2 at 2.)

Specifically, Murray alleges he is the “sole heir to Irvin Singleton Johnson’s 1987 FHA

Judgment” in the amount of 43 million dollars. (Id.) He claims his father passed the inheritance

“straight” to him “for reparations to black and brown Philly.” (Id.) He next claims the DHS

estate recovery office in Harrisburg flagged the inheritance as “threat money” and “swallowed it

under Medicaid offsets, even though it wasn’t Medicaid cash.” (Id. at 2–3.) Murray alleges

Defendants Honkala, Councilmembers Brooks and Gaultier, “plus the so-called Poor People’s

Army,” including other individuals not named as defendants, “laundered the rest.” (Id.) Senator

Santorum was allegedly a congressman at the time these events occurred and “sat on the

appropriations [committee] that year.” (Id. at 3.) Murray then continues to list several non-party

individuals and entities that he appears to believe may be involved with or have documents

related to his allegedly stolen inheritance. (Id. at 3–5.) He also claims he has received death

4 Murray submitted a seven-page handwritten Complaint. (Doc. No. 2.) The factual allegations

set forth in this Memorandum are taken from that Complaint. Where the Court quotes from the

Complaint, punctuation, spelling, and capitalization errors are cleaned up.

threats and is “being denied housing, threatened, harassed, attacked, blackballed, and erased

because [he is] reclaiming” the 43 million dollars “in reparations funds.” (Id. at 6.)

As relief, Murray appears to request bank transfer, routing information, and other

documents pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”) from several state agencies

and private institutions and individuals5 so he can recover his claimed inheritance “before Cheri

Honkala buries it again.” (Id. at 4–5.) He requests that his inheritance be returned to him (id. at

7) and that his case be “escalat[ed]” to the FBI (id. at 2).6 He also requests money damages and

restoration of his housing rights, listing an address of 5138 Reno Street, but providing no city,

state, or zip code. (Id.)

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

The Court will grant Murray leave to proceed in forma pauperis because it appears that

he is incapable of paying the fees to commence this civil action. Accordingly, 28 U.S.C.

5 Congress enacted FOIA to “facilitate public access to Government documents.” United States

Dep’t of State v. Ray, 502 U.S. 164, 173 (1991) (citation omitted). FOIA requires federal agencies to

disclose, upon request, broad classes of agency records unless those records are covered by the statute’s

exemptions. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3)(A), (b) (describing agencies’ obligations, procedures to be

followed when seeking information under the Act, and exemptions). Any claims under the FOIA fail for

lack of a legal basis because that statute does not apply to state agencies or private entities/individuals.

See 5 U.S.C. § 551(1) (defining “agency” for purposes of FOIA as certain authorities of the United

States).

6 In this vein, Murray requests that those involved, presumably the named Defendants, be

criminally prosecuted and sentenced to life in prison. But the Court cannot provide this relief because a

“private citizen lacks a judicially cognizable interest in the prosecution or nonprosecution of another.”

See, e.g., Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 619 (1973) (finding that a citizen lacks standing to

contest prosecutorial policies “when he himself is neither prosecuted nor threatened with prosecution”)

(citations omitted); Bliss v. Lehigh Cnty. Parole, No. 25-cv-4808, 2025 WL 3028168, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Oct.

29, 2025) (citing Lewis v. Jindal, 368 F. App’x 613, 614 (5th Cir. 2010) (“It is well-settled that the

decision whether to file criminal charges against an individual lies within the prosecutor’s discretion, and

private citizens do not have a constitutional right to compel criminal prosecution.”)); Smith v. Friel, No.

19-cv-943, 2019 WL 3025239, at *4 (M.D. Pa. June 4, 2019), report and recommendation adopted, 2019

WL 3003380 (M.D. Pa. July 10, 2019) (collecting cases and stating “courts have long held that a civil

rights plaintiff may not seek relief in civil litigation in the form of an order directing the criminal

prosecution of some third parties”).

§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) applies, requiring the Court to dismiss the Complaint if it is frivolous. A

complaint is frivolous if it “lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.” Neitzke v. Williams,

490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). The use of the term “frivolous” in § 1915 “embraces not only the

inarguable legal conclusion, but also the fanciful factual allegation.” Id. Section 1915 accords

judges “the unusual power to pierce the veil of the complaint’s factual allegations and dismiss

those claims whose factual contentions are clearly baseless . . . .” Id. at 327. “[A] finding of

factual frivolousness is appropriate when the facts alleged rise to the level of the irrational or the

wholly incredible[.]” Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33 (1992). A claim is legally baseless

if it is “based on an indisputably meritless legal theory.” Deutsch v. United States, 67 F.3d 1080,

1085 (3d Cir. 1995).

Additionally, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) requires the Court to dismiss the Complaint if

it fails to state a claim. Whether a complaint fails to state a claim under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is

governed by the same standard applicable to motions to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 12(b)(6), see Tourscher v. McCullough, 184 F.3d 236, 240 (3d Cir. 1999), which

requires the Court to determine whether the complaint contains “sufficient factual matter,

accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556

U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quotations omitted); see also Talley v. Wetzel, 15 F.4th 275, 286 n.7 (3d

Cir. 2021). At this early stage of the litigation, the Court accepts the facts alleged in the

Complaint as true, draws all reasonable inferences in Murray’s favor, and asks only whether that

Complaint, liberally construed, contains facts sufficient to state a plausible claim. Shorter v.

United States, 12 F.4th 366, 374 (3d Cir. 2021), abrogation on other grounds recognized by

Fisher v. Hollingsworth, 115 F.4th 197 (3d Cir. 2024). Conclusory allegations do not suffice.

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Because Murray is proceeding pro se, the Court construes his allegations

liberally. Vogt v. Wetzel, 8 F.4th 182, 185 (3d Cir. 2021) (citing Mala v. Crown Bay Marina,

Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 244–45 (3d Cir. 2013)). The Court will “apply the relevant legal principle

even when the complaint has failed to name it.” Id. However, “pro se litigants still must allege

sufficient facts in their complaints to support a claim.” Id. (quoting Mala, 704 F. 3d at 245).

III. DISCUSSION

The exact nature of Murray’s claims is unclear. Since he references various local, state

and federal government officials and agencies, and appears to allege his civil rights were

violated, the Court understands him to be asserting constitutional claims. The vehicle by which

federal constitutional claims may be brought in federal court is 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

As an initial matter, Murray may not proceed on his claims because his allegations, to the

extent decipherable, lack a basis in fact and are frivolous. The Court has thoroughly reviewed

Murray’s Complaint and cannot discern any plausible basis for a non-frivolous claim upon which

he could move forward. Murray appears to assert that various government officials and

agencies, as well as private entities and individuals, conspired to steal his purported $43 million

inheritance and attempted to murder him because of that inheritance. Specifically, he claims he

has received death threats and is “being denied housing, threatened, harassed, attacked,

blackballed, and erased because [he is] reclaiming” the $43 million “in reparations funds.” (Doc.

No. 2 at 6.) He asserts “they,” presumably Defendants, “don’t get to kill [him] for an

inheritance.” (Id.) These allegations are wholly incredulous. Accordingly, the Court will

dismiss Murray’s claims, without leave to amend, as factually baseless.7 See, e.g., Caterbone v.

7 Although it appears Murray’s claims under FOIA relate only to the state agencies or private

entities/individuals he listed in his Complaint, which fail for the reasons discussed supra n.5, to the extent

Murray intended to include the federal agency defendants, the Court also cannot discern any plausible

basis for a non-frivolous FOIA claim upon which he could move forward. See Rhodes v. Fed. Bureau of

Investigation, No. 16-cv-93, 2017 WL 1021314, at *4 (N.D. Ind. Mar. 16, 2017) (“[T]he remainder of

Rhodes’ complaint, which references unspecified actions allegedly taken by unidentified FBI agents

Nat’l Sec. Agency, 698 F. App’x 678, 679 (3d Cir. 2017) (dismissing appeal as lacking an

arguable basis in fact where underlying allegations were based on plaintiff’s assertion that he

was a “victim of U.S. sponsored mind control and cointelpro harassment program”); Harley v.

City of Phila. City Gov’t, No. 21-3680, 2021 WL 4844156, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 18, 2021)

(dismissing as frivolous Harley’s claims based on “a conspiracy by Defendants to target her with

wiring, voices, and electrical activity, and to murder her”); Price v. Fed. Bureau of Investigation,

No. 20-3015, 2020 WL 4368063, at *3 (E.D. Pa. July 30, 2020), aff’d, 845 F. App’x 106 (3d Cir.

2021) (finding plaintiff’s allegations to be factually frivolous where plaintiff asserted that

“numerous law enforcement agencies, attorneys, prison officials, and medical professionals have

used neurological and psychological technology to control the ‘four basic groups of his brain and

mental functions’ and “that the use of this ‘technology’ and ‘mind control’ has caused him

numerous impairments and drove him to criminal and erratic behavior”).

Even if Murray’s allegations were not factually frivolous, which the Court concludes they

are, his claims also do not have any basis in any plausible constitutional violation8 for the

additional reasons as set forth below.

A. Claims Against DHS

The Eleventh Amendment bars suits against a state and its agencies in federal court that

seek monetary damages. See Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 99–100

related to harassment, torture (using ‘directed energy weapons’), theft, destruction of property,

defamation, civil rights violations, attempted murder (‘by forced suicide’), and misconduct, suggests that

any FOIA claims regarding these allegations are frivolous because ‘the facts alleged rise to the level of

the irrational or wholly incredible.’”).

8 “To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by the

Constitution and laws of the United States, and must show that the alleged deprivation was committed by

a person acting under color of state law.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); see also Groman v.

Twp. of Manalapan, 47 F .3d 628, 638 (3d Cir. 1995) (“The color of state law element is a threshold

issue; there is no liability under § 1983 for those not acting under color of law.”).

(1984); see also A.W. v. Jersey City Public Schs., 341 F.3d 234, 238 (3d Cir. 2003). DHS is a

state agency immune from suit and is not a “person” subject to liability under § 1983. See, e.g.,

Betts v. New Castle Youth Dev. Ctr., 621 F. 3d 249, 253 (3d Cir. 2010) (“State governments and

their subsidiary units are immune from suit in federal court under the Eleventh Amendment.”);

Karns v. Shanahan, 879 F.3d 504, 519 (3d Cir. 2018) (noting that “‘[s]tates or governmental

entities that are considered “arms of the State” for Eleventh Amendment purposes’ are not

‘persons’ under § 1983”) (quoting Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 70 (1989));

Sherle v. Pa. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., No. 21-cv-140, 2022 WL 17469468, at *2 (W.D. Pa. Dec. 6,

2022) (dismissing § 1983 claim against DHS as barred by the Eleventh Amendment). Because

DHS is immune from liability under § 1983, this claim will be dismissed.

B. Claims Against PHA and SEPTA

As a public housing authority, PHA is considered a municipal corporation for the

purposes of § 1983. See Watson v. Phila. Hous. Auth., 629 F. Supp. 2d 481, 485 (E.D. Pa. 2009)

(citing Wright v. Phila. Hous. Auth., No. 94-cv-1601, 1994 WL 597716, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 1,

1994)). SEPTA is also treated as a municipality for purposes of claims brought under § 1983.

See Brown v. SEPTA, 539 F. App’x 25, 27 (3d Cir. 2013); see also Thompson v. Se. Pa. Transp.

Auth., No. 20-cv-756, 2021 WL 2414610, at *3 (E.D. Pa. June 14, 2021), aff’d, No. 21-cv-2286,

2022 WL 17958629 (3d Cir. Dec. 27, 2022). Municipal defendants, such as PHA and SEPTA,

are not liable under § 1983 unless a municipal policy or custom caused the alleged constitutional

violation. See Lee v. Petrolichio, 697 F. App’x 112, 113 n.5 (3d Cir. 2017) (concluding that the

PHA was not a proper defendant in § 1983 action where plaintiff “did not allege an ‘official

policy or custom.’”). Besides naming PHA and SEPTA as defendants, Murray asserts no

allegations about the PHA or SEPTA’s involvement in the alleged wrongs or that those wrongs

were the result of a PHA or SEPTA policy or custom. Murray has thus not stated a plausible

§ 1983 claim against PHA or SEPTA. See McTernan v. City of York, PA, 564 F.3d 636, 658 (3d

Cir. 2009) (“To satisfy the pleading standard, [the plaintiff] must . . . specify what exactly that

custom or policy was.”). Given the frivolity of his underlying allegations, no leave to amend

will be granted as to these Defendants. Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 112–13

(3d Cir. 2002) (“[D]ismissals of frivolous claims do not require leave to amend due to the long

tradition of denying leave to amend . . . when amendment is inequitable or futile.”).

C. Claims Against U.S. Treasury and HUD

Murray names the U.S. Treasury9 and HUD as defendants. He has not alleged any legal

basis for a claim against the U.S. Treasury or HUD to recover money damages. “Absent a

waiver, sovereign immunity shields the Federal Government and its agencies from suit.” See

F.D.I.C. v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 475 (1994). Since there is no waiver of immunity for an

individual to pursue damages claims against the U.S. Treasury or HUD for alleged constitutional

violations, Murray’s claim may not proceed. See Treasurer of N.J. v. U.S. Dep’t of Treasury,

684 F.3d 382, 395 (3d Cir. 2012) (“Without a waiver of sovereign immunity, a court is without

subject matter jurisdiction over claims against federal agencies or officials in their official

capacities.”).

D. Fair Housing Act Claims

Murray also asserts he is “being denied housing” because of his alleged inheritance and

requests restoration of his housing rights, listing an address of 5138 Reno Street.10 (Doc. No. 2

9 The Court is unable to discern the meaning of Murray’s reference to the defendant named “U.S

Treasury Mexico, LLC-HUD” and treats it as duplicative of the U.S. Treasury.

10 Plaintiff filed an emergency motion after filing his Complaint, requesting the Court to

immediately restore his housing voucher, which the Court denied for the reasons set forth in its Order

filed on October 24, 2025. (See Doc. No. 7.) Plaintiff subsequently filed a combined motion to

at 6–7.) It is possible that Murray intended to assert a Fair Housing Act (“FHA”)11 retaliation

claim based on allegations that he was terminated from a housing assistance program in

retaliation for attempting to recover his alleged stolen inheritance. See Holley v. Dep’t of

Veteran Affairs, 165 F.3d 244, 248 (3d Cir. 1999) (“We apply the applicable law, irrespective of

whether a pro se litigant has mentioned it by name.”).

The FHA “prohibits housing discrimination on the basis of, inter alia, race, gender, and

national origin.” 431 E. Palisade Ave. Real Est., LLC v. City of Englewood, 977 F.3d 277, 283

(3d Cir. 2020); see also 42 U.S.C. § 3604(b). The Fair Housing Amendments Act (“FHAA”),

which was adopted by Congress in 1988, extended FHA protections to individuals with

disabilities. Id.; see also 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f). The FHA’s anti-retaliation provision makes it

“unlawful to coerce, intimidate, threaten, or interfere with any person in the exercise or

enjoyment of, or on account of his having exercised or enjoyed . . . any right granted or protected

by section . . . 3604 . . . of this title.” 42 U.S.C. § 3617. The regulations associated with § 3617

reconsider and appeal, attaching a letter dated November 16, 2021, from Councilmember Brooks

congratulating him for securing housing at this same address, 5138 Reno Street located in Philadelphia.

(See Doc. No. 11 at 11.) Murray also attached a document that appears to be from the City of

Philadelphia Office of Homeless Services on which he wrote in black ink that this document was given to

him “on the day of eviction” from the Reno address on August 25, 2025. (Id. at 12.) It appears he may

be attempting to challenge a state court eviction from the Reno address. This Court is barred from

intervening in such an action. Courts in the Third Circuit have consistently held that “[t]he Anti-

Injunction Act precludes a federal court from enjoining state court eviction or foreclosure proceedings.”

McMillan v. Nationstar Mortg. Co., No. 20-1321, 2020 WL 4201605, at *2 (E.D. Pa. July 22, 2020)

(collecting cases); Frankel v. Guzman, No. 20-5208, 2020 WL 6161512, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 21, 2020)

(rejecting emergency request to enjoin eviction proceedings and noting weight of authority in Third

Circuit to support holding); Rhett v. Div. of Hous., Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs, No. 14-5055, 2014 WL

7051787, at *3 (D.N.J. Dec. 12, 2014) (“[T]o the extent Plaintiff requests that this Court dismiss the

eviction proceedings or order them transferred to this Court, the Anti–Injunction Act prohibits this Court

from taking such action.”); Frankel v. Kessler, No. 21-cv-93, 2021 WL 229321, at *5 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 22,

2021) (dismissing complaint on screening and denying temporary restraining order where claims related

to state court eviction proceeding were barred by Anti-Injunction Act).

11 He names “FHA” as a defendant without clarifying the referenced abbreviation. The Court

construes his reference to the FHA as an intent to state a claim under the Federal Housing Act given the

allegations related to his housing rights.

make clear that the section prohibits acts directed at individuals “because of” their membership

in a protected class. 24 C.F.R. § 100.400(c)(2) (listing prohibited conduct to include

“[t]hreatening, intimidating or interfering with persons in their enjoyment of a dwelling because

of the race, color, religion, sex, handicap, familial status, or national origin of such persons”)

(emphasis added). Prohibited acts under § 3617 include retaliating against individuals who

report discriminatory housing practices or participate in an FHA proceeding. See 42 U.S.C.

§ 3617; 24 C.F.R. § 100.400(c). “To prevail on a § 3617 retaliation claim, a plaintiff must

demonstrate that (1) []he engaged in a protected activity; (2) the defendant subjected [him] to an

adverse action; and (3) a causal link exists between the protected activity and the adverse

action.” Lloyd v. Presby’s Inspired Life, 251 F. Supp. 3d 891, 904 (E.D. Pa. 2017).

The FHA is a federal anti-discrimination statute intended to address discriminatory

housing practices targeting members of specific protected classes. See Mt. Holly Gardens

Citizens in Action, Inc. v. Township of Mount Holly, 658 F.3d 375, 381 (3d Cir. 2011) (“The

FHA can be violated by either intentional discrimination or if a practice has a disparate impact

on a protected class.”). Murray does not allege that he was discriminated against because he was

a member of a protected class. This is fatal to any FHA claim, including any FHA retaliation

claim. See, e.g., Davis v. Rubin, No. 20-6271, 2020 WL 7624833, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 22, 2020)

(dismissing FHA interference and retaliation claims on screening where plaintiff does not link

alleged harassment to “[his] exercise or enjoyment of a right under the FHA” and does not allege

a protected activity involving complaints about discrimination). Because Murray’s claims are

predicated solely on allegations surrounding retaliation for his alleged inheritance, not

discrimination based on a protected class, this claim will be dismissed with prejudice as

amendment would be futile.

E. Claims Against Former U.S. Senator Rick Santorum

Murray names former U.S. Senator Santorum as a defendant, claiming that he “sat on the

appropriations [committee] that year” and was a congressman when his alleged inheritance was

purportedly stolen. (Doc. No. 1 at 3.) The Court understands Murray to be attempting to assert a

Bivens claim12 against Senator Santorum based on his involvement on the House Committee of

Appropriations when he was a member of the U.S. House of Representatives. However, these

claims are time-barred. According to public records, Senator Santorum was a member of the

U.S. House of Representative from January 3, 1991, to January 3, 1995, and was later elected to

the United States Senate. See https://history.house.gov/People/Listing/S/SANTORUM,-Richard-

John-(Rick)-(S000059)/ (last viewed Nov. 19, 2025). Like constitutional claims against state

officials brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, there is no specific statute of limitations for

Bivens claims; rather, also like claims brought under § 1983, the timeliness of a Bivens claim is

governed by Pennsylvania’s two-year statute of limitations for personal injury torts. See

Kornafel v. United States Postal Serv., 784 F. App’x 842, 843 (3d Cir. 2019) (citing Kach v.

Hose, 589 F.3d 626, 634 (3d Cir. 2009)). Because Senator Santorum has not been a

congressman in more than 20 years, any claims arising out of conduct that took place during that

timeframe are well beyond the statute of limitations and untimely on the face of the Complaint.

See Wisniewski v. Fisher, 857 F.3d 152, 157 (3d Cir. 2017) (“A complaint is subject to dismissal

12 The basis for asserting a constitutional claim against a federal official is Bivens v. Six Unknown

Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 392 (1971) (holding that a remedy is

available for a federal agent’s violation of a citizen’s Fourth Amendment right to be free from warrantless

searches and seizures); Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 70 (2001) (stating that the “purpose of

Bivens is to deter individual federal officers from committing constitutional violations” by subjecting

them to personal liability).

for failure to state a claim on statute of limitations grounds only when the statute of limitations

defense is apparent on the face of the complaint.”).

F. Claims Against Private Individuals and Entities

Murray names Cheri Honkala, Dowan Harris, Sterling Johnson, James Lafayette, Renee

Williams, Alec Incorp., and the Poor People’s Army as defendants (see Doc. No. 1 at 2.), all of

whom appear to be private individuals and entities rather than “state actors” subject to liability

under § 1983 for constitutional violations. Whether a defendant is acting under color of state

law—i.e., whether the defendant is a state actor—depends on whether there is “such a close

nexus between the State and the challenged action’ that seemingly private behavior may be fairly

treated as that of the State itself.” Leshko v. Servis, 423 F.3d 337, 339 (3d Cir. 2005) (internal

quotations omitted). “To answer that question, [the United States Court of Appeals for the Third

Circuit has] outlined three broad tests generated by Supreme Court jurisprudence to determine

whether state action exists: (1) whether the private entity has exercised powers that are

traditionally the exclusive prerogative of the state; (2) whether the private party has acted with

the help of or in concert with state officials; and (3) whether the state has so far insinuated itself

into a position of interdependence with the acting party that it must be recognized as a joint

participant in the challenged activity.” Kach v. Hose, 589 F.3d 626, 646 (3d Cir. 2009) (internal

quotations and alteration omitted). Additionally, “[a]ction taken by private entities with the mere

approval or acquiescence of the State is not state action.” Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan,

526 U.S. 40, 52 (1999). Rather, to support a finding of state action, “the government must be

‘responsible for the specific conduct of which the plaintiff complains.’” Borrell v. Bloomsburg

Univ., 870 F.3d 154, 160 (3d Cir. 2017) (quoting Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1004 (1982)).

The Complaint does not allege any facts pertaining to the conduct of these private individuals

and entities that would indicate they were state actors under the three tests outlined by the Third

Circuit. Indeed, other than the allegations against Cheri Honkala and the Poor People’s Army

for allegedly participating in stealing his inheritance, Murray does not assert any facts related to

these individuals and entities nor does he allege how they violated his civil rights. Accordingly,

the claims against Honkala, Harris, Johnson, Lafayette, Williams, Alec Incorp., and the Poor

People’s Army will be dismissed.

G. Claims Against District Attorney Krasner and Representative Brown

Murray names District Attorney Krasner and Representative Brown as defendants but

makes no allegations about how they were involved in the incidents he describes. In a § 1983

action, the personal involvement of each defendant in the alleged constitutional violation is a

required element, and therefore, a plaintiff must allege how each defendant was involved in the

events and occurrences giving rise to the claims. See, e.g., Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195,

1207 (3d Cir. 1988); Jutrowski v. Towship of Riverdale, 904 F.3d 280, 290 (3d Cir. 2018) (“Each

Government official, his or her title notwithstanding, is only liable for his or her own

misconduct.”) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 677) (emphasis in original); Dooley v. Wetzel, 957

F.3d 366, 374 (3d Cir. 2020) (“Personal involvement requires particular ‘allegations of personal

direction or of actual knowledge and acquiescence.’”) (quoting Rode, 845 F.2d at 1207). See

also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676 (explaining that “[b]ecause vicarious liability is inapplicable to . . .

§ 1983 suits, a plaintiff must plead that each Government-official defendant, through the

official’s own individual actions, has violated the Constitution”). Other than naming District

Attorney Krasner and Representative Brown as defendants, Murray does not allege any facts as

to how these individuals violated his civil rights and thus, he fails to assert the personal

involvement required to state a plausible claim against them. Accordingly, the claims against

District Attorney Krasner and Representative Brown will be dismissed.

H. Claims Against Philadelphia City Councilmembers Brooks and Gaultier

Lastly, Murray brings claims against Philadelphia Councilmembers Brooks and Gaultier.

He claims that after DHS flagged the inheritance as “threat money” and “swallowed it under

Medicaid offsets,” Councilmembers Brooks and Gaultier along with others “laundered the rest.”

(Doc. No. 1 at 2–3.) Accordingly, the Court interprets this claim as asserting a Fourth

Amendment violation pursuant to § 1983. Under the Fourteenth Amendment, Murray is entitled

to due process of law before the government can deprive him of his “life, liberty, or property.”

U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1, cl. 3. Nonetheless, an individual may not assert a claim under

§ 1983 or the Fourteenth Amendment for even an intentional deprivation of the individual’s

property by a government employee “if a meaningful postdeprivation remedy for the loss is

available.” Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 533 (1984); see also Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S.

327, 328 (1986) (negligent acts of officials causing unintentional loss of property do not violate

due process). Pennsylvania law provides Murray with an adequate state remedy—the

Pennsylvania Tort Claims Act—for the alleged loss of his property. See Spencer v. Bush, 543 F.

App’x 209, 213 (3d Cir. 2013); see also Shakur v. Coelho, 421 F. App’ x 132, 135 (3d Cir. 2011)

(explaining that the Pennsylvania Tort Claims Act provides an adequate remedy for a willful

deprivation of property). Accordingly, any Fourteenth Amendment due process claims will be

dismissed.13

13 Because the Court has dismissed Murray’s federal claims, the Court will not exercise

supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c) over any remaining state law claims he intended to

pursue against Councilmembers Brooks and Gaultier. Accordingly, the only independent basis for

jurisdiction over any such claims is 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a), which grants a district court jurisdiction over a

case in which “the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000, exclusive of interest and

costs, and is between . . . citizens of different States.” Section 1332(a) requires “‘complete diversity

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court will grant Murray leave to proceed in forma

pauperis and dismiss the Complaint as factually frivolous and for failure to state a claim under

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).14 All federal claims will be dismissed with prejudice and leave to

amend will not be given as the Court concludes that any attempt to amend would be futile. See

Grayson, 293 F.3d at 108, 110. Any state law claims Murray intended to bring will be dismissed

without prejudice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. An appropriate order follows.

between all plaintiffs and all defendants,’ even though only minimal diversity is constitutionally required.

This means that, unless there is some other basis for jurisdiction, ‘no plaintiff [may] be a citizen of the

same state as any defendant.’” See Lincoln Ben. Life Co. v. AEI Life, LLC, 800 F.3d 99, 10 (3d Cir. 2015)

(quoting Lincoln Prop. Co. v. Roche, 546 U.S. 81, 89 (2005) and Zambelli Fireworks Mfg. Co. v. Wood,

592 F.3d 412, 419 (3d Cir. 2010) (internal footnotes omitted)). An individual is a citizen of the state

where he is domiciled, meaning the state where he is physically present and intends to remain. See

Washington v. Hovensa LLC, 652 F.3d 340, 344 (3d Cir. 2011). Murray alleges he is a resident of

Pennsylvania. Although he does not allege an address for Councilmembers Brooks and Gaultier, their

positions on the Philadelphia City Council suggests they are Pennsylvania citizens. Accordingly, he has

not sufficiently alleged that the parties are diverse for purposes of establishing the Court’s jurisdiction

over any state law claims he intends to pursue.

14 Murray also filed a motion to appoint counsel (see Doc. No. 8), which will be denied since his

claims did not pass statutory screening. See Tabron v. Grace, 6 F.3d 147, 155 (3d Cir. 1993) (in

determining whether appointment of counsel is appropriate, the Court should first determine whether

plaintiff’s lawsuit has a legal basis). Murray also filed a Motion for Reconsideration and Appeal of his

Emergency Injunction (Doc. No. 11), and an Emergency Motion for Entry of Default and Default of

Judgment based on Defendants’ failure to respond to the Complaint (Doc. No. 15). Because this case will

be dismissed with prejudice at the statutory screening stage and not proceed to the service stage, these

motions will be denied as moot.