Case law

Cottingham v. Warden, Ohio Reformatory for Women

District Court, S.D. Ohio · Aug 17, 2021

“A state court’s adjudication only results in an ‘unreasonable application’ of clearly established federal law when ‘the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from [the Supreme] Court’s decisions … Decisions by lower courts are relevant “to the extent [they] already reviewed and interpreted the relevant Supreme Court case law to determine whether a legal principle or right had been clearly established by the Supreme

O'Malley v. NaphCare, Inc.

101 F. Supp. 3d 742 · District Court, S.D. Ohio · Nov 17, 2014

NaphCare’s assertion that the statement in question is not “about” O’Malley, or that it does not qualify as being “of or concerning” her for purposes of a defamation claim, is not well taken. … Such a motion may consist of a “facial attack,” under which the moving party asserts that the allegations of the complaint are not sufficient to establish jurisdiction. O’Bryan v.

Brinkman v. Gilligan

85 F. Supp. 2d 761 · District Court, S.D. Ohio · Jun 17, 1999

The focus of their memorandum is clearly on the latter motion. … That language, above and beyond Dowell , clearly establishes that this Court retains the jurisdiction to entertain the Dayton Defendants’ Motion to Modify School Assignment Plan (Doc. # 275).

At & T Global Information Solutions Co. v. Union Tank Car Co.

29 F. Supp. 2d 857 · District Court, S.D. Ohio · Nov 2, 1998

These debts would certainly have qualified under Pritchett . Vermont American controlled Larsan, and Larsan disposed of its wastes in a manner that violated CERCLA. … Case law does exist which clearly distinguishes between the tests used to, impute either arranger or operator liability. See, e.g., U.S. v. TIC Inv.

Lanton v. Ocwen Loan Servicing LLC

District Court, S.D. Ohio · Feb 27, 2024

#132, Defendants’ and Plaintiffs’ supplemental briefing and replies concerning the Notice of Error in Plaintiffs’ Qualified Written Request of August 3, 2015. Doc. ##136, 137, 138 and 139. … Additionally, “[rlule 25(a) clearly contemplates [the] appointment of legal representatives, such as an executor or an administrator.” Roberson v. Wood, 500 F. Supp. 854, 859 (S.D.

Hicks v. Faris

District Court, S.D. Ohio · Aug 30, 2024

Therefore, Hicks has established standing. … Kelly, No. 20-4077-DDC-GEB, 2021 WL 4284534 (D.Kan., Sept. 21, 2021) (granting qualified immunity to defendant who blocked individual from sending emails to state-owned email addresses where complaint did not allege email

Bentley v. Honeywell International Inc.

223 F.R.D. 471 · District Court, S.D. Ohio · Sep 23, 2004

Motors Corp., 133 F.3d 388, 397 (6th Cir.1998) (qualifying this statement by adding, “[w]hat we are looking for is a common issue the resolution of which will advance the litigation.”). … Clearly, a Rule 23(b)(3) class could properly be certified under these circumstances.”); Ludwig, 2003 WL 22478842 at *5; LeClercq, 2001 WL 199840 at *7 (noting that, “Repetitive discovery for individual eases on the same

Cultrona v. Warden Correctional Reception Center

District Court, S.D. Ohio · Apr 20, 2022

Counsel argued in part that Hamilton was not qualified to create such a map. … “There is no clearly established Supreme Court precedent which holds that a state violates due process by permitting propensity evidence in the form of other bad acts evidence.” Bugh v.

Woods v. Aramark Correctional Services

District Court, S.D. Ohio · Jan 13, 2025

immunity under the circumstances here. … As to the subjective element, Plaintiff wholly fails to establish this element.

White v. Erdos

District Court, S.D. Ohio · Dec 9, 2020

. § 1983, which prohibits any person “under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State” from depriving a United States citizen “of any rights, privileges or immunities secured by the constitution … The video evidence and declarations clearly show that when defendant pushed plaintiff into the cell, plaintiff immediately turned back around and disobeyed defendant’s orders.

Jones v. Morris

541 F. Supp. 11 · District Court, S.D. Ohio · Aug 28, 1981

Morgan I dealt with an order of the Secretary of Agriculture which established maximum rates to be charged by market agencies at the Kansas City stockyards. … Clearly, a common pleas court is a more competent forum for a review of the sufficiency of the evidence than a school board.

Brewery District Society v. Federal Highway Administration

211 F. Supp. 2d 902 · District Court, S.D. Ohio · Mar 29, 2002

This arrangement of segmenting the administration and responsibilities, in our opinion, more clearly define[s] the roles of the City of Columbus and ODOT on the overall project. … to be proper: it is all but inconceivable that the FHWA would institute a formal project-merger procedure when such a process would serve no purpose other than to subject it to judicial review where it would otherwise be immune

Miranda v. Xavier University

District Court, S.D. Ohio · Mar 28, 2022

Third, Xavier argues that Plaintiff cannot establish damages because she still received a nursing education and, indeed, has a nursing degree. … A consumer may “qualify for class-action certification under [OCSPA] only if the defendant’s alleged violation ... is substantially similar to an act or practice previously declared to be deceptive.” Marrone v.

DeFrank v. Atlantic Specialty Insurance Company

District Court, S.D. Ohio · Jul 7, 2020

According to defendant, DeFrank claimed that T.G. qualified as Crouse’s foster child. See Doc. 11 at PAGEID120. … Another coverage issue raised by ASIC concerned whether Crouse died in the course of performing his job (“under dispatch”), which plaintiffs contend he clearly did.

United States v. Mayhew

380 F. Supp. 2d 915 · District Court, S.D. Ohio · Jun 22, 2005

A, and that the days’ events were so traumatic that his ability to think clearly was affected. … This request for some time alone does not qualify as a clear and unambiguous request for counsel. 19 .

Simmonds v. Warden Southern Ohio Correctional Facility

District Court, S.D. Ohio · Dec 3, 2019

“Identifying clearly established federal law is . . . the ‘threshold question under AEDPA.’” Dewald v. Wrigglesworth, 748 F.3d 295, 299 (6th Cir. 2014)(quoting Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 390 (2000). … In determining what constitutes clearly established federal law, “we must consult ‘the holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of [the Supreme] Courts’ decisions as of the time of the relevant state-court decision.’”

DeSanzo v. Titanium Metals Corp.

351 F. Supp. 2d 769 · District Court, S.D. Ohio · Jan 10, 2005

Valle testified that Blosser did not expressly state that he would not be included in the downsizing, but contends that Blosser clearly implied as much. … protected class, (2) was discharged, (3) was qualified for the position, and (4) was replaced by, or the discharge permitted the retention of, a person of substantially younger age.

American Premier Underwriters Inc v. General Electric Company

District Court, S.D. Ohio · Aug 25, 2020

First, there is no dispute that the Railcars and Yards qualify as separate “facilities” under CERCLA. … And the purchase agreemenis under which GE sold the Railcars clearly state that GE was a contractor.

R.L.K. v. Indian Hill Exempted Village School District

District Court, S.D. Ohio · Jan 23, 2025

Dukes, which established that in the employment discrimination context, plaintiffs typically must establish the existence of a discriminatory companywide policy to certify a companywide class. 564 U.S. at 358. … Her conclusory assertion that an illegal policy or practice exists at Indian Hill is clearly not adequate to satisfy the commonality requirement.

Canadian Pacific Enterprises (U.S.) Inc. v. Krouse

506 F. Supp. 1192 · District Court, S.D. Ohio · Jan 16, 1981

and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be— (A) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law; (B) contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege, or immunity … This Court is satisfied that the Supreme Court did not intend its words to establish a more intrusive review than had been conducted traditionally under the “arbitrary and capricious” standard.