Case law
Opinions from 1658 to today.
9,632 results
1.45s
Robert L. Preston v. United States
696 F.2d 528 · Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Dec 29, 1982
The court upheld the referee’s partial denial of CCC’s claim, reasoning as follows: The evidence clearly established that there was a very large shortage when Commodity issued its shipping orders and received grain out of … It is clear that the defendant does not qualify as a buyer in the ordinary course.
Cited 8 timesPublishedJeremy Dale v. Anthony Agresta
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Jun 4, 2019
Qualified immunity shields government officials from lawsuits for damages unless they violate a clearly established and specific constitutional right. See Taylor v. Barkes, 135 S. Ct. 2042, 2045 (2015). … We agree with the district court that Agresta is entitled to qualified immunity because Dale did not have a clearly established right to a seatbelt.
Cited 0 timesUnpublishedJeremy Dale v. Anthony Agresta
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Jun 4, 2019
Qualified immunity shields government officials from lawsuits for damages unless they violate a clearly established and specific constitutional right. See Taylor v. Barkes, 135 S. Ct. 2042, 2045 (2015). … We agree with the district court that Agresta is entitled to qualified immunity because Dale did not have a clearly established right to a seatbelt.
Cited 0 timesUnpublishedCharles Woods v. Evansville Press Company, Inc., the E.W. Scripps Company
791 F.2d 480 · Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Jun 27, 1986
The June 22 column clearly is not advertising by any stretch of the imagination. … The June 22 column clearly need not be read to imply that Mr. Woods himself is personally at the brink of financial disaster. *487 Moreover, Mr. Mr. FitzGerald’s prediction that Mr.
Cited 37 timesPublishedCentral States, Southeast & Southwest Areas Pension Fund v. Nagy
714 F.3d 545 · Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Apr 22, 2013
Put differently, in these sorts of ERISA cases, we review “mixed questions of law and fact” under a clearly erroneous standard. … Both activities qualify as an unincorporated trade or business under § 1301(b)(1).
Cited 16 timesPublished186 F.2d 627 · Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Jan 10, 1951
The language of the Act plainly discloses a twofold purpose, (1) waiver by the government of the immunity which it had previously enjoyed, and (2) that its liability be determined “in accordance with the law of the place … E.2d 537 , which clearly establishes the principle in Illinois that the owner of a dangerous instrumentality is responsible for damages caused by that instrumentality when he fails to adhere to a statutory *633 standard of
Cited 31 timesPublishedGregory J. Moore v. Steven C. Bryant
348 F.3d 238 · Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Dec 17, 2003
A “ ‘state court decision that correctly identifies the governing legal rule but applies it unreasonably to the facts of a particular prisoner’s case’ qualifies as a decision involving an unreasonable application of clearly … Therefore, we agree with the district court that the state court’s rejection of his ineffective assistance claim was contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established Supreme Court law.
Cited 60 timesPublished603 F.2d 7 · Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Aug 1, 1979
Of necessity, the district court also concluded that plaintiff’s motion to compel the Union to answer proffered interrogatories be denied. 8 II The party moving for summary judgment has the burden of clearly establishing … Such a policy can “lock in” the effects of past discrimination and relegate qualified minorities to the status of non-vested, temporary permit workers. See Gibson v.
Cited 138 timesPublishedUnited States v. United Brotherhood of Carpenters & Joiners of America, Local 169
457 F.2d 210 · Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Jan 4, 1972
The error made by the district court is that failure to follow the Ogilvie Plan is upon this record clearly not “standing alone and in and of itself.” … The district court was clearly in error in finding for the defendants and against the United States.
Cited 2 timesPublished597 F.3d 824 · Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Feb 26, 2010
This official-capacity claim against the Sheriff is considered one against a municipality, and municipalities are immune from punitive damages in § 1983 suits. United States ex rel. Chandler v. … More importantly, without evidence that Madison was on notice of inadequate inmate care by Lonz, we do not see how the full scope of Lonz’s qualifications is relevant to establishing Madison’s deliberate indifference.
Cited 517 timesPublishedGoodman, Warren v. Bertrand, Daniel
467 F.3d 1022 · Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Oct 31, 2006
United States,’ or (2) ‘involved an unreasonable application of . . . clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.’ ” Williams v. … See Williams, 529 U.S. at 391 (“It is past question that the rule set forth in Strickland qualifies as ‘clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.’ ”).
Cited 56 timesPublished42 F.3d 1391 · Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Oct 28, 1994
But if the acts committed are not in dispute, this court [court of appeals] can examine those undisputed facts to determine if they violated a law that was clearly established at the time. 7 In his opinion, Judge Dillin noted … that critical facts were not yet established that would entitle defendants to qualified immunity.
Cited 0 timesUnpublishedUnited States v. Warner, Lawrence E.
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Oct 25, 2007
But guilt no matter how clearly established cannot cancel a criminal defendant’s right to a trial that meets minimum standards of procedural justice. … The government’s attempt to immunize jurors itself suggests the proceedings were broken beyond repair.
Cited 0 timesPublishedLatta, Roger v. LaPorte County Sheri
221 F. App'x 443 · Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Feb 12, 2007
Second, although the district court found that prosecutors and witnesses were protected by principles of qualified rather than absolute immunity, we think that the better conclusion is that absolute immunity applies. … None of the witnesses who remain as appel- lees properly may be classified as a complaining witness, covered only by qualified immunity. See Kalina v. Fletcher, 522 U.S. 118 (1997).
Cited 4 timesUnpublished149 F.3d 734 · Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Jul 24, 1998
It is well-established that “if a statute is unambiguous, the statute governs; if, however, Congress’ silence or ambiguity has ‘left the gap for the agency to fill,’ courts must defer to the agency’s interpretation so long … He argues that mere possession of a firearm does not qualify as a violent crime in all cases.
Cited 31 timesPublishedUnited States v. James T. Smith
131 F.3d 685 · Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Dec 15, 1997
The prior convictions were within the ten-year time limit established by the Rules. Fed.R.Evid. 609(b). … In order to qualify as intimidation under Jones , the defendant’s conduct must constitute a threat. Id. at 625 .
Cited 47 timesPublished830 F.2d 1441 · Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Sep 28, 1987
the general WIN program. 42 U.S.C. §§ 645 (b)(1)(B), 632a(b), 614 (1982). 11 Congress requires AFDC eligibility as a condition of qualifying for participation in demonstration projects and work supplementation programs established … The dissent contends that the statutory scheme establishing the AFDC and AFDC-UP programs clearly reveals Congress’ intent on this issue and that the legislature obviously wished to deny benefits to families headed by illegal
Cited 27 timesPublishedUnited States v. Ricky A. Salyers
160 F.3d 1152 · Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Nov 20, 1998
ISSUES (1) Whether the trial judge “clearly erred” when he denied Ricky Salyers’ motion to suppress; (2) whether the district court “clearly erred” when it found that the MK 141s seized from the trailer qualify as “destructive … The defendant Salyers asks us to review this finding de novo, and argues that the MK 141 “clearly falls into the pyrotechnic category,” and thus does not qualify as a “destructive device.” We disagree.
Cited 31 timesPublishedKozuszek, Nicole v. Brewer, Dale
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Oct 8, 2008
So there was no constitutional violation here.1 1 Additionally, because Brewer and Nelson did not violate the Kozuszeks’ constitutional rights, they are shielded from liability by qualified immunity, which generally … protects state actors from civil damages “insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.”
Cited 0 timesPublishedUnited States v. Warner, Lawrence E.
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Nov 1, 2007
But guilt no matter how clearly established cannot cancel a criminal defendant’s right to a trial that meets minimum stan- dards of procedural justice. … The govern- ment’s attempt to immunize jurors itself suggests the proceedings were broken beyond repair.
Cited 0 timesPublished
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