Opinion

United States v. Warner, Lawrence E.

Court
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
Filed
Nov 1, 2007
Status
Published
On the bench
Per Curiam
Nature of suit
criminal
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 39.8%

The opinion

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

____________

OCTOBER 25, 2007Œ

OPINION PUBLISHED NOVEMBER 1, 2007

BeforeŒŒ

Hon. FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, Chief Judge

Hon. RICHARD A. POSNER, Circuit Judge

Hon. KENNETH F. RIPPLE, Circuit Judge

Hon. DANIEL A. MANION, Circuit Judge

Hon. MICHAEL S. KANNE, Circuit Judge

Hon. DIANE P. WOOD, Circuit Judge

Hon. TERENCE T. EVANS, Circuit Judge

Hon. ANN CLAIRE WILLIAMS, Circuit Judge

Hon. DIANE S. SYKES, Circuit Judge

Nos. 06-3517 & 06-3528

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

LAWRENCE E. WARNER AND

GEORGE H. RYAN, SR.,

Defendants-Appellants.

Œ

This Order was originally released in typescript on October 25,

2007.

ŒŒ

Hon. Joel M. Flaum and Hon. Ilana Diamond Rovner took no

part in the consideration or decision of this matter.

2 Nos. 06-3517 & 06-3528

____________

Appeals from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.

Nos. 02-CR-506-1, 4—Rebecca R. Pallmeyer, Judge.

____________

ORDER

On August 28, 2007, defendants-appellants filed a

petition for rehearing with suggestion for rehearing

en banc, and on September 11, 2007, plaintiff-appellee

filed an answer to the petition. The panel has voted to

deny the petition for rehearing. A vote on whether to grant

rehearing en banc was requested, and a majority of the

judges in regular active service have voted to deny the

petition. Judges Posner, Kanne, and Williams’s joint

opinion dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc

is appended.

The petition is therefore DENIED.

POSNER, KANNE, and WILLIAMS, Circuit Judges, dissent-

ing from the denial of rehearing en banc. The panel

opinions are long, but the essential case for rehearing

en banc can be gleaned from the 18 bullet points in the

dissent from the panel majority opinion:

! In a case that was tried over a six month period,

the jurors entered and exited the courthouse every

day past scores of television and still cameras and

reporters.

! The jurors used public elevators and brushed

elbows with anyone who happened to be in them.

Nos. 06-3517 & 06-3528 3

! Although the court’s intent was not to make the

jurors’ names public, that effort was compromised

when the jurors’ names were used in the in-court

voir dire.

! When jury deliberations were ready to commence

in the most high profile case in Chicago in recent

memory, there was no thought of sequestering the

jury.

! During the initial eight days of deliberations an

apparent holdout juror was purportedly threatened

by other jurors with a charge of bribery.

! Legal research gained by a juror from the internet

was—contrary to the court’s instruction—brought into

the jury room in an effort to persuade the recalci-

trant juror to change her position.

! A reporter for the Chicago Tribune advised the

district court during jury deliberations that the news-

paper’s research had disclosed major inconsistencies

between answers in a jury questionnaire and public

records.

! Based on the information provided by the Chicago

Tribune, the district judge, in concurrence with all

parties, requested the U.S. Attorney’s Office to con-

duct a background check on all jurors.

! Jury deliberations were halted following the

Chicago Tribune disclosure and the hiatus continued

during the investigation of the jurors by the U.S.

Attorney’s Office.

! During the five-day hiatus in jury deliberations,

the exposé by the Chicago Tribune was published

revealing that, indeed, false answers had been given

on a jury questionnaire and that the sitting jurors

were now under investigation.

4 Nos. 06-3517 & 06-3528

! Amidst questions raised by the district judge

concerning the necessity of advising the jurors of their

constitutional rights and their right to counsel, the

individual examination of six sitting and three alter-

nate jurors was begun.

! Through the judge’s examination it was deter-

mined that a majority of jurors had provided false

answers under oath and could face criminal prosecu-

tion. Many jurors who were interrogated told the

district judge that they were scared, intimidated or

sorry for what had occurred.

! During the course of the interrogations, the

jurors were granted immunity from prosecution by

the U.S. Attorney.

! Some jurors later hired lawyers in order to repre-

sent their own independent interests arising from

their participation in the trial.

! Two jurors who provided untruthful answers

were excused from further service while others so

situated were retained.

! Before the hiatus in deliberation, jurors informed

the court that they were having a conflict and yet after

the interrogations the judge dismissed one of the

jurors in the conflict without determining whether

she was a holdout juror.

! Alternate jurors were seated, but not in the order

required by Rule 24.

! After eight days of deliberation by the original

jury, and five days in hiatus, a reconstituted jury

deliberated for ten days and returned the verdicts in

this case.

United States v. Warner, No. 06-3517, 2007 WL 2363220,

at *34-35 (Aug. 21, 2007) (Kanne, J., dissenting). “To

Nos. 06-3517 & 06-3528 5

describe the circumstances surrounding the jury man-

agement and jury deliberations summarized above as

‘nothing unusual’ is to simply turn a blind eye to the

realities of what occurred.” Id. at *35.

We agree with the panel majority that the evidence of

the defendants’ guilt was overwhelming. But guilt no

matter how clearly established cannot cancel a criminal

defendant’s right to a trial that meets minimum stan-

dards of procedural justice. “If the police, after arresting

[the defendant] and obtaining an eyewitness identifica-

tion of him plus his confession, had taken him directly to

the penitentiary on the ground that a trial would be a

waste of time for someone so patently guilty, he would be

entitled to release on habeas corpus; he would have been

deprived of his liberty without due process of law.”

Walberg v. Israel, 766 F.2d 1071, 1074 (7th Cir. 1985). Or

“if the parties stipulated to trial by 12 orangutans the

defendant’s conviction would be invalid notwithstanding

his consent, because some minimum of civilized procedure

is required by community feeling regardless of what the

defendant wants or is willing to accept.” United States v.

Josefik, 753 F.2d 585, 588 (7th Cir. 1985); see also United

States v. Bownes, 405 F.3d 634, 636 (7th Cir. 2005). The

Supreme Court has held that a judge may not grant a

directed verdict in a criminal case no matter how over-

whelming the defendant’s guilt, United States v. Martin

Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564, 572-73 (1977), and that “a

criminal defendant tried by a partial judge is entitled to

have his conviction set aside, no matter how strong the

evidence against him.” Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641,

647 (1997). Likewise if the jury is partial, as we noted

just last month in United States v. Vasquez-Ruiz, No. 06-

2180, 2007 WL 2695639 (7th Cir. Sept. 17, 2007), and

perhaps if it is just plain befuddled. Cf. In re Japanese

Electronic Products Antitrust Litigation, 631 F.2d 1069,

1084-86 (3d Cir. 1980).

6 Nos. 06-3517 & 06-3528

This case is within the orbit of these principles, as the

panel majority seems to have sensed; for while it pointed

out that a number of objections to the conduct of the

trial had been waived, it went on to discuss those objec-

tions and satisfy itself that they were unfounded or that

any errors identified by them were harmless. But harm-

lessness is not the test of reversible error when a cascade

of errors turns a trial into a travesty.

Against this it will be argued that ours is an adversary

system, that a judge is just an umpire, and that it is not

his or her business what procedures the opposing parties’

lawyers want the trial to be governed by. But these are

at best half-truths. There is an independent judicial

interest in the proper functioning of the adjudicative

process. That interest is at its zenith in a criminal jury

trial.

We are also concerned that the panel majority opinion,

unless set aside, will be read as an endorsement of laissez-

faire appellate review, and that its discussion of the

merits of the issues that it thought were waived or in-

volved only harmless errors will have the force of prece-

dent in future cases. The opinion signals an excessively

tolerant attitude toward the management decisions of

trial judges, as when it says that “the fact that the trial

may not have been picture-perfect is, in itself, nothing

unusual,” 2007 WL 2363220, at *1. That is a misleading

metaphor. A picture-perfect trial, especially a picture-

perfect jury trial, is not only unusual; it is rarer than a

hen’s tooth. To suggest that the trial in this case may

have been, at worst, of merely average imperfection may

be taken by district judges in this circuit to mean that

this court is largely indifferent to how trials are con-

ducted, believing that to be the business of trial judges.

Mainly it is. But a federal trial judge has an independent

duty, enforceable if necessary by the appellate court, to

manage a jury trial with alert concern for the difficulty of

Nos. 06-3517 & 06-3528 7

eliciting reliable determinations from the lay persons

who make up a jury, and with recognition that the diffi-

culty grows rapidly with the length of the case.

Regarding the first point—the difficulty of eliciting

reliable determinations from the lay judges whom we

call jurors—one of the disturbing features of the trial in

this case was the investigation, and potential prosecution,

of jurors who had made misstatements on their juror

questionnaires. Not only did these misstatements cast

doubt on the jurors’ ability to serve, but the court’s

grilling of the jurors on this topic may have prevented

them from performing their duty conscientiously and

undistractedly. They faced potential prosecution by a party

to the case—the federal government. They may have

feared perjury charges, having seen first-hand in the trial

that the government prosecutes people for making false

statements. Had the government fully immunized the

jurors from prosecution, and had the jurors known this,

there is the considerable risk that they would have been

biased in favor of the government. But even if the jurors

did not know that any offer of immunity had been made,

they may have decided to convict the defendants in order

to avoid provoking the government’s ire and inviting a

retaliatory prosecution of them (the jurors). The govern-

ment’s attempt to immunize jurors itself suggests the

proceedings were broken beyond repair.

Regarding the second point—the problems associated

with the length of the trial—federal trial judges (bank-

ruptcy judges and magistrate judges as well as district

judges) recognize and discharge a duty of active trial

management. (So much for the umpireal analogy.) They

do not defer abjectly to the lawyers’ preferences regard-

ing length of trial, number of exhibits, wording of instruc-

tions, and so forth. They often override the strong prefer-

ences of the lawyers on both sides regarding such

matters. They are not umpires when it comes to manage-

8 Nos. 06-3517 & 06-3528

ment of the trial; they are directors of the drama that

we call trial by jury. (Trials are closer to theater than they

are to ball games.) Of course, management decisions are

committed to the trial judge’s discretion. But that dis-

cretion can be abused, as it was in this case, resulting

in a distended trial. The trial should not have taken

anywhere near the six months that it did take. Its exces-

sive length contributed both to the procedural errors

that marred it and to the failure of judicial correction of

those errors.

In civil cases, it is common for the trial judge, well

before the trial begins, to go over with the lawyers the

list of witnesses that each side intends to call. The judge

quizzes the lawyers carefully, asking with regard to

each name on the list: Why do you want to call this

witness? If you do call him, what (in general terms) will he

be testifying about? What will that testimony add to

your case? How lengthy would his testimony be and

what would he cover that requires that length of time? Do

you really need witness X to discuss topic A when you

already have Y to discuss it? Can the parties agree to a

stipulation in lieu of some of the evidence? Invariably

after such an interrogation, the witness lists are found

to be richly padded and the testimony sought to be

elicited from each witness found to be full of redun-

dancies and irrelevancies. The management-conscious

judge conducts the same inquiry with respect to the

documentary evidence that the lawyers want to present,

which also often exceeds the reasonable limits of jurors’

comprehension.

When as much of the padding of the case (that is, the

case as it had been prepared by the lawyers) as possible

has been removed, the judge asks the lawyers how much

time they anticipate for the trial, and then fixes a limit

on the length of the trial, usually a tighter limit than the

lawyers want. The limit is tentative, however—flexible, not

Nos. 06-3517 & 06-3528 9

rigid. As the trial proceeds, it may become apparent that

more time is needed, and if so the judge will raise the

limit.

Now it is true that the practice in criminal trials is

different, mainly because the scope of pretrial discovery

is so much more limited in criminal cases than in civil

ones. No statute or rule empowers the judge in a federal

criminal case to require witness statements or other

discovery to be provided ahead of time. On the contrary, 18

U.S.C. § 3500(a) provides that “no statement or report

in the possession of the United States which was made by

a Government witness or prospective Government wit-

ness (other than the defendant) shall be the subject of

subpoena, discovery, or inspection until said witness has

testified on direct examination in the trial of the case.”

Similarly, Fed. R. Crim. P. 26.2(a) requires production

upon motion of a statement of a defense witness (other

than the defendant) only after that witness has testified

on direct examination. These rules are motivated in part

by concerns with possible tampering with witnesses.

But although judges cannot force the lawyers to

exchange their witness lists early on, they can persuade

the lawyers to do so, and should unless there are con-

cerns with possible witness tampering. That case to one

side, the Manual for Complex Litigation § 32.24 (Fed.

Judic. Center, 3d ed. 1995) explains that “prosecutors

can generally be persuaded to make early production

since, by giving the defense an opportunity to prepare, it

will avoid interruptions at trial and may lead to a plea.”

The Handbook of Recommended Procedures for the Trial

of Protracted Cases, 25 F.R.D. 351, 399-402 (1960), recom-

mends pretrial conferences in complex criminal cases and

cites one judge as having said that he was able to shorten

a criminal trial from eight months to 59 days by holding

such a conference. Id. at 400. The Handbook recom-

10 Nos. 06-3517 & 06-3528

mends other measures as well that trial judges can use

to reduce the length of federal criminal trials, id. at 402-

03, as does the Manual for Complex Litigation, supra,

§§ 32.11, 32.22, 32.33, which underscores the importance

of the trial judge’s

insisting, within the limits demanded by fairness, that

the case move expeditiously to conclusion; and encour-

aging cooperation among counsel; while recognizing

counsel’s obligation of zealous advocacy, the court can

encourage them to confine themselves to issues

that are reasonably disputable and not to assert

rights that will have no impact on the outcome but

whose exercise can cause delay . . . . Although criminal

trials require greater circumspection in the exercise of

judicial control than civil trials, the judge should not

hesitate to exercise such control as is necessary to

maintain order and momentum. Unless the judge does

so, such a trial may take on a life of its own, jeopardiz-

ing due process rights and imposing unreasonable

costs and burdens . . . . The seriousness of the issues

at stake may lead the attorneys to try the case leav-

ing no stone unturned. This requires the judge to

assert and retain control of the proceedings in order

to move them to an expeditious conclusion. The

trial schedule is an important aspect of that con-

trol . . . . [W]hatever the schedule, interruptions

should be avoided . . . . Unnecessary witnesses and

exhibits should be eliminated as much as possible

during pretrial; some may, however, become unnec-

essary only after developments at trial. The judge

should exclude witnesses or exhibits that are ob-

viously redundant or otherwise unnecessary, and

should curtail redundant and needlessly lengthy

interrogation. [Emphasis added, citations omitted].

All the legal authority a trial judge needs for stream-

lining a criminal trial is the judiciary’s inherent authority

Nos. 06-3517 & 06-3528 11

to manage trials with due regard for eliciting intelligent

consideration of the issues by the jurors, plus Rule 403

of the Federal Rules of Evidence, which allows the judge

to exclude relevant evidence “if its probative value is

substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice,

confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by

considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless

presentation of cumulative evidence.” As the Manual for

Complex Litigation points out, Rule 403 is enforced most

effectively when it is applied before the trial begins, so as

to avoid lengthy sidebars. Motions in limine are of course

common, and frequently granted, in criminal as in civil

trials.

We have authorized the trial judges in criminal trials

to place time limits on testimony. United States v. Vest,

116 F.3d 1179, 1186-87 (7th Cir. 1997), while pointing

out that they “are best used as guideposts rather than

deadlines in criminal trials, and . . . are no substitute for

involved trial judges who must always shepherd trials

along, curtailing repetitive, irrelevant and immaterial

questioning.”

None of these powers to prevent unduly protracted trials

has to lie dormant until awakened by a motion. The

importance of the trial judge’s vigorous exercise of his or

her powers lies in the fact that a trial of the length of the

trial in this case places excessive strain on the jury

system. It is, to begin with, difficult to assemble a compe-

tent jury if you warn the prospective jurors that the trial

may go on for six months. In fact the judge in this case

warned that it would last “only” four months. We do not

know how the jurors felt when they discovered that their

tour of duty had been extended without forewarning or

their consent.

Moreover, the longer the trial, the less likely the jury

is to be able to render an intelligent verdict. Jurors be-

12 Nos. 06-3517 & 06-3528

come overwhelmed by the volume of evidence and

numbed by its repetitiousness. Their attention flags;

their minds wander; the witnesses—there were more

than a hundred in the trial of the two defendants—get

mixed up in the jurors’ minds, or forgotten; the profusion

of exhibits—there were more than a thousand—makes

the documentary record unintelligible. The impressions

created by the closing arguments are likely to wipe out

everything that went before. Jury comprehension has been

found to diminish after a mere 20 days of trial. Richard

Lempert, “Civil Juries and Complex Cases: Taking Stock

After Twelve Years” 20 (Center for Research on Social

Organization Working Paper Series #488, Nov. 1992),

http://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/dspace/bitstream/

2027.42/51254/1/488.pdf, visited Sept. 21, 2007; A Hand-

book of Jury Research § 3.02(c), p. 3-6 (Walter F. Abbott &

John Batt eds. 1999).

Twenty days and up happens also to be the top category

of federal trials by length, and fortunately few federal

criminal trials last that long. Annual Report of the Director

of the Administrative Office of the United States, 2006,

tab.T-2, http://www.uscourts.gov/judbus2006/contents.html

(visited Sept. 21, 2007). Why did this one? What was

special about it? The prominence of defendant Ryan? That

is not a proper reason in a legal system that aspires to

equal justice for all.

A study in which jurors in long (more than 20 days) and

short (1 to 6 days) federal trials (albeit civil rather

than criminal) were interviewed found a number of

disquieting differences. Jurors in the long trials were

substantially more likely to be retired or unemployed

and substantially less likely to have a college education.

Nearly three-fourths of the jurors in the lengthy trials

said the evidence was “difficult” or “very difficult” to

understand, compared to 30 percent who reported the

same in short trials. Of course the length of the trial might

Nos. 06-3517 & 06-3528 13

be correlated with the complexity of the evidence, and

the latter might be the befuddling force. But this would

not adequately explain why twice as many jurors in long

than in short trials reported their attention wandering

during the presentation of evidence either “occasionally” or

“quite a lot,” and why more than twice as many (amount-

ing to almost half of all the jurors who were interviewed)

found it difficult or very difficult to understand how they

were supposed to reach a verdict. Joe S. Cecil et al., Jury

Service in Lengthy Civil Trials 1, 9, 11-13, 28 (tab. 7), 33

(tab. 8) (Fed. Judic. Center 1987).

So now imagine jurors’ mental state after six months,

bearing in mind that memory loss and the psychological

or cognitive problems of jurors in a super-long trial

compound the first problem, the difficulty of recruiting

competent jurors for protracted trials: a less intelligible

trial is heard by a less capable jury. The longer the trial,

moreover, the likelier jury misconduct becomes. The

jurors become bored, impatient, irritated; the judge’s

instruction against discussing the case before the jury

retires to deliberate becomes increasingly irksome and

likely to be disobeyed.

And the parties (more often the defendant than the

prosecutor, since a conviction is a more likely outcome

of a federal criminal trial than an acquittal) lose, as a

practical matter, much of the protection that the judge

is supposed to provide against jury misconduct. Imagine

how a district judge who has spent six months presiding

at a trial, doubtless bored to tears much of the time by

its meandering pace, feels about the prospect of grant-

ing a mistrial and thus condemning herself (unless the

parties settle) to the agony of trying the same case over

again. And if the first trial wasn’t boring, the second has

got to be excruciatingly so since the judge is hearing all

the evidence for the second time. So can a defendant

who moves for a mistrial at the end of a six-month trial

14 Nos. 06-3517 & 06-3528

hope for a fair shake? The district judge seems to have

been influenced in denying a mistrial by concern—unre-

lated to the merits of declaring a mistrial—with the

difficulty of impaneling an impartial jury for a second trial

when the first trial had received so much publicity, in no

small part because of its length and its management

problems. She said: “I have before me—nobody has

called it this, but this is a motion for a mistrial at this

point. If I grant this motion, these defendants are going

to be tried again. I don’t—I am just—I am really wonder-

ing whether if I grant the motion for a mistrial, I am

effectively saying it isn’t possible to pick a jury for this

case.”

We are not alone in our concerns about protracted trials.

“Exceedingly lengthy trials lead to reduced concentration

and recollection of events on the part of all participants,

particularly witnesses and jurors. In very long cases,

exhaustion may diminish everyone’s performance. The

quality and representative nature of the jury may be

reduced by the fact that many citizens—often the most

competent—are unable or unwilling to take the time to

sit for cases lasting weeks or months.” Gordon Van Kessel,

“Adversary Excesses in the American Criminal Trial,” 67

Notre Dame L. Rev. 403, 478-79 (1992); see also “Principle

12: Courts Should Limit the Length of Jury Trials

Insofar as Justice Allows, and Jurors Should Be Fully

Informed of the Trial Schedule Established,” in American

Bar Association, Principles of Juries and Jury Trials

(Aug. 2005); Patrick E. Longan, “The Shot Clock Comes to

Trial: Time Limits for Federal Civil Trials,” 35 Ariz. L.

Rev. 603, 703-07 (1993). Arizona offers extra compensation

to jurors who serve for more than 5 (!) days. Ariz. Rev.

Stat. § 21-222(C).

The role of the courts of appeals in protecting jurors

and litigants from excessively protracted criminal trials

that strain the capacities of jurors, and by doing so

Nos. 06-3517 & 06-3528 15

undermine procedural justice, merits plenary consider-

ation by this court.

A true Copy:

Teste:

________________________________

Clerk of the United States Court of

Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

USCA-02-C-0072—11-1-07

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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