Jeremy Dale v. Anthony Agresta

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted June 3, 2019*

Decided June 4, 2019

Before

JOEL M. FLAUM, Circuit Judge

MICHAEL Y. SCUDDER, Circuit Judge

AMY J. ST. EVE, Circuit Judge

No. 17‐3585

JEREMY L. DALE, Appeal from the United States

Plaintiff‐Appellant, District Court for the Southern District

of Indiana, Indianapolis Division.

v. No. 1:15‐cv‐0140‐SEB‐MPB

ANTHONY AGRESTA, et al., Sarah Evans Barker,

Defendants‐Appellees. Judge.

ORDER

Anthony Agresta, a Marion County, Indiana sherriff’s deputy, was transporting

prisoner Jeremy Dale in a van without seatbelts when another car rear‐ended the van.

Dale was injured in the accident and was returned to the jail for medical treatment

before being taken to a hospital. Dale sued Agresta, the Marion County Sheriff’s

Department, and the county sheriff under the Eighth Amendment, claiming that they

were deliberately indifferent to both the excessive risk of harm caused by transporting

* We have agreed to decide this case without oral argument because the briefs

and record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would

not significantly aid the court. FED. R. APP. P. 34(a)(2)(C).

No. 17‐3585 Page 2

him without a seatbelt and to his medical needs after the accident. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

The district court entered summary judgment for the defendants. Because Agresta is

entitled to qualified immunity for transporting Dale without a seatbelt and did not

personally prevent Dale from receiving medical care on the scene, we affirm the

judgment in his favor. And because there is no evidence of a policy or custom of not

providing seatbelts to inmates, we also affirm the entry of summary judgment for the

sheriff’s department.

Agresta was driving Dale, unrestrained by a seatbelt or safety harness, in a

county transport van. Dale was handcuffed, and his waist and ankles were shackled.

While the van was stopped at a traffic light, a car struck it from behind. The impact

tossed Dale, and he banged his head before landing face down on the van’s floor. He

injured his back, face, and arms.

After the accident, Agresta put the van in park, turned on the emergency

equipment, and radioed dispatch, which sent a medic. One of Agresta’s supervisors,

who had since arrived on the scene, turned away the medic and ordered Agresta to

send Dale back to the jail for a medical evaluation. According to Dale, Agresta then

leaned his body weight on Dale’s back, “jerk[ed]” him out of the van, and carried him to

a patrol car. The jail’s medical staff evaluated Dale and referred him to an offsite

hospital. Dale arrived at the hospital (this time in a vehicle with seatbelts) about one

hour after the accident. X‐rays revealed no broken bones, and medical staff gave Dale

Ibuprofen and discharged him. Dale suffered pain and was diagnosed some time later

with an injured disc in his back.

Dale filed suit, and after screening, see 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, he proceeded on three

Eighth Amendment claims. First, he claimed that Agresta was deliberately indifferent to

his safety by failing to provide him with a seatbelt. Second, he asserted that the sheriff’s

department and the sheriff in his official capacity (functionally the same defendant,

see Katz‐Crank v. Haskett, 843 F.3d 641, 646–47 (7th Cir. 2016)) maintained a policy or

practice of transporting prisoners in vans without seatbelts. See Monell v. Depʹt of Soc.

Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 690–91 (1978). (At summary judgment, he also

argued that they inadequately trained the deputies to use seatbelts.) Third, Dale

claimed that Agresta recklessly denied him medical care after the accident.

The district court granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment. The

court ruled first that Agresta did not act with deliberate indifference as a matter of law

because, without more, failing to secure a prisoner with a seatbelt “does not represent a

total lack of concern.” Moreover, the court continued, a jury could not find that the

No. 17‐3585 Page 3

one‐hour delay in treatment caused Dale harm. It then determined that the Monell claim

against the sheriff’s department failed because Dale did not show an underlying Eighth

Amendment violation. Finally, the court declined to assess Dale’s claim of inadequate

training because it was outside of the complaint’s scope.

We review the district court’s entry of summary judgment de novo, drawing all

reasonable inferences in Dale’s favor. See Giles v. Godinez, 914 F.3d 1040, 1048 (7th Cir.

2019). We will affirm if there is no genuine issue of material fact and may do so on any

basis presented in the record. See Figgs v. Dawson, 829 F.3d 895, 902 (7th Cir. 2016).

On appeal, Dale argues first that Agresta’s failure to provide him with a seatbelt

constitutes deliberate indifference because it created an excessive risk of, and

manifested in, a serious injury. Agresta responds (as he did when moving for summary

judgment) that Dale had no right to a seatbelt under the Eighth Amendment, and that,

alternatively, he is entitled to qualified immunity. Qualified immunity shields

government officials from lawsuits for damages unless they violate a clearly established

and specific constitutional right. See Taylor v. Barkes, 135 S. Ct. 2042, 2045 (2015).

We agree with the district court that Agresta is entitled to qualified immunity

because Dale did not have a clearly established right to a seatbelt. True, the Eighth

Amendment protects inmates from prison officials knowing of and disregarding

excessive risks of future harm. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994); Helling v.

McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 33 (1993). But that principle is too general to defeat qualified

immunity. See City of Escondido v. Emmons, 139 S. Ct. 500, 503 (2019) (discussing “right to

be free of excessive force”). Neither the Supreme Court nor this court has ruled that

transporting an inmate without a seatbelt creates an intolerable risk of harm. Indeed,

when an arrestee who was unbuckled and escaped from the back seat of a squad car

caused the accident that led to his death, we concluded that the failure to seatbelt him

was, at most, negligent. See Proffitt v. Ridgway, 279 F.3d 503, 507 (7th Cir. 2002).

Moreover, other circuits have concluded that, without reckless driving or other

exacerbating circumstances, failing to seat‐belt a shackled inmate does not pose a

substantial risk of serious harm. See Jabbar v. Fischer, 683 F.3d 54, 57–58 (2d Cir. 2012);

Spencer v. Knapheide Truck Equip. Co., 183 F.3d 902, 906–07 (8th Cir. 1999); see also

Thompson v. Commonwealth of Virginia, 878 F.3d 89, 105 (4th Cir. 2017) (collecting cases).

Dale lacks evidence that Agresta did anything to increase the risk of harm beyond

transporting him in a van without seatbelts. Because we conclude that Dale did not

have a clearly established right to a seatbelt, we need not consider whether Agresta

violated that right. See Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009).

No. 17‐3585 Page 4

Dale adds that Agresta recklessly increased Dale’s risk of harm after the

accident by declining help from a medical professional, removing him from the van,

and failing to take him immediately to a hospital. But a jury could not find as much.

Dale needed evidence that Agresta personally put him in harm’s way. See Palmer v.

Marion Cty., 327 F.3d 588, 593–94 (7th Cir. 2003). The record, however, shows that after

the accident, Agresta put the van in park, activated the emergency equipment, and

radioed for help, bringing a medic to the area. A supervising deputy—not Agresta—

declined the medic’s assistance and ordered that Dale be transported back to the jail,

rather than to a hospital. And though it might have been advisable to allow a medical

professional to remove Dale from the van to another vehicle, Dale lacks any medical

evidence that Agresta endangered him or caused harm by doing it himself.

Dale next argues that a jury could find in his favor on his Monell claim against

the sheriff’s department. We disagree. The department may be liable under § 1983 if its

official policy or custom violates a plaintiff’s constitutional rights. See Monell, 436 U.S.

at 690–91; Katz‐Crank, 843 F.3d at 647. Even if we assumed that the lack of seatbelt

violated Dale’s Eighth Amendment rights, Dale has not produced evidence that the

sheriff’s department did not provide seatbelts as a matter of policy. (Rather, Dale notes

that the department’s applicable policy requires deputies to exercise “due regard” for

safe driving practices and to transport people only in vehicles that are “properly

equipped and in functioning and safe condition.”) One instance of negligence does not

establish that a practice is so widespread and well‐settled that it can properly be called a

custom. See Wragg v. Vill. of Thornton, 604 F.3d 464, 468 (7th Cir. 2010). Thus, the fact that

Dale once rode in a van without seatbelts, especially given that he was transported with

a seatbelt on other occasions, is not enough to withstand summary judgment.

Finally, Dale asserts that a jury could conclude that the sheriff’s department did

not adequately train its deputies. Although inadequate training can be the basis for an

Eighth Amendment claim, see City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 387 (1989), the

district court did not abuse its discretion by declining to consider a claim based on

allegations that Dale did not include in the complaint. See Chessie Logistics Co. v. Krinos

Holdings, Inc., 867 F.3d 852, 860 (7th Cir. 2017); Hancock v. Potter, 531 F.3d 474, 480

(7th Cir. 2008). And even if Dale had preserved the claim, he only speculates that

Agresta was inadequately trained to safely transport prisoners, and that is not enough

to take the matter to trial. See Lapre v. City of Chicago, 911 F.3d 424, 435 (7th Cir. 2018).

The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.