"[t]here is no restriction to the type of suit that may be brought against [a] county — tort or contract"
How later courts described this case
- "[t]here is no restriction to the type of suit that may be brought against [a] county — tort or contract"
- county lacks governmental immunity, can sue and be sued
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
I was strongly inclined to register my dissent in this case, but had I dissented, I would have stood alone, and I see no useful purpose in continuing to express a dissenting view when I know that the other members of this Court are committed to a contrary opinion. My views on the extent and scope of "governmental immunity" in Alabama were clearly stated in Hutchinson v. Board of Trustees of University of Alabama , 288 Ala. 20 , 256 So.2d 281 (1971), and in the dissenting opinions of Justice Merrill in Jackson v. City of Florence , 294 Ala. 592 , 320 So.2d 68 (1975), and Lorence v. Hospital Board of Morgan County , 294 Ala. 614 , 320 So.2d 631 (1975). I refer the reader to those opinions.
My prior views of "governmental immunity" were based upon a sincere belief that if "governmental immunity" was to be abolished, the legislative branch was the appropriate branch to abolish it. In Lorence, supra , Justice Merrill suggested that the legislature could change the effect of that decision. Because the legislature did not change the effect of Lorence , and because I feel compelled to follow the precedent this Court, as presently constituted, has now established, I concur in the result. See Mr. Justice Black's special concurrence in Morgan v. Virginia , 328 U.S. 373 , 66 S.Ct. 1050 , 90 L.Ed. 1317
(1946), where he said: "In view of the Court's present disposition to apply that formula, I acquiesce."