reasoning that the fact that “the express-preemption provi- sion” at issue “does not cover the” substance of the plaintiffs’ claims “supports an inference that there is no implied preemption of those” claims
How later courts described this case
- reasoning that the fact that “the express-preemption provi- sion” at issue “does not cover the” substance of the plaintiffs’ claims “supports an inference that there is no implied preemption of those” claims
- summarizing the Florida Supreme Court's ruling that "the Phase I findings establish the causal link between the tobacco companies' conduct and the class members' injuries because the companies acted wrongfully toward all of the class members"
- providing that the party asserting preclusion bears the burden of establishing the elements
- explaining that “the central features of due process” are “no- tice” and “an opportunity to be heard”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
WILSON, Circuit Judge,
dissenting:
At its most fundamental level, the Due Process Clause guarantees an aggrieved party notice and “the opportunity to present his case and have its merits fairly judged.” See Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 428, 433 , 102 S.Ct. 1148, 1153, 1156 , 71 L.Ed.2d 265 (1982). The defendants have no doubt been provided notice and some degree of opportunity to be heard in court, but like Judge Tjoflat, I am not content that the use of the Engle *1315 jury’s highly generalized findings in other forums meets “the minimum procedural requirements of the ... Due Process Clause in order to qualify for ... full faith and credit.” See Kremer v. Chem. Constr. Corp., 456 U.S. 461, 481 , 102 S.Ct. 1888 , 1897-98, 72 L.Ed.2d 262 (1982). Because such a violation requires remand, I see no need to determine whether the Engle findings are preempted by federal law.