reasoning that the fact that “the express-preemption provi- sion” at issue “does not cover the” substance of the plaintiffs’ claims “supports an inference that there is no implied preemption of those” claims
How later courts described this case
- reasoning that the fact that “the express-preemption provi- sion” at issue “does not cover the” substance of the plaintiffs’ claims “supports an inference that there is no implied preemption of those” claims
- summarizing the Florida Supreme Court's ruling that "the Phase I findings establish the causal link between the tobacco companies' conduct and the class members' injuries because the companies acted wrongfully toward all of the class members"
- providing that the party asserting preclusion bears the burden of establishing the elements
- explaining that “the central features of due process” are “no- tice” and “an opportunity to be heard”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
JULIE CARNES, Circuit Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part:
I concur in the majority opinion’s decision that federal law does not preempt the jury findings in the underlying Engle litigation. As to defendants’ Due Process Clause challenge, the latter presents a close question on which reasonable minds can differ. I do not disagree that the majority opinion articulates reasonable arguments in explaining why it rejects defendants’ challenge. On balance, however, I agree with Judges Tjoflat and Wilson that on the particular and unusual facts of the underlying Engle litigation, its jury findings are too non-specific to warrant them being given preclusive effect in subsequent trials. Concluding that defendants’ due process rights were therefore violated, I respectfully dissent as to the Majority’s contrary holding.