holding that officer properly impounded car where driver had been arrested and “the only alternative available was to let appellant’s passenger take possession of the car,” but the passenger was unable to produce a driver’s license
How later courts described this case
- holding that officer properly impounded car where driver had been arrested and “the only alternative available was to let appellant’s passenger take possession of the car,” but the passenger was unable to produce a driver’s license
- noting that the State may satisfy its burden to establish a valid inventory search “through the testimony of the officers that an inventory policy existed and that the policy was followed” and that “[t]here was no need to introduce into evidence a written inventory”
- stating that there was no need to introduce into evidence a written inventory where officers testified that an inventory policy existed and that policy was followed
- stating the police should respect a prisoner=s wish to leave his car with a companion who had a valid driver=s license
Written by the judges who cited it.
Distinguished
Distinguished by Autran v. State, 1992 Tex. App. LEXIS 1585 (1992)
In Kelley v. State, 677 S.W.2d 34 (Tex.Crim.App.1984), the Court held in language almost identical to that in Stephen, that Gill was factually distinguishable from the case in which the officer had obtained possession and control of the keys to the trunk of an automobile.
The opinion
TEAGUE, Judge,
dissenting.
In my view, the majority opinion implicitly overrules the principles of law that this Court stated in Gill v. State, 625 S.W.2d 307 (Tex.Cr.App.1981) (On State’s Motion for Rehearing), regarding an “inventory search” of a locked automobile trunk.
This Court in Gill v. State, supra, expressly held, inter alia, that “Absent a showing of probable cause and exigent circumstances, a warrantless search of a locked automobile trunk is per se illegal.” (319).
This Court also expressly held in Gill v. State, supra, that “the expression, ‘inventory search,’ is not a talisman in whose presence the Fourth Amendment or Art. 1, Section 9, of the Texas Constitution fades away and disappears.” (318-319), After re-reading the majority opinion, it is apparent to me that its author has implicitly reworded the expression. By the majority opinion, it now reads, “the expression, ‘inventory search,’ is a talisman in whose presence the provisions of the respective Constitutions governing warrantless searches and seizures without probable cause fade away.”
From the facts stated in the majority opinion, it is obvious to me that when the police officer unlocked the locked automobile trunk, he was then in the act of conducting a warrantless search. The facts stated in the majority opinion do not reflect that he acted with probable cause. Such a search used to be unlawful action by the police, which caused any seized evidence to be excluded at trial.
I also dissent to the majority opinion’s disposition of appellant’s third ground of error, which relates to jury argument by the prosecuting attorney. Unless one suffers from myopia, it should be obvious to anyone that the prosecuting attorney was not arguing that appellant deserved a long sentence, but, instead, was expressing his opinion why our laws governing how long a prisoner will serve are ineffective, which, of course, used to be improper jury argument.
For all of the above reasons, I respectfully dissent.