holding that officer properly impounded car where driver had been arrested and “the only alternative available was to let appellant’s passenger take possession of the car,” but the passenger was unable to produce a driver’s license
How later courts described this case
- holding that officer properly impounded car where driver had been arrested and “the only alternative available was to let appellant’s passenger take possession of the car,” but the passenger was unable to produce a driver’s license
- noting that the State may satisfy its burden to establish a valid inventory search “through the testimony of the officers that an inventory policy existed and that the policy was followed” and that “[t]here was no need to introduce into evidence a written inventory”
- stating that there was no need to introduce into evidence a written inventory where officers testified that an inventory policy existed and that policy was followed
- stating the police should respect a prisoner=s wish to leave his car with a companion who had a valid driver=s license
Written by the judges who cited it.
Distinguished
Distinguished by Autran v. State, 1992 Tex. App. LEXIS 1585 (1992)
In Kelley v. State, 677 S.W.2d 34 (Tex.Crim.App.1984), the Court held in language almost identical to that in Stephen, that Gill was factually distinguishable from the case in which the officer had obtained possession and control of the keys to the trunk of an automobile.
The opinion
CLINTON, Judge,
dissenting.
Reasons given by me in Gary v. State, 647 S.W.2d 646, at 649 (Tex.Cr.App.1983), Backer v. State, 656 S.W.2d 463, at 465-467 (Tex.Cr.App.1983) and Ward v. State, 659 S.W.2d 643, at 649, n. 6 (Tex.Cr.App.1983) are enough to show that an “inventory” like this one is a charade played out to cover a general search of a motor vehicle— scripted by opinions from this Court, some of which are those cited above, advancing amiable legal fiction.
The notion that government is free to impose its will upon citizens and their effects or possessions in the manner done in this cause is rejected by literal constitutional language designed, written and adopted to provide the very security against inva *46 sions of privacy condoned by the majority (again). Adding to all that an utterly gratuitous application to possessions in the trunk of an automobile on a public street of what was permitted peace officers at a station house by the Supreme Court in Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640 , 103 S.Ct. 2605 , 77 L.Ed.2d 65 (1983), demonstrates just how near full circle we have come in 1984. See Brown v. State, 657 S.W.2d 797, 799 (Tex.Cr.App.1983) (Concurring Opinion).
In the instant case, driving in early morning hours, the citizen “made an abrupt left turn without signaling,” and lost his rights because his companion could not produce “identification.”
I dissent.