holding that counsel was not ineffective merely because he was suspended from the practice of law for nonpayment of State Bar dues as counsel continued to be licensed during the suspension and his status was reinstated to that which he occupied prior to the delinquency
How later courts described this case
- holding that counsel was not ineffective merely because he was suspended from the practice of law for nonpayment of State Bar dues as counsel continued to be licensed during the suspension and his status was reinstated to that which he occupied prior to the delinquency
- overruling Martinez v. State, 167 Tex.Crim. 97, 318 S.W.2d 66 (1958), where death penalty was reversed when trial counsel was suspended for failing to pay State Bar dues although no complaint had been asserted about counsel’s incompetence
- holding that failure to pay bar dues does not constitute denial of counsel
- Although a delinquent attorney is “prohibited” from practicing law, “[h]e only has to pay his dues *** to resume his status as a ‘practicing lawyer,’ ” and he has not thereby become unlicensed (emphasis omitted)
Written by the judges who cited it.
Distinguished
Distinguished by Satterwhite v. State, 1997 Tex. App. LEXIS 4622 (1997)
The Hill and Cantu cases are distinguishable from this case.
The opinion
McDONALD, Presiding Judge
(concurring.)
I concur with the results reached by Judge WOODLEY in these two cases. I think the waiver is applicable to both cases where the cases are tried upon stipulated evidence and upon agreement as to the punishment to be recommended, as was here done. If appellant had time to get ready to stipulate and agree and waive in one case, then what else could he get ready for? He waived in both cases very effectively.