holding that counsel was not ineffective merely because he was suspended from the practice of law for nonpayment of State Bar dues as counsel continued to be licensed during the suspension and his status was reinstated to that which he occupied prior to the delinquency
How later courts described this case
- holding that counsel was not ineffective merely because he was suspended from the practice of law for nonpayment of State Bar dues as counsel continued to be licensed during the suspension and his status was reinstated to that which he occupied prior to the delinquency
- overruling Martinez v. State, 167 Tex.Crim. 97, 318 S.W.2d 66 (1958), where death penalty was reversed when trial counsel was suspended for failing to pay State Bar dues although no complaint had been asserted about counsel’s incompetence
- holding that failure to pay bar dues does not constitute denial of counsel
- Although a delinquent attorney is “prohibited” from practicing law, “[h]e only has to pay his dues *** to resume his status as a ‘practicing lawyer,’ ” and he has not thereby become unlicensed (emphasis omitted)
Written by the judges who cited it.
Distinguished
Distinguished by Satterwhite v. State, 1997 Tex. App. LEXIS 4622 (1997)
The Hill and Cantu cases are distinguishable from this case.
The opinion
MORRISON, Judge
(dissenting).
I respectfully dissent to the affirmance of these convictions and to the overruling of Martinez v. State, 167 Tex.Cr.R. 97 , 318 S.W.2d 66 . It will only require a short research by any member of the bar to pass upon the soundness of such opinion. It is vital to remember that at Martinez’ first trial there were no formal or informal bills of exception and no objection to the Court’s charge. Appellant’s brief on original submission in a death penalty conviction consisted of two pages of generalities. It was only upon rehearing that the writer discovered that this Court had so lightly affirmed a death penalty conviction.
Upon retrial Martinez was represented not only by a legally licensed lawyer, but by one of the most capable in our field, as is demonstrated by the opinion which I prepared for this Court. Martinez v. State, 169 Tex.Cr.R. 229 , 333 S.W.2d 370 . Every accused and especially those in death penalty cases is entitled to, as we said in Brown v. State, 168 Tex.Cr.R. 67 , 323 S.W.2d 954 , “at least one tolerably fair trial.” This Martinez did not secure at his first trial and this he did get on his second trial. I retreat not one step from what I said in both cases.
Aside from this, it is quite clear from the reasoning in McKinzie v. Ellis, 5 Cir., 287 F.2d 549 , that these convictions should not stand.