holding that trial court's commencement of sentencing proceedings within 120-day period mandated by Seventh Circuit was "reasonable interpretation of the federal district court order"
How later courts described this case
- holding that trial court's commencement of sentencing proceedings within 120-day period mandated by Seventh Circuit was "reasonable interpretation of the federal district court order"
- noting that the circuit court also told jurors that "if they did not unanimously find defendant eligible for the death penalty" there would be no second phase, and that the circuit court also instructed the jury that "`[n]either by these instructions nor by any ruling or remark which I have made do I mean to indicate any opinion as to the facts or as to what your verdict should be'"
- finding no abuse of discretion when the court refused a nonpattern instruction where the “subject matter of defendant’s proposed instructions was [already] covered by two pattern instructions”
- noting that codefendant's prison record over four years shows "repeated disciplinary violations involving violence, including possession of a weapon, attacking prison staff members, and fighting"
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
CHIEF JUSTICE HARRISON, dissenting:
Following a jury trial in the circuit court of Cook County, defendant, Dennis Emerson, was found guilty of the murder of Delinda Byrd, the attempted murder of Robert Ray, the armed robbery of both Byrd and Ray, and aggravated arson. A sentencing hearing was then conducted, after which the jury returned a verdict directing the court to sentence defendant to death. Defendant was so sentenced.
Defendant appealed to this court, and we reversed and remanded for a new trial. People v. Emerson, 97 Ill. 2d 487 (1983). On retrial, defendant was once again found guilty of murder, attempted murder, armed robbery, and aggravated arson and was once again sentenced to death. Defendant then brought a second appeal to our court. This time we granted an outright reversal to defendant on his conviction for aggravated arson, but affirmed his convictions for murder, attempted murder, and armed robbery. We also upheld his death sentence. People v. Emerson, 122 Ill. 2d 411 (1987). Three of the court’s seven justices dissented.
Defendant next sought post-conviction relief in the circuit court of Cook County. The circuit court dismissed his post-conviction petition without an evidentiary hearing. We affirmed. People v. Emerson, 153 Ill. 2d 100 (1992). Defendant then attempted to obtain habeas corpus relief in the federal courts. The federal courts determined that there was no basis for setting aside the guilt phase of defendant’s second trial but held that ineffective assistance of counsel at the sentencing phase required that defendant’s death sentence be set aside and that he be granted a new sentencing hearing. Emerson v. Gramley, 91 F.3d 898 (7th Cir. 1996).
Pursuant to the mandate of the federal courts, a new sentencing hearing was conducted by the circuit court of Cook County. At that hearing, a jury determined that defendant was eligible for the death penalty and that there was nothing to preclude imposition of a penalty of death in this case. The circuit court then sentenced defendant to death, and he has appealed directly to our court as a matter of right. 134 Ill. 2d R. 603.
On this appeal, defendant contends that his death sentence should be vacated and that he should receive a sentence other than death because, inter alla, our state’s death penalty law is unconstitutional. I agree. For the reasons set forth in my dissent in People v. Bull, 185 Ill. 2d 179 (1998), the Illinois death penalty law violates the eighth and fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution (U.S. Const., amends. VIII, XTV) and article I, section 2, of the Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 2). Defendant’s sentence of death should therefore be vacated, and he should be sentenced to a term of imprisonment. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 38, par. 9 — l(j).
For the foregoing reasons, I would reverse the judgment of the circuit court, vacate defendant’s death sentence, and remand the cause to the circuit court for imposition of a sentence of imprisonment. I therefore dissent.