holding that trial court's commencement of sentencing proceedings within 120-day period mandated by Seventh Circuit was "reasonable interpretation of the federal district court order"
How later courts described this case
- holding that trial court's commencement of sentencing proceedings within 120-day period mandated by Seventh Circuit was "reasonable interpretation of the federal district court order"
- noting that the circuit court also told jurors that "if they did not unanimously find defendant eligible for the death penalty" there would be no second phase, and that the circuit court also instructed the jury that "`[n]either by these instructions nor by any ruling or remark which I have made do I mean to indicate any opinion as to the facts or as to what your verdict should be'"
- finding no abuse of discretion when the court refused a nonpattern instruction where the “subject matter of defendant’s proposed instructions was [already] covered by two pattern instructions”
- noting that codefendant's prison record over four years shows "repeated disciplinary violations involving violence, including possession of a weapon, attacking prison staff members, and fighting"
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
■ JUSTICE RATHJE, specially concurring:
I disagree with the majority’s decision to engage in comparative sentencing review. See 189 Ill. 2d at 499-500. Just weeks ago, in People v. Fern, 189 Ill. 2d 48 (1999), this court held:
“We agree with those decisions rejecting cross-case comparative sentencing as a basis for challenging a sentence. We find that such an analysis does not comport with our sentencing scheme’s goal of individualized sentencing and would unduly interfere with the sentencing discretion vested in our trial courts.” Fern, 189 Ill. 2d at 55 .
This unqualified rejection of a comparative sentencing analysis leaves no doubt that a comparative sentencing approach is improper and may not be used when reviewing the propriety of a defendant’s sentence. 1 Notwithstanding the fact that the ink has yet to dry on this court’s decision in Fern, the majority here has decided that comparative sentencing analysis is not so bad after all, as long as only this court gets to do it. I am unable to join the majority’s decision to engage in an analysis that this court forbids every other court in this state from performing.
That said, I agree with the majority’s conclusion that defendant’s sentence should be affirmed. In reaching this conclusion, I recognize the significant facts that the only evidence the State presented in aggravation arose from acts defendant committed before 1980 and that defendant presented substantial mitigating evidence relating to his behavior since 1980. Nevertheless, these facts were completely presented to the jury. The jury weighed these facts and concluded that the mitigating evidence was not sufficient to preclude the imposition of the death penalty. While I believe that the evidence here was close, I find nothing in the record to justify a reversal of the jury’s decision.
JUSTICE HEIPLE joins in this special concurrence.
But see Fern, 189 Ill. 2d at 65-80 (Rathje, J., dissenting).