holding that sexual intercourse or the promise of sexual intercourse is a "thing of value” under the state bribery statute
How later courts described this case
- holding that sexual intercourse or the promise of sexual intercourse is a "thing of value” under the state bribery statute
- holding that sexual intercourse or the promise of sexual intercourse is a “thing of value” under state bribery statute
- interpreting prior version of bribery statute
- “The test of value is the desire of a person for the thing in question.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
BOOKOUT, Judge
(dissenting):
The indictment charges that appellant, “ . . . did . . . unlawfully and corruptly accept or agree to accept . . . a promise to do an act beneficial to the said Thomas D. McDonald, . . . , to-wit: Sexual intercourse, the promise of sexual intercourse . . . from one . . . Myra Braidfoot Layton, a woman, under an agreement or with an understanding that his act, opinion, decision or judgment would be given in a particular manner, or upon a particular side of a cause, . . . , being a criminal prosecution of said Myra Layton Braidfoot, . . . , charged with Grand Larceny under the laws of the State of Alabama,” and that he “would dismiss or cause to be dismissed, nol-pros or cause to be nol-prossed, reduce or cause to be reduced, continue to cause to be continued, or otherwise dispose of or have disposed of, said criminal prosecution in a manner beneficial to said Myra Layton Braidfoot. . . . ”
Mrs. Braidfoot testified that on her third visit to the Judge’s chambers, “he said if I met him at the King’s Inn we could talk about the situation and maybe take care of it.” She told him she would meet him there. Appellant made no promise or agreement to do anything specifically about the case. He only agreed “to talk about the situation and maybe take care of it.” (Emphasis supplied).
The appellant’s conduct with other women certainly shows pattern, motive, or intent, however, intent alone is insufficient to support the positive averments spelled out in the indictment. The above conversation lacked specificity of action by the appellant as charged in the indictment. On reviewing the evidence, I am unable to find an actual promise or agreement that appellant would dismiss or nol-pros Mrs. Braidfoot’s case in exchange for her favors. He suggested meeting and talking, and although we may believe from his pattern of conduct he would make an illegal proposition, nevertheless, we do not know for he never got to that point.
After considering the application for rehearing, I have sufficient doubt that I now believe the seriousness of the case and charges involved deserve our review on rehearing.