holding “that the Board [validly exercised its legislative discretion] in this matter only after a lengthy deliberation completely consistent with both the procedure called for by the relevant zoning ordinance and the rules prohibiting illegal contract zoning”
How later courts described this case
- holding “that the Board [validly exercised its legislative discretion] in this matter only after a lengthy deliberation completely consistent with both the procedure called for by the relevant zoning ordinance and the rules prohibiting illegal contract zoning”
- addressing conditional rezoning ordinances and stating: " ‘[t]hat which makes for the exclusive and preferential benefit of such particular landowner, with no relation to the community as a whole, is not a valid exercise of [the police power]
- stating that not all spot zoning is illegal
- “[t]he possible ‘factors’ are numerous and flexible, and they exist to provide guidelines for a judicial balancing of interests”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Justice Webb
dissenting.
I join in the dissent of Justice Mitchell and I add a few comments. It appears to me the majority has overruled Blades v. City of Raleigh, 280 N.C. 531 , 187 S.E. 2d 35 (1972) and Allred v. City of Raleigh, 277 N.C. 530 , 178 S.E. 2d 432 (1971). In an attempt to distinguish Blades and Allred from this case the majority goes to some length in explaining the difference between what it says is valid conditional use zoning and illegal contract zoning. The difficulty for me with the majority opinion is that the definitions it uses for conditional use zoning and contract zoning are contrary to the holdings of Blades and Allred .
*642 The majority says:
In our view, therefore, the principal differences between valid conditional use zoning and illegal contract zoning are related and are essentially two in number. First, valid conditional use zoning features merely a unilateral promise from the landowner to the local zoning authority as to the landowner’s intended use of the land in question, while illegal contract zoning anticipates a bilateral contract in which the landowner and the zoning authority make reciprocal promises. Second, in the context of conditional use zoning, the local zoning authority maintains its independent decision-making authority, while in the contract zoning scenario, it abandons that authority by binding itself contractually with the landowner seeking a zoning amendment.
This definition simply does not square with Blades and Allred . The facts in each of those two cases were that a landowner petitioned the City of Raleigh for a change in the zoning ordinance. In each case the landowner submitted plans for the buildings he would construct if the change was made. The City Council in each case rezoned the property as requested by the landowner. This Court in each case held this was illegal contract zoning. There was no more evidence in either case that there was a bilateral contract or any reciprocal promises than there is in this case. There was no more evidence in those cases than there is in this case that the zoning board abandoned its independent decision making authority. In my opinion Blades and Allred are indistinguishable from this case.
I believe that prior to today the rule was that if a person requested a zoning change and submitted plans of the type building he would construct if the change were granted, and the zoning authority made the change based on the promise to construct such a building, that would be contract zoning. We have held contrary to this and in doing so have overruled Blades and Allred .
I vote to affirm the Court of Appeals.
Justice Mitchell joins in this dissenting opinion.