holding “that the Board [validly exercised its legislative discretion] in this matter only after a lengthy deliberation completely consistent with both the procedure called for by the relevant zoning ordinance and the rules prohibiting illegal contract zoning”
How later courts described this case
- holding “that the Board [validly exercised its legislative discretion] in this matter only after a lengthy deliberation completely consistent with both the procedure called for by the relevant zoning ordinance and the rules prohibiting illegal contract zoning”
- addressing conditional rezoning ordinances and stating: " ‘[t]hat which makes for the exclusive and preferential benefit of such particular landowner, with no relation to the community as a whole, is not a valid exercise of [the police power]
- stating that not all spot zoning is illegal
- “[t]he possible ‘factors’ are numerous and flexible, and they exist to provide guidelines for a judicial balancing of interests”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Justice Mitchell
dissenting.
The zoning amendment and conditional use permit in this case amounted to written acceptance by Guilford County of Clapp’s offer — by written application — to use his property only in certain ways. Thus, for reasons fully discussed in the opinion of the Court of Appeals, 85 N.C. App. 211 , 354 S.E. 2d 309 (1987), Guilford County’s actions in the present case also amounted to illegal “contract zoning.” See Blades v. City of Raleigh, 280 N.C. 531 , 187 S.E. 2d 35 (1972); Allred v. City of Raleigh, 277 N.C. 530 , 178 S.E. 2d 432 (1971).
I believe that Guilford County was without authority to engage in any conditional use zoning whatsoever in 1982, the time it did so in the present case. Effective 4 July 1985, the General Assembly amended N.C.G.S. § 153A-342 and N.C.G.S. § 160A-382 to allow cities and counties to establish conditional use districts. 1985 N.C. Sess. Laws ch. 607. Although the act was entitled an act to “make clear” the authority of local governments to establish such districts, I do not believe that the title controls in this case. Courts need refer to the title in construing an act only when the meaning of the act is in doubt. Finance Corp. v. Scheidt, Comr. of Motor Vehicles, 249 N.C. 334 , 106 S.E. 2d 555 (1959). Here, the 1985 act expressly authorizes units of local government *641 to establish conditional use districts upon a petition by the owners of all the property to be included. Prior to that enactment, units of local government did not have such authority. See generally Blades v. City of Raleigh, 280 N.C. 531 , 187 S.E. 2d 35 ; Allred v. City of Raleigh, 277 N.C. 530 , 178 S.E. 2d 432 . Therefore, the action of the General Assembly is fully consistent with the ordinary presumption that, by amending an existing statute, the legislature intended a departure from the old law. See Childers v. Parker’s, Inc., 274 N.C. 256 , 162 S.E. 2d 481 (1968).
The majority cites numerous scholarly authorities in support of its very thorough discussion of social policy arguments in favor of conditional use zoning. Boiled down to their essence, these arguments simply amount to an expression of the majority’s view that the authority to engage in conditional use zoning will give planners and local governing authorities greater flexibility and that such flexibility is very valuable. Beyond question, conditional use zoning authority will give them greater flexibility. Because I believe that the General Assembly had not authorized conditional use zoning at the time in question here, I find it unnecessary to consider whether conditional use zoning gives so much “flexibility” to local planners and governing bodies that they are left free to allow or disapprove specific uses of property in an unconstitutionally arbitrary and unpredictable manner.
For the foregoing reasons, I dissent.
Justice WEBB joins in this dissenting opinion.