The opinion
MORRISON, Judge
(dissenting).
Had these questions been propounded to Sergeant Bessent, I might agree that the defense of entrapment was raised. I do not agree that the issue of Gabriel being an accomplice witness is in this case. When carefully examined, this entire record discloses that Gabriel had been with the police force only a short time and this was his second or third undercover ■ assignment. His duty was to patrol traffic. It was from this duty that he was relieved on the night in question. From this moment forward, his every act was under the direct supervision and direction of Bessent In truth and in fact he went to this “not so new” $3.00 a night motel because Bessent told him to do so. The danger in this opinion lies in the fact that it will be misunderstood by the legal profession and by law enforcement officers. This Court has repeatedly held that where an officer who has reliable in *248 formation which leads him to believe that procuring and prostitution are taking place at a certain location and goes there for the purpose of arresting the offenders, the issue of entrapment i; not raised. Brown v. State, 162 Tex.Cr.R. 85 , 282 S.W.2d 224 , and Cooper v. State, 162 Tex.Cr.R. 624 , 288 S.W.2d 762 . This is exactly what occurred here. Bessent had reasonable ground to believe that prostitution was taking place at the Seven Acres Lodge because he testified he had been “there a number of times observing this same sort of thing.”
Counsel who tried the case did not think, after due reflection, that the issue of entrapment was raised because he did not in his twenty-five page scholarly brief and in his argument before this Court discuss the defense of entrapment.
In the relatively recent case of Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427 , 83 S.Ct. 1381 , 10 L.Ed.2d 462 , the Supreme Court of the United States annotated and discussed the defense of entrapment and held that it was not raised in that case. See also 70 Harvard Law Review 1302.
For the reasons stated, I respectfully dissent.