holding that there was a “sufficient nexus” between a student’s website, on which he made “derogatory, profane, offensive, and threatening” comments about his teacher and correspondingly caused her significant health problems, and the school, so as to bring the speech on-campus, where it then satisfied the applicable Tinker substantial disruption test
How later courts described this case
- holding that there was a “sufficient nexus” between a student’s website, on which he made “derogatory, profane, offensive, and threatening” comments about his teacher and correspondingly caused her significant health problems, and the school, so as to bring the speech on-campus, where it then satisfied the applicable Tinker substantial disruption test
- concluding that offensive student website, although not true threat, caused "actual and substantial disruption of the work of the school," thus permitting school to impose disciplinary action pursuant to Tinker
- holding that responsibility for water damage “cannot lawfully be assigned to appellant” since “it was only the natural flow of excess water produced by the storm which proceeded down through the natural watercourse and caused the damage to appellees’ properties.”
- applying Watts and concluding that middle school student's posting on his " 'Teacher Sux' " web page, which asked "why [the teacher] should die, show[ing] a picture of [the teacher's] head severed from her body and solicit[ed] funds for a hitman," was not true threat but, instead, was "sophomoric [and] degrading" humor when considered in "full context," including comedic and profane references, comparison of teacher to Adolf Hitler, lack of forwarding address for solicitation of "$20 to help pay for the hitman," humorous reaction of viewers, absence of direct communication to teacher, inaction by school officials for "extended time period," and lack of any reason to believe that student had ability to carry out threats
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Abrogated by Commonwealth v. Knox, J., Aplt., 190 A.3d 1146 (2018)
807 A.2d 847, 854 (Pa. 2002) (internal quotations and citation omitted), abrogated by Knox, supra;
The opinion
*677 Justice CASTILLE,
concurring.
I join the majority opinion. I think the question of whether the communications at issue amounted to a “true threat” is a close one, and one that reasonable jurists might disagree about. In light of the totality of the circumstances, including the targeted, violent and solicitous statements here concerning one particular teacher, there is something to be said for Mr. Chief Justice Zappala’s conclusion that the communications “constituted threatening statements which connote a serious expression of intent to inflict harm” which are entirely beyond First Amendment protection. This question, however, is an intensely factual one and, after much reflection, I am satisfied to join in Mr. Justice Cappy’s view of the matter. I do so because Justice Cappy’s analysis of this important question, as well as the question of whether the School District could otherwise punish J.S. for the communications — including Justice Cappy’s exposition of the constitutional standards and considerations that must govern our review — is analytically comprehensive and legally convincing. I also join in the majority opinion because I believe that it is important for this Court to decide eases by clear majority opinion whenever possible, and particularly where, as here, the case is heard upon discretionary appeal. See U.S. Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391 ,---, 122 S.Ct. 1516, 1526-27 , 152 L.Ed.2d 589 (2002) (O’Connor, J., concurring).