holding that there was a “sufficient nexus” between a student’s website, on which he made “derogatory, profane, offensive, and threatening” comments about his teacher and correspondingly caused her significant health problems, and the school, so as to bring the speech on-campus, where it then satisfied the applicable Tinker substantial disruption test
How later courts described this case
- holding that there was a “sufficient nexus” between a student’s website, on which he made “derogatory, profane, offensive, and threatening” comments about his teacher and correspondingly caused her significant health problems, and the school, so as to bring the speech on-campus, where it then satisfied the applicable Tinker substantial disruption test
- concluding that offensive student website, although not true threat, caused "actual and substantial disruption of the work of the school," thus permitting school to impose disciplinary action pursuant to Tinker
- holding that responsibility for water damage “cannot lawfully be assigned to appellant” since “it was only the natural flow of excess water produced by the storm which proceeded down through the natural watercourse and caused the damage to appellees’ properties.”
- applying Watts and concluding that middle school student's posting on his " 'Teacher Sux' " web page, which asked "why [the teacher] should die, show[ing] a picture of [the teacher's] head severed from her body and solicit[ed] funds for a hitman," was not true threat but, instead, was "sophomoric [and] degrading" humor when considered in "full context," including comedic and profane references, comparison of teacher to Adolf Hitler, lack of forwarding address for solicitation of "$20 to help pay for the hitman," humorous reaction of viewers, absence of direct communication to teacher, inaction by school officials for "extended time period," and lack of any reason to believe that student had ability to carry out threats
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Abrogated by Commonwealth v. Knox, J., Aplt., 190 A.3d 1146 (2018)
807 A.2d 847, 854 (Pa. 2002) (internal quotations and citation omitted), abrogated by Knox, supra;
The opinion
Chief Justice ZAPPALA,
concurring.
I agree with the majority that the disciplinary action taken by Bethlehem Area School District against J.S. did not violate his first amendment right to freedom of speech. I therefore join the majority in affirming the order of the Commonwealth Court. I write separately, however, to note my disagreement with several issues addressed by the majority.
Because the United States Supreme Court has given little guidance since rendering its decision in Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705 , 89 S.Ct. 1399 , 22 L.Ed.2d 664 (1969), in terms of a standard to determine what constitutes a “true threat,” I join the majority in relying on Lovell By and Through Lovell v. Poway Unified School District, 90 F.3d 367 (9th Cir.1996), and In the Interest of A.S., 243 Wis.2d 173 , 626 N.W.2d 712 (2001), for supplying a standard to adjudge whether certain speech falls within the definition of “true threat,” that is, “if the communication is a serious expression of intent to inflict harm.” Majority op. at 858. I cannot, however, agree with the majority that the statements made by J.S. on *676 the web site at issue fail to satisfy this standard. In my opinion, in light of the totality of the circumstances here, the statements at issue (as summarized in the majority opinion at pp. 851-52 and 858) constitute threatening statements which connote a serious expression of intent to inflict harm and are therefore beyond first amendment protection. As such, the statements provided an ample basis for Bethlehem Area School District to determine that J.S. violated school district policy by committing the Level III infraction of “threat to a teacher.”
The majority goes on to conclude that although the statements made by J.S. on the web site at issue did not constitute a “true threat,” the web site did create “an actual and substantial interference with the work of the school to a magnitude that satisfies the requirements of Tinker [v. Des Moines Independent Community School District, 393 U.S. 503 , 89 S.Ct. 733 , 21 L.Ed.2d 731 (1969)].” Majority op. at 869. I agree with the majority’s application of Tinker and the majority’s ultimate conclusion. However, in the course of reaching this conclusion the majority “hold[s] that where speech that is aimed at a specific school and/or its personnel is brought onto the school campus or accessed at school by its originator, the speech will be considered on-campus speech.” Majority op. at 865 (emphasis added). I believe this holding is overly broad and unnecessary to the resolution of this case.
As the majority aptly points out, J.S. “facilitated the on-campus nature of the speech by accessing the web site on a school computer in a classroom, showing the site to another student, and by informing other students at school of the existence of the web site.” Id. at 865. In my view, these factors alone support the characterization of the speech as on-campus speech. However, the fact that a web site is merely accessed at school by its originator is an insufficient basis upon which to base a characterization of the speech as on-campus speech.
Accordingly, I concur in the result.
Justice NIGRO joins this concurring opinion.