holding that, claimant entitled to benefits even though she could perform time-of-injury job and was symptom free because continued employment would place her at risk of serious injury from blood clot caused by original work injury
How later courts described this case
- holding that, claimant entitled to benefits even though she could perform time-of-injury job and was symptom free because continued employment would place her at risk of serious injury from blood clot caused by original work injury
- noting that a medical witness’s entire testimony must be reviewed and taken as a whole and a final decision should not rest upon words taken out of context of the entire testimony
- claimant entitled to workers’ compensation benefits even though she was physically capable of performing time-of-injury job and did not currently display symptoms, where continued employment placed her at risk of serious or fatal injury resulting from blood clot caused by original injury
- unequivocal medical testimony established that claimant “should never return to work as a screen-maker, and that to do so would be like playing Russian Roulette”
Written by the judges who cited it.
Distinguished
Distinguished by Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board, 550 Pa. 658 (1998)
Farquhar is distinguishable from this case because it is undisputed that Baxter’s asthma was a pre-existing condition and was not directly caused by his employment.
Distinguished by Cyclops Corporation/Sawhill Tubular Division v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board, 158 Pa. Commw. 595 (1993)
Employer argues that our Supreme Court’s decisions in Pawlosky and Farguhar are inapplicable to the instant case, because neither testifying physician presented an unequivocal opinion that claimant’s return to work would aggravate his lung condition.
The opinion
HUTCHINSON, Justice,
concurring.
I concur in the result. I also note my general agreement with the rationale by which Mr. Justice Larsen concludes that the authorities below erred in denying benefits. However, I believe footnote 3, slip op. at 15, Opinion Announcing the Judgment of the Court, is unnecessary to that rationale and I disassociate myself from it for the reasons set forth in my dissenting opinion in Pawlosky v. W.C.A.B., 514 Pa. 450 , 525 A.2d 1204 (1987).