holding that, claimant entitled to benefits even though she could perform time-of-injury job and was symptom free because continued employment would place her at risk of serious injury from blood clot caused by original work injury
How later courts described this case
- holding that, claimant entitled to benefits even though she could perform time-of-injury job and was symptom free because continued employment would place her at risk of serious injury from blood clot caused by original work injury
- noting that a medical witness’s entire testimony must be reviewed and taken as a whole and a final decision should not rest upon words taken out of context of the entire testimony
- claimant entitled to workers’ compensation benefits even though she was physically capable of performing time-of-injury job and did not currently display symptoms, where continued employment placed her at risk of serious or fatal injury resulting from blood clot caused by original injury
- unequivocal medical testimony established that claimant “should never return to work as a screen-maker, and that to do so would be like playing Russian Roulette”
Written by the judges who cited it.
Distinguished
Distinguished by Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board, 550 Pa. 658 (1998)
Farquhar is distinguishable from this case because it is undisputed that Baxter’s asthma was a pre-existing condition and was not directly caused by his employment.
Distinguished by Cyclops Corporation/Sawhill Tubular Division v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board, 158 Pa. Commw. 595 (1993)
Employer argues that our Supreme Court’s decisions in Pawlosky and Farguhar are inapplicable to the instant case, because neither testifying physician presented an unequivocal opinion that claimant’s return to work would aggravate his lung condition.
The opinion
NIX, Chief Justice,
concurring.
My reading of this record satisfies me that the medical testimony establishes that Ms. Farquhar did not, prior to her employment as a screen-maker, possess a physiologic propensity that caused the thrombosis, but rather the condition resulted from her activities while engaged in that *334 employment. I therefore agree that she is entitled to benefits because her present susceptibility to blood clots results from her former employment and the employer made no attempt to establish the availability of other suitable work accessible to appellant.
I also agree that section 440 of the Workmen’s Compensation Act, 77 P.S. § 996 (Supp.1986), is here applicable; and I therefore join in the mandate of the Court.