holding that, claimant entitled to benefits even though she could perform time-of-injury job and was symptom free because continued employment would place her at risk of serious injury from blood clot caused by original work injury
How later courts described this case
- holding that, claimant entitled to benefits even though she could perform time-of-injury job and was symptom free because continued employment would place her at risk of serious injury from blood clot caused by original work injury
- noting that a medical witness’s entire testimony must be reviewed and taken as a whole and a final decision should not rest upon words taken out of context of the entire testimony
- claimant entitled to workers’ compensation benefits even though she was physically capable of performing time-of-injury job and did not currently display symptoms, where continued employment placed her at risk of serious or fatal injury resulting from blood clot caused by original injury
- unequivocal medical testimony established that claimant “should never return to work as a screen-maker, and that to do so would be like playing Russian Roulette”
Written by the judges who cited it.
Distinguished
Distinguished by Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board, 550 Pa. 658 (1998)
Farquhar is distinguishable from this case because it is undisputed that Baxter’s asthma was a pre-existing condition and was not directly caused by his employment.
Distinguished by Cyclops Corporation/Sawhill Tubular Division v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board, 158 Pa. Commw. 595 (1993)
Employer argues that our Supreme Court’s decisions in Pawlosky and Farguhar are inapplicable to the instant case, because neither testifying physician presented an unequivocal opinion that claimant’s return to work would aggravate his lung condition.
The opinion
*333 FLAHERTY, Justice,
concurring and dissenting.
I agree that appellant-claimant’s workmen’s compensation benefits should, on this record, be reinstated. Thus, I concur in the mandate of reversal and remand for entry of an appropriate order. I would not however, remand for a determination of the reasonableness of appellee’s contest of the matter. The reasonableness of the contest is a question of law, Herre Bros., Inc. v. W.C.A.B. (Mumma), 75 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 499, 502 , 462 A.2d 907, 908 (1983); Hartman v. W.C.A.B., 17 Commonwealth Ct. 609, 614, 333 A.2d 819, 822 (1975); and certainly one which we are competent to determine on appeal.
Although, in my view, the record is adequate to determine, as a matter of law, the reasonableness of the contest, as all the lower tribunals had before them the same deposition testimony and all interpreted it in the same fashion and favorably to appellee, and this supplies an adequate basis to conclude that appellee’s persistent refusal to pay compensation, though ultimately determined to have been erroneous, was neither capricious nor, in the language of Section 440, 77 P.S. § 996, “unreasonable,” Section 440 does seem to provide that, even where a reasonable basis for the contest is established, a successful claimant may be awarded attorney’s fees. This award is in the sound discretion of the referee. As this is the first stage of the proceedings where claimant has prevailed, and the referee has not previously had a chance to consider the propriety of an award of attorney’s fees, I would, thus, remand to the referee for a prompt determination of this question.
ZAPPALA and PAPADAKOS, JJ., join this concurring and dissenting opinion.