stating that the firefighter's rule "insulates a defendant from liability for injuries arising out of the inherent dangers of the profession" of a safety officer and determining that "inherent dangers" include "alleged negligence relating to the condition of the premises"
How later courts described this case
- stating that the firefighter's rule "insulates a defendant from liability for injuries arising out of the inherent dangers of the profession" of a safety officer and determining that "inherent dangers" include "alleged negligence relating to the condition of the premises"
- recognizing exceptional cases, such as those involving willful misconduct, in which courts have refused to apply firefighter's rule to bar action; similarly adopting flexible approach to address "different fact patterns as they are presented"
- applying the firemen's rule to bar a tort lawsuit arising from injury sustained by a police officer in a public street
- stating that the rule premised liability on the basis of traditional status categories of entrants upon property of another
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Superseded by statute, as recognized in Lego v. Liss
429 Mich. 347 , 365, 415 N.W.2d 178 (1987) ("While we find that primary assumption of a risk is still viable in Michigan, we decline to adopt the fireman's rule on the basis of the doctrine. However, we do not do so for the reason argued by plaintiff-the lack of direct employment relationship between taxpayers and fire fighters. The public policy rationales advanced in favor of the rule are more than sufficient to su…
The opinion
Cavanagh, J.
(concurring in part and dissenting in part). I join in the majority opinion for the reasons expressed in Justice Archer’s concurrence, but only to the extent that the adoption of the fireman’s rule in Michigan applies to owners and occupiers of the premises in question. I dissent *381 from the majority’s extension of the fireman’s rule to defendants, such as Detroit Edison in Kreski v Modern Wholesale, who are not owners or occupiers of the premises. The adoption of the rule is primarily based on the concern that it is unreasonable to require landowners or occupiers to prepare their premises for the arrival of fire fighters and police officers, whose need and appearance is usually unpredictable. This and other policy considerations which justify protecting landowners and occupiers from liability are absent when considering independent negligent causes. I would thus affirm the trial court’s denial of Detroit Edison’s motion for summary judgment in Kreski, supra.