Opinion

Kreski v. Modern Wholesale Electric Supply Co.

  • 429 Mich. 347
  • 415 N.W.2d 178
Court
Michigan Supreme Court
Filed
Nov 13, 1987
Status
Published
Author
Archer
On the bench
Boyle, Cavanagh, Levin, Brickley, Archer, Griffin, Riley
Cited by
90 cases

Superseded by statute, as recognized in Lego v. Liss

stating that the firefighter's rule "insulates a defendant from liability for injuries arising out of the inherent dangers of the profession" of a safety officer and determining that "inherent dangers" include "alleged negligence relating to the condition of the premises"

How later courts described this case

  • stating that the firefighter's rule "insulates a defendant from liability for injuries arising out of the inherent dangers of the profession" of a safety officer and determining that "inherent dangers" include "alleged negligence relating to the condition of the premises"
  • recognizing exceptional cases, such as those involving willful misconduct, in which courts have refused to apply firefighter's rule to bar action; similarly adopting flexible approach to address "different fact patterns as they are presented"
  • applying the firemen's rule to bar a tort lawsuit arising from injury sustained by a police officer in a public street
  • stating that the rule premised liability on the basis of traditional status categories of entrants upon property of another

Written by the judges who cited it.

Later courts went against this

  • Superseded by statute, as recognized in Lego v. Liss

    429 Mich. 347 , 365, 415 N.W.2d 178 (1987) ("While we find that primary assumption of a risk is still viable in Michigan, we decline to adopt the fireman's rule on the basis of the doctrine. However, we do not do so for the reason argued by plaintiff-the lack of direct employment relationship between taxpayers and fire fighters. The public policy rationales advanced in favor of the rule are more than sufficient to su…
    Michigan Supreme CourtJan 4, 2016by statutemedium confidenceRead it

The opinion

Archer, J.

(concurring). I signed the majority opinion and concur because it does not foreclose fire fighters and police officers from bringing a cause of action which includes but is not limited to *380 allegations of wrongdoing or negligence after they are on the scene; alleged negligence rising to the level of wilful, wanton, or intentional misconduct; a situation in which injuries occurred when the buildings were open to the public for business; allegations that the owners misled the plaintiffs regarding the condition of the buildings or the nature of the activities carried on inside; allegations that defendants had a present ability to warn of dangers on the premises; or allegations that defendants intentionally set a fire or that the fire was a product of an illegal activity. See ante, p 371.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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