stating that the firefighter's rule "insulates a defendant from liability for injuries arising out of the inherent dangers of the profession" of a safety officer and determining that "inherent dangers" include "alleged negligence relating to the condition of the premises"
How later courts described this case
- stating that the firefighter's rule "insulates a defendant from liability for injuries arising out of the inherent dangers of the profession" of a safety officer and determining that "inherent dangers" include "alleged negligence relating to the condition of the premises"
- recognizing exceptional cases, such as those involving willful misconduct, in which courts have refused to apply firefighter's rule to bar action; similarly adopting flexible approach to address "different fact patterns as they are presented"
- applying the firemen's rule to bar a tort lawsuit arising from injury sustained by a police officer in a public street
- stating that the rule premised liability on the basis of traditional status categories of entrants upon property of another
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Superseded by statute, as recognized in Lego v. Liss
429 Mich. 347 , 365, 415 N.W.2d 178 (1987) ("While we find that primary assumption of a risk is still viable in Michigan, we decline to adopt the fireman's rule on the basis of the doctrine. However, we do not do so for the reason argued by plaintiff-the lack of direct employment relationship between taxpayers and fire fighters. The public policy rationales advanced in favor of the rule are more than sufficient to su…
The opinion
Boyle, J.
(concurring in part and dissenting in part). I agree with the rationale and result in Kreski v Modern Wholesale Electric. I do not agree, however, that a concealed trap door is, as a matter of law, a "normal, inherent, and foreseeable risk[ ] of the chosen profession.” (Ante, p 372.) Nor can I agree, as a matter of law, that in these circumstances, the defendant owed no duty to the plaintiff. The questions of defendant’s knowledge of the danger and opportunity to warn, Clark v Corby, 75 Wis 2d 292 ; 249 NW2d 567 (1977), are essentially factual matters. Because I am not convinced on this record that amendment of the complaint would be futile, Ben P Fyke & Sons v Gunter Co, 390 Mich 649 , 213 NW2d 134 (1973), I would remand to the trial court for further proceedings.