noting that while section 109– 1(a) “requires that an arrestee be presented to a judge ‘without unnecessary delay,’ noncompliance therewith does not, by itself, obviate a confession or render an otherwise voluntary confession inadmissible at trial. Rather, such delay is merely a factor to be considered on the question of voluntariness.”
How later courts described this case
- noting that while section 109– 1(a) “requires that an arrestee be presented to a judge ‘without unnecessary delay,’ noncompliance therewith does not, by itself, obviate a confession or render an otherwise voluntary confession inadmissible at trial. Rather, such delay is merely a factor to be considered on the question of voluntariness.”
- “a delay of 24 to 36 hours prior to presentment is usually not considered to be unnecessary”
- Aa delay of 24 to 36 hours prior to presentment is usually not considered to be unnecessary"
- “[T]his court has recognized that ‘a history of substance abuse is a double-edged sword at the aggravation/mitigation phase of the penalty -9- No. 1-18-0621 hearing.’ ”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
JUSTICE KILBRIDE, also dissenting:
For the reasons set forth in my dissents in People v. Hickey, 204 Ill. 2d 585, 636-39 (2001) (Kilbride, J., dissenting), and People v. Simpson, 204 Ill. 2d 536, 581-85 (2001) (Kilbride, J., dissenting), defendant’s convictions and sentence should be set aside because the trial proceedings were not conducted in accordance with the new supreme court rules governing capital cases. The procedures in capital cases prior to this court’s adoption of the new rules were unreliable and did not adequately protect a defendant’s constitutional rights. Consequently, since the new rules were promulgated to address the deficiencies of constitutional dimension that regularly occurred under the old system, the rules must be applied retroactively to all capital cases currently pending on direct appeal. See People v. Hudson, 195 Ill. 2d 117, 126 (2001), citing Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 328 , 93 L. Ed. 2d 649, 661 , 107 S. Ct. 708, 716 (1987). For those reasons, I respectfully dissent.