noting that while section 109– 1(a) “requires that an arrestee be presented to a judge ‘without unnecessary delay,’ noncompliance therewith does not, by itself, obviate a confession or render an otherwise voluntary confession inadmissible at trial. Rather, such delay is merely a factor to be considered on the question of voluntariness.”
How later courts described this case
- noting that while section 109– 1(a) “requires that an arrestee be presented to a judge ‘without unnecessary delay,’ noncompliance therewith does not, by itself, obviate a confession or render an otherwise voluntary confession inadmissible at trial. Rather, such delay is merely a factor to be considered on the question of voluntariness.”
- “a delay of 24 to 36 hours prior to presentment is usually not considered to be unnecessary”
- Aa delay of 24 to 36 hours prior to presentment is usually not considered to be unnecessary"
- “[T]his court has recognized that ‘a history of substance abuse is a double-edged sword at the aggravation/mitigation phase of the penalty -9- No. 1-18-0621 hearing.’ ”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
CHIEF JUSTICE HARRISON, dissenting:
The proceedings which culminated in Ballard’s convictions and sentence of death were fatally flawed because they did not comport with the new rules enacted by our court governing the conduct of cases in which the State is seeking the death penalty. For the reasons set forth in my dissenting opinion in People v. Hickey, 204 Ill. 2d 585, 631-36 (2001) (Harrison, C.J., dissenting), the procedures contained in those rules are indispensable for achieving an accurate determination of innocence or guilt and are applicable to all capital cases now coming before us. Because Ballard was tried, convicted and sentenced without the benefit of the new rules, his convictions and death sentence should be vacated, and the cause should be remanded to the circuit court for a new trial.
Even if Ballard were not entitled to the benefit of the new rules, his sentence of death could not stand. For the reasons set forth in my partial concurrence and partial dissent in People v. Bull, 185 Ill. 2d 179 (1998), the Illinois death penalty law is void and unenforceable because it violates the eighth and fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution (U.S. Const., amends. VIII, XIV) and article I, section 2, of the Illinois Constitution (111. Const. 1970, art. I, § 2). Absent the new rules, there is no basis for altering that conclusion. At a minimum, Ballard’s sentence of death should therefore be vacated, and he should be sentenced to a term of imprisonment. 720 ILCS 5/9 — l(j) (West 1996).