stating that “the reason for revocation of probation need not necessarily be the commission of or conviction for subsequent criminal conduct. Rather, … [a] probation violation is established whenever it is shown that the conduct of the probationer indicates the probation has proven to have been an ineffective vehicle to accomplish rehabilitation and not sufficient to deter against future antisocial conduct.” (citation omitted)
How later courts described this case
- stating that “the reason for revocation of probation need not necessarily be the commission of or conviction for subsequent criminal conduct. Rather, … [a] probation violation is established whenever it is shown that the conduct of the probationer indicates the probation has proven to have been an ineffective vehicle to accomplish rehabilitation and not sufficient to deter against future antisocial conduct.” (citation omitted)
- holding that '<the scope of review in an appeal following a sentence imposed after probation revocation is limited to the validity of the revocation proceedings and the legality of the sentence imposed following revocation"
- stating that “Superior Court has recognized on numerous occasions that, ‘an implied condition of any sentence of probation is that the defendant will not commit a further offense.’”
- discussing appellate jurisdiction over an argument that a sentencing court lacked the authority to revoke probation and impose a new sentence
Written by the judges who cited it.
Distinguished
Distinguished by Commonwealth v. Mazzetti, 615 Pa. 555 (2012)
The trial court explained that the cases relied upon by the Commonwealth, Commonwealth v. Johnson, 967 A.2d 1001 (Pa.Super.2009), and Commonwealth v. Infante, 585 Pa. 408, 888 A.2d 783 (2005), were inapposite.
The opinion
Chief Justice CAPPY,
dissenting.
The Majority endorses the decision of the trial court to “re-revoke” Appellee’s probation based on what the Majority classifies as a contingency arising from the trial court’s decision to treat Appellee with leniency regarding the possible outcome of pending criminal charges. (Majority opinion at p. 423-25, 888 A.2d 783, 793 ). As I cannot accept this depiction of the trial court’s actions in this case and because I do not agree that the trial court has the option to “re-revoke” probation, I am compelled to dissent.
A finding of a probation violation is warranted when the evidence shows that probation is not an effective means of rehabilitation or deterrence of future antisocial conduct. Commonwealth v. Kates, 452 Pa. 102 , 305 A.2d 701, 708 (1973). The focus at the violation hearing is on the conduct of the probationer. The resolution of any pending charges that might have prompted a violation hearing is not necessary to the issue of revocation. Id. at 711. In situations where a probationer feces a violation hearing because of new charges, the trial court has two options: to conduct the hearing before or after the new charges are resolved. Kates , at 709; Commonwealth v. Burrell, 497 Pa. 367 , 441 A.2d 744, 745 (1982). What a trial court cannot do, however, is, as here, have it both ways.
*428 Probation is appropriate where the probationer and society can both benefit and inappropriate when the probationer reveals that his or her conduct has not reformed and society faces new threats from continued exposure to the probationer. That is why a trial court has the authority to revoke probation when the conduct of the probationer necessitates immediate action without the need to await resolution of pending charges. Those same considerations can, in other cases, justify waiting for resolution of new charges where the conduct of the probationer has not created a need for immediate action. There is no justification, nor authority, for a trial judge to “re-revoke” probation after a conviction stemming from conduct known to the trial court at the prior revocation hearing. To endorse the trial court’s actions in this case would subject a probationary defendant to multiple revocations based upon the identical conduct.
Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.
Justice NIGRO joins this dissenting opinion.