stating that “the reason for revocation of probation need not necessarily be the commission of or conviction for subsequent criminal conduct. Rather, … [a] probation violation is established whenever it is shown that the conduct of the probationer indicates the probation has proven to have been an ineffective vehicle to accomplish rehabilitation and not sufficient to deter against future antisocial conduct.” (citation omitted)
How later courts described this case
- stating that “the reason for revocation of probation need not necessarily be the commission of or conviction for subsequent criminal conduct. Rather, … [a] probation violation is established whenever it is shown that the conduct of the probationer indicates the probation has proven to have been an ineffective vehicle to accomplish rehabilitation and not sufficient to deter against future antisocial conduct.” (citation omitted)
- holding that '<the scope of review in an appeal following a sentence imposed after probation revocation is limited to the validity of the revocation proceedings and the legality of the sentence imposed following revocation"
- stating that “Superior Court has recognized on numerous occasions that, ‘an implied condition of any sentence of probation is that the defendant will not commit a further offense.’”
- discussing appellate jurisdiction over an argument that a sentencing court lacked the authority to revoke probation and impose a new sentence
Written by the judges who cited it.
Distinguished
Distinguished by Commonwealth v. Mazzetti, 615 Pa. 555 (2012)
The trial court explained that the cases relied upon by the Commonwealth, Commonwealth v. Johnson, 967 A.2d 1001 (Pa.Super.2009), and Commonwealth v. Infante, 585 Pa. 408, 888 A.2d 783 (2005), were inapposite.
The opinion
Justice SAYLOR,
concurring.
I join the majority opinion, subject only to a reservation concerning the passage suggesting that the sentencing court could have revoked Appellee’s probation and imposed a maximum sentence based on the mere fact of Appellee’s having been arrested and charged with new crimes. See Majority Opinion, at 423-25, 888 A.2d at 793. In this regard, I tend toward the view that the fact of an arrest and new charges should not be deemed sufficient in and of itself to support revocation. Accord Commonwealth v. Sims, 770 A.2d 346, 352 (Pa.Super.2001); see generally Johnson v. State, 62 Md.App. 548 , 490 A.2d 734, 736-37 (1985) (collecting cases). 1 I join the *427 majority disposition not so much because I view the sentencing court’s approach as an act of lenity, 2 but rather, because I find nothing in the governing statutory scheme to prevent the approach as an orderly manner of addressing multiple acts that are in violation of the terms governing a probationer’s release.
. Indeed, a number of jurisdictions have couched revocation on such limited grounds as a due process violation. See, e.g., State v. Kidwell, *427 1995 WL 68164 (Ohio App. Feb. 16, 1995); Wright v. State, 640 S.W.2d 265, 269 (Tex.Crim.App.1982).
. In this regard, I also have difficulty with the majority’s indication that the maximum sentence was imposable based on technical violations. While this may be true in the abstract, there are limits to the sentencing court’s discretion, and, as applied to the circumstances of individual technical probation violations, it may be an abuse of discretion to impose a maximum sentence.